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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
The three essays in this dissertation examine issues related to corporate 
governance, investment, and financing decisions. 
In the first essay, I analyze the consequences of CEO succession on board 
composition. I show that existing independent directors with no social ties to a 
succeeding CEO are more likely to depart from the board after the succeeding CEO takes 
charge. Compared to exiting independent directors, newly hired independent directors are 
more likely to be socially connected to the succeeding CEO. The effect of CEO-director 
social ties on independent director turnover is more pronounced when a succeeding CEO 
is hired into an under-performing or into a poorly governed firm, and thus is likely to 
have greater bargaining power over the board. In addition, strong external governance, as 
measured by the level of industry competition and the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOX), reduces a CEO’s influence on director selection. Finally, an increase in board 
social dependence is detrimental to firm value when the firm’s need for board advising is 
low. The results provide new insights into the consequences of CEO succession and shed 
light on the within-firm evolution of board composition. 
The second essay is coauthored with E. Han Kim at the University of Michigan. 
In the second essay, we study how the status of U.S. universities and the demand for U.S. 
education in foreign markets jointly determine U.S. universities’ investments in overseas 
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degree programs. We show two waves of overseas programs offered by U.S. universities: 
A supply driven wave in the late 1980s to the mid 1990s and a current wave beginning in 
the early 2000s, with distinctly different players. We compile a comprehensive dataset on 
overseas degree programs and host country characteristics. We find that universities 
behave much like multinational corporations when they make investments overseas. 
Finance plays an important role. Real GDP per capita and tertiary school age population 
are two key determinants of the location choice. Asia and the Middle East are popular 
destinations for U.S. overseas programs, driven by market size and oil money, 
respectively. We also find that U.S. universities offer lower tuition discounts in countries 
with higher real GDP per capita. Undergraduate degree programs are discounted more 
than master degree programs because of greater local competition. Last, when 
universities reduce costs through partnerships with local universities or through financial 
support from local governments, the savings are not passed on to local students in the 
form of lower tuition. 
The third essay is coauthored with Cong Wang at Chinese University of Hong 
Kong and Fei Xie at George Mason University. In the third essay, we examine the impact 
of reputation on contracting outcomes in the equity market. We show that firms with past 
earnings restatements are subject to large reputational penalties when contracting with 
investment banks in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Specifically, we find that firms 
that restate due to accounting irregularities subsequently pay higher underwriting fees 
(about 10-20% in relative terms or 50-100 basis points in absolute terms). The effect of 
restatements on underwriting fees is more pronounced for larger offerings and offerings 
in the first few years after restatements, and lessens as restatement firms make corporate 
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governance improvements. We also find that restatement firms employ more lead 
underwriters, form larger syndicates, and are less likely to use the faster and cheaper 
accelerated underwriting method than the traditional book building process. Overall, our 
evidence supports the hypothesis that financial misrepresentation tarnishes a firm’s 
reputation and increases its contracting costs when accessing the equity market, but 
subsequent corporate governance improvements can mitigate this adverse consequence.
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Chapter II 
The Consequences of CEO Succession on Board Composition 
 
II.1. Introduction  
 CEO succession has long been a subject of interest to financial economists, as a 
change in CEO is often associated with substantial organizational change (Gabarro 
(1987)). A large body of literature has sought to evaluate how CEO succession affects 
subsequent firm strategic changes (Weisbach (1995)), personnel changes (Helmich and 
Brown (1972), Fee and Hadlock (2004), and Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer (2006)), and 
operating performance improvement (Denis and Denis (1995)). However, little attention 
has been paid to how CEO succession affects board composition despite the fact that 
previous studies document a high incidence of outside director turnover following CEO 
succession (Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Denis and Sarin (1999), Yermack (2004), 
and Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010)). In this paper, I explore one aspect, CEO-
director connections, to explain the likelihood of director departure/addition during the 
years following CEO succession, and the subsequent shareholder value consequences of 
such changes on the board. I present some first evidence on the causes and consequences 
of director turnover following CEO succession, in order to shed light on the dynamic 
CEO-board relationship within a firm. 
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that CEO-director connections affect how new 
CEOs reshape their boards. For instance, five months after Jamie Dimon took over as the 
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CEO of Bank One Corporation in 2000, five out of seventeen outside directors1 retired 
from the board of Bank One. Although the company announced that the five directors 
retired voluntarily, public media speculated that these directors left under pressure from 
the new CEO, Mr. Dimon. Two months later, Dimon convinced the board to hire two 
new outside directors: one, a former co-worker at Citigroup; the other, a fellow board 
member of Tricon.2  Since a new CEO may not be as powerful as an established CEO, it 
is surprising that a new CEO has such immediate power when little is known about his 
ability to manage the firm. Is Dimon an exception, or are all new CEOs able to influence 
director selection? If new CEOs are able to influence board composition shortly after 
installation, do they vary in their abilities to do so? And what are the consequences of 
independent director turnover? Answering these questions will offer insight into how 
much influence a CEO can have on the within-firm evolution of board composition and 
shed light on the effectiveness of recent corporate governance reforms aimed at ensuring 
board independence and at strengthening board monitoring.3  
 I begin my study with an examination of independent director departure during 
the first year of a new CEO’s tenure. Several studies document a high incidence of 
outside director departure following CEO succession (Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), 
Denis and Sarin (1999), Ward, Bishop and Sonnenfeld (1999), Yermack (2004), Farrell 
and Whidbee (2000), and Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010)). Whether a new CEO 
affects board composition, however, remains unclear. I use social ties, based on common 
                                                 
1I use “independent directors” and “outside directors” interchangeably in this paper to refer to directors 
who are legally independent. Legally independent directors are directors who have neither business 
relations with the firm nor any personal relations with the firm’s management team. 
2 For a detailed description of the board restructuring event, see Khurana (2002). 
3 For a summary of recent regulatory changes and regulatory definitions of independent directors, see 
Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2009). 
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social activities, educational background, and employment, to measure the relationship 
between an independent director and a new CEO. Since individuals who share similar 
experiences are more likely to develop mutual trust and support (Westphal and Zajac 
(1995)), a new CEO is likely to encourage independent directors with whom he is not 
connected to leave the board in order to enhance the board’s support of his proposals. 
One potential concern with my independent director departure analysis is that existing 
independent directors who lack social connections to a new CEO may voluntarily depart, 
because they feel less inclined to serve with a new CEO that they do not know well. A 
negative relationship between CEO-director social ties and the likelihood of director 
departure, therefore, may not reflect the CEO’s influence over board members. If an 
incoming CEO is able to influence board composition, he is not only likely to influence 
the departure of existing directors, but also the addition of new directors. More 
specifically, an incoming CEO is more likely to select independent directors who are 
socially connected to him to replace former independent directors who lack social ties to 
him. 
 I further examine whether new CEOs differ in their abilities to bargain for 
friendly boards.4 Board composition is often viewed as a bargaining outcome between a 
CEO and the incumbent directors (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)) and a powerful CEO 
has greater influence over board member selection (Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), 
Westphal and Zajac (1995), and Fracassi and Tate (2009)). When a new CEO takes 
charge, he inherits the board of his predecessor; a board that is less likely to be 
susceptible to his personal influence (Wade, O'Reilly and Chandratat (1990), Core, 
                                                 
4 A “friendly board” refers to a board with a high percentage of directors who are legally independent, but 
nevertheless socially connected to the CEO. 
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Holthausen and Larcker (1999), and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2007)). However, a new 
CEO may have significant bargaining power over the incumbent board with respect to 
director selections, especially when he is hired into an underperforming firm to initiate 
substantial organizational changes as a “corporate savior” (Khurana (2002)). This new 
CEO may have such broad latitude because of the perception that he is especially 
competent to initiate strategic changes within the firm. Moreover, while current 
independent directors may possess valuable firm-specific knowledge, new independent 
directors typically bring with them understandings of alternative technologies and 
managerial practices used by other firms, which may facilitate organizational change 
during a transition in leadership. The need for strategic changes, then, offers the new 
CEO a legitimate reason to initiate changes in the boardroom. I use firm operating 
performance prior to CEO succession to measure the level of organizational change a 
firm needs. Poor firm performance is often followed by CEO dismissals and outside CEO 
successions. I expect the relationship between CEO-director social ties and independent 
director turnover to be more pronounced when a firm is underperforming and faces an 
urgent need for organizational change. 
 I then examine whether good internal and external governance can reduce a 
CEO’s influence on director selections. I use the percentage of truly independent 
directors5 on the board prior to CEO turnover to measure internal governance, and use the 
level of industry competition and the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) as 
proxies for external governance. I expect good governance to mitigate the positive 
relationship between CEO-director social ties and independent director addition. 
                                                 
5 Truly independent directors are directors who are legally independent and are not socially connected to 
the CEO. 
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 Last, I examine whether shareholders benefit from changes in independent 
directors. Recent literature emphasizes both the monitoring and advising roles played by 
independent directors (Adams and Ferreira (2007), Adams (2009), and Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2010)). While social ties between a CEO and independent directors can 
enhance a board’s advising effectiveness since a CEO is more willing to share 
information with and seek advice from a friendly board, it is unclear whether 
shareholders capture the benefits from the enhanced boardroom collaboration since CEO-
board connections may also compromise the monitoring effectiveness of the board. I 
directly test the impact of board social dependence6 on firm value. 
 Specifically, I collect a sample of 1,489 CEO succession events between 2000 and 
2007. I focus on heterogeneity at the director level, analyzing who left the board and who 
were appointed to the board during the first year of a CEO’s tenure. I find that incumbent 
independent directors who lack connections to the succeeding CEO are significantly 
more likely to depart after the new CEO takes charge. And, as expected, compared to 
exiting independent directors, new independent directors are more likely to share prior 
connections with the succeeding CEO. Further analysis reveals that the impact of CEO-
director social ties on independent director turnover is more pronounced when a firm is 
underperforming or when a firm has a lower percentage of truly independent directors on 
the board prior to CEO turnover. In addition, a new CEO’s influence over director 
selection is primarily concentrated in non-competitive industries and in the years prior to 
the passage of SOX. Last, an increase in a board’s social dependence is also associated 
with a decrease in firm value, especially when the firm’s need for board advising is low. 
                                                 
6 Board social dependence is measured as the number of legally independent directors socially connected to 
the CEO, normalized by the total number of directors on the board. 
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Taken together, the evidence suggests that a new CEO, especially a powerful one, is able 
to influence independent director turnover and bargain for a friendly board immediately 
upon taking charge. While a friendly board facilitates boardroom collaboration, it seems 
that the benefits of enhanced team collaboration are entirely captured by the new CEO 
rather than by the shareholders of the firm. 
 The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, my study adds to the 
research that studies the consequences of CEO succession on various aspects of the firm. 
I build on prior research that finds a substantial within-firm change in board composition 
following CEO succession (Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Denis and Sarin (1999)) 
and explore further the CEO-director relationship to explain such changes on the board. I 
show that an incoming CEO can have significant impact on the retentions/additions of 
independent directors. While the extent to which a new CEO can initiate change in the 
boardroom has attracted considerable attention in the media over the last decade (Foshee 
(1998)) and Worthen, Scheck and Lublin (2011)), this paper is the first large-sample 
study presenting quantitative evidence on a new CEO’s influence on board composition. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) show that new independent directors are often hired to 
replace departing independent and inside directors after a succeeding CEO assumes 
office and this often leads to an increase in the percentage of independent directors on the 
board. They offer two possible explanations for this. First, a new CEO may not be ready 
to promote inside directors who are likely to be his successors; he thus hires independent 
directors who will serve as his advisers. Second, since a new CEO has relatively less 
bargaining power compared to an established CEO, shareholders are able to put more 
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independent directors on the board to monitor the new CEO. My results support their first 
conjecture.  
 Second, my study offers insight into the effect of CEO power on within-firm 
change in board composition and complements recent studies that examine the cross-
sectional relationship between CEO power and director selection (Westphal and Zajac 
(1995), Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007), Linck, Netter and Yang (2008), Hwang 
and Kim (2009), and Fracassi and Tate (2009)). As Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2010) point out, none of the above-mentioned studies shed light on the within-firm 
change in board composition. In contrast, I use firm-CEO fixed effects regressions to 
control for unobserved firm-specific factors, and explore firm-specific time-varying 
changes in board composition. I also control for a wide array of director expertise and 
perceived quality measures that may affect director selection (Adams, Gray and Nowland 
(2010)). Consistent with the predictions of the bargaining model in Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998), my evidence suggests that a CEO has considerable influence on 
within-firm change in board composition, and a powerful CEO is more likely to bargain 
for a friendly board. While previous studies suggest that CEOs who sit on the nominating 
committees of boards, who are chairmen of the board, or who are connected to existing 
board members are more likely to influence new director selection (Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999)), Westphal and Zajac (1995), Fracassi and Tate (2009)), and Zajac and 
Westphal (1996)), I show that in the CEO succession context, an incoming CEO’s power 
to bargain for a friendly board is higher when he is expected to initiate substantial 
changes in the firm or when internal and external governance is weak. 
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 Finally, my study contributes to the recent literature on outside director turnover. 
Yermack (2004) suggests that poor performance is positively correlated with outside 
director turnover. Other studies suggest that outside directors are more likely to leave a 
board when they enter into disputes with the management (Agrawal and Chen (2009)) or 
when they are likely to possess negative information about the firm (Fahlenbrach, Low 
and Stulz (2010)). I show that independent director turnover can also be affected by 
social connections between the CEO and outside directors. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the construction of the 
sample and variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses the 
implications. Section 5 concludes. 
II.2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 In this section, I first develop hypotheses regarding how CEO-director 
connections affect the departure of existing independent directors and the addition of new 
independent directors. I then discuss the consequences of such changes on the board. 
 When a new CEO takes charge, he may not have developed good working 
relationships with existing independent directors.  Existing independent directors with no 
past connections to the new CEO (henceforth “unconnected directors”) may be less 
willing to continue serving on the board with a new CEO about whom they know very 
little. As existing independent directors may also have different views about the source of 
a firm’s problems and the strategic changes it needs to make, a new CEO may encourage 
some independent directors to whom he is not connected to leave the board and will then 
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replaces them with “friendly” independent directors in order to strengthen his control of 
the board. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Independent directors with no past connections to the succeeding CEO are more 
likely to leave the board after the new CEO takes office, and they will be replaced by new 
independent directors who are socially connected to the succeeding CEO. 
 How much influence a CEO has on the selection of independent directors depends 
on the CEO’s relative bargaining power over the incumbent board. Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) document that a firm is more likely to appoint inside directors when the 
CEO is on the nominating committee of the board. Moreover, in firms where CEOs have 
more bargaining power over the boards (e.g., when a CEO is chairman of the board or 
when the board is less independent of the CEO), new directors are more likely to be 
demographically similar to the CEOs (Westphal and Zajac (1995)), share more past 
connections with the CEOs (Fracassi and Tate (2009)), or may have served on other 
boards that are friendly to management (Zajac and Westphal (1996)).  
Previous studies suggest that independent directors who joined a board before the 
incumbent CEO are less subject to the CEO’s influence and make better monitors than 
directors who joined the board after the CEO took office (Wade, O’Reilly, and 
Chandratat (1990), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2007)). However, CEO turnover may follow a prolonged period of poor performance 
and the board may need to hire a superior replacement manager to initiate substantial 
organizational changes within the firm. A new CEO may have greater bargaining power 
over the incumbent board when the CEO is hired into an underperforming company as “a 
corporate savior” (Khurana (2002)). The CEO may then be able to bring in independent 
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directors with whom he is socially connected. Since the new CEO is expected to initiate 
strategic changes in the firm, he also has an incentive to bring in independent directors 
who are likely to be his supporters and as well as capable advisers of strategic issues.  
I use firm operating performance prior to CEO turnover as a measure of a firm’s 
need for organizational change. Shen and Cannella (2002) suggest that firms that 
experienced poor performance prior to CEO turnover are expected to initiate substantial 
strategic changes. I expect newly elected independent directors to be more likely to share 
social connections with the succeeding CEO when the firm is performing poorly.  
Several studies (Giroud and Mueller (2010, 2011) and Kim and Lu (2010, 2011)) 
document that good internal and external governance reduces a CEO’s power within the 
firm. Following these studies, I use the percentage of truly independent directors prior to 
CEO turnover as a measure of internal governance, and the industry concentration ratio 
and the passage of SOX as measures of external governance. I posit that good internal 
and external governance reduces a CEO’s influence over director selections. 
This prediction is summarized in the second hypothesis: 
H2: The effect of CEO-director connections on independent director turnover is more 
pronounced when the incoming CEO’s bargaining power over the board is high. 
Despite the high costs associated with board social dependence such as excessive 
CEO compensation and value-destroying acquisitions (Hwang and Kim (2009) and 
Fracassi and Tate (2009)), social connections between new CEOs and independent 
directors can enhance boardroom collaboration and the boards’ advising effectiveness. 
Although new independent directors may lack the firm-specific knowledge which 
incumbent directors have acquired during their tenure on the board, they typically bring a 
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fresh perspective that facilitates implementation of new strategies during a transition 
period. Therefore, whether the benefits of board advising as a result of increased board 
social dependence can balance out the costs of weakened board monitoring depends on a 
firm’s need for board advising. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: An increase in board social dependence is detrimental to firm value, especially when 
a firm’s need for board advising is low. 
II.3. Sample and variables 
II.3.A. Sample 
 I use the BoardEx database7 to identify all CEO turnover events between 2000 
and 2007.8 For each firm, if the executive listed as the CEO in any year is different from 
the CEO listed for the previous year, I treat it as a CEO turnover event.9 I then identify 
the date and cause of CEO turnover through a Lexis/Nexis news search. Following 
previous studies (Parrino (1997), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Parrino, Sias and 
Starks (2003), Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004), and Jenter and Kanaan (2008)), a 
turnover event is defined as forced if it is not due to the following reasons: sudden death, 
health, normal retirement (when the CEO is 60 years old or older, or the retirement is 
announced six months prior to CEO turnover), move to a higher/comparable level 
position at another firm. I exclude CEO turnover events due to mergers, acquisitions, or 
spinoffs. Firm year observations involving interim CEOs or co-CEOs are also deleted. To 
                                                 
7 http://www.boardex.com/. See the Appendix in Fracassi and Tate (2009) for a detailed description of the 
BoardEx database. 
8 The sample starts from 2000, because the coverage of BoardEx Directors database is rather limited prior 
to 2000. BoardEx began covering board information of S&P 500, S&P mid-cap 400, and S&P small-cap 
600 firms in 2000 and gradually increased their coverage of US firms over time. The sample ends in 2007, 
because I need at least two years of board composition information to calculate changes in independent 
directors. 
9 CEO turnover occurred in approximately 11% of the firm-year observations in the BoardEx database, 
which is comparable to recent studies using the Risk Metrics director database (Mobbs (2009)). 
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clearly isolate the effect of one CEO succession event on the changes in board 
composition, I require the departing CEO to be in office for at least two years prior to 
CEO turnover and the succeeding CEO to serve for two years or more. I define an outside 
CEO succession as one where the new CEO has been with the firm for less than one year 
before becoming CEO. I obtain financial information from Compustat, stock price 
information from CRSP, and institutional holdings from Thomson Reuters 13F filings. 
The final sample consists of 1,489 CEO succession events,10 among which 678 departing 
CEOs were fired and 417 new CEOs were hired from outside the firm. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th level to reduce the influence of outliers. 
Variable definitions are presented in Appendix II.A. For director level regressions, I 
include firm-CEO fixed effects.11 For firm level regressions, I include Fama-French 12 
industry fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects.  
II.3.B. Measures of CEO-director connections 
Current debate on the effectiveness of board governance centers on whether 
CEOs are able to fill their boards with directors who are legally independent, but 
nevertheless socially connected to them. To maintain their personal relationships with the 
CEOs, connected directors12 may well compromise their fiduciary duties to shareholders. 
The public media are also critical of independent directors who share social ties with the 
CEOs through common educational background and employment. They see these 
                                                 
10 The sample consists of 1,409 unique firms. Among the 1,409 firms, 1,265 firms experienced one CEO 
succession event, 109 firms experienced two CEO succession events, and 2 firms experienced three CEO 
succession events, during the sample period. Excluding the firms that experienced multiple CEO succession 
events does not affect the empirical results. 
11 Firm-CEO fixed effect regression is equivalent to firm fixed effect regression for firms that experienced 
only one CEO succession event during the sample period. 
12 “Connected directors” refers to directors who are legally independent but have prior social connections to 
the CEOs.  
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connected independent directors as being too sympathetic to management (Davidoff 
(2010)). 
I collect CEO and director education, social activity, and employment 
information13 from the BoardEx database.14 The BoardEx database contains demographic 
information for directors of U.S. public companies. The BoardEx employment file reports 
detailed information on directors’ employment histories, including their roles in 
organizations that they have worked for and their years of employment. The BoardEx 
education file reports information on directors’ education histories, including the higher 
education institutions they attended, degree awarded, and their graduation years. The 
BoardEx activity file contains information on other organizations that these directors 
belong to, such as charitable organizations and leisure clubs. I construct dummy variables 
to measure three types of social connection between a CEO and a director formed prior to 
the CEO succession year15 and outside the firm that experienced the CEO turnover. An 
independent director is connected to the incoming CEO via social activities (Activity) if 
they were members of the same social organization. An independent director is connected 
to the incoming CEO via education (Education) if they attended the same educational 
institution. An independent director is connected to the succeeding CEO via employment 
(Employment) if they worked for the same company or served on the same board outside 
                                                 
13 Among the outside directors in my sample, 0.33% have no employment history, 23.05% have no activity, 
and 13.23% have no education information reported in the BoardEx database. When no information is 
available for a director, I treat her as unconnected to the CEO. This is likely to lead to measurement errors 
in the social tie variables and is likely to bias me against finding any significant results. 
14 The BoardEx database may assign different identification numbers to one organization. For example, 
Harvard Business School has two names in the database (Harvard Business School and Harvard Graduate 
School of Business Administration) with two different identification numbers. I code both of them as the 
business school of Harvard University and assign them a unique identification number. 
15 For about 50% of the directors in the sample, the activity or degree dates are unknown. Since education 
ties are more likely to be formed before an executive becomes a CEO or a director, I include such weak ties 
in my analyses and also test the sensitivity of my results to missing dates.  
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the focal firm that experienced a CEO succession. I then create a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if an independent director is connected to the CEO through prior activity, 
education or employment, and 0 otherwise. As a robustness check, I also use the total 
number of social ties between a director and a CEO in my empirical analyses and I obtain 
similar results. Furthermore, Duchin and Sosyura (2010) and Chidambaran, Kedia and 
Prabhala (2010) suggest that the effects of social connections on corporate decisions vary 
across the three types of social ties. I also examine how each type of CEO-director social 
connections affects independent director turnover differently.  
II.4. Empirical results 
II.4.A. Summary statistics 
Panel A of Table II.1 shows the sample distribution by fiscal year. The number of 
CEO turnover events increased markedly in 2003, most likely because the BoardEx 
database increased their coverage of US firms in 2003.16 The number of CEO turnover 
events in my sample decreased in 2007 because of the unavailability of post-CEO 
turnover board information for some firms that experienced CEO turnover in 2007. Panel 
B of Table II.1 tabulates the disclosed reasons for CEO turnover in my sample. 43.2% of 
the firms do not provide any information in their public news announcements regarding 
the cause of CEO turnover. The second most frequently cited reason for CEO turnover is 
retirement (32.1% of the sample). Based on the classification scheme used in previous 
studies ((Parrino (1997), Parrino, Sias and Starks (2003), Huson, Malatesta and Parrino 
(2004), and Jenter and Kanaan (2008)), however, Panel C of Table II.1 shows that 678 
out of 1,489 departing CEOs were considered fired. It appears that firms routinely 
                                                 
16 For a description of the trend of CEO turnover events over time, see Kaplan and Minton (2006). 
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obscure the actual cause of CEO turnover. Panel D of Table II.1 shows that Business 
Services, Banking, Electronic Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products, and Retail industries 
experienced the most frequent CEO succession events during the sample period. 
 Panel A of Table II.2 provides the summary statistics of firm characteristics. The 
sample firms have mean (median) total asset values of $8.58 (1.00) billion, Tobin’s Q of 
2.09 (1.46), R&D intensity of 0.21 (0.00), leverage ratio of 0.22 (0.19), SIC two-digit 
industry-adjusted ROA of 0.01 (0.01), fiscal year market-adjusted stock return of 0.06 (-
0.04), annual stock return volatility of 0.45 (0.39), and a fraction of institutional block 
holdings of 0.17 (0.14) in the year prior to CEO succession. Two years after CEO 
succession, the sample firms have mean (median) total asset values of $9.96 (1.46) billion, 
Tobin’s Q of 1.74 (1.36), R&D intensity of 0.13 (0.00), leverage ratio of 0.24 (0.20), and 
SIC two-digit industry-adjusted ROA of 0.01 (0.01). The average firm size is comparable 
to recent studies using the ExecuComp database to identify CEO turnover events (Jenter 
and Kanaan (2008)). In addition, pre-turnover firm stock return is much lower for forced 
CEO turnovers and outside CEO successions. 
Panel B of Table II.2 presents the characteristics of departing and succeeding 
CEOs. The average (median) age of departing CEOs is 58 (59) years, with an average 
time in office of 9.59 (7.25) years. The average (median) age of succeeding CEOs is 50 
(51) years, having been with the firm for an average (median) of 7.60 (4.55) years before 
assuming the title of the CEO. 
 Panel C of Table II.2 presents the board composition of the sample firms in the 
fiscal years immediately prior to and following CEO turnover. In the year prior to CEO 
turnover, the average (median) firm has 9.21 (9.00) directors, 67.84% (71.43%) of whom 
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are independent directors. 66% of the departing CEOs are also chairmen of the board. 
The board composition is similar to recent studies using the IRRC director database 
(Masulis, Wang and Xie (2010)) and BoardEx database (Schmidt (2009)). One year after 
CEO turnover, the average (median) firm has 9.18 (9.00) directors, 73.66% (75.00%) of 
which are independent. This is consistent with the evidence in Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988) that firms increase their board independence after a change in CEO. Further, 29% 
of the succeeding CEOs are also chairmen of the board, suggesting a separation of CEO 
and Chairman of the Board positions during a transition in leadership (Brickley, Coles 
and Jarrell (1997)).  
 Panel D1 and D2 of Table II.2 provide summary statistics of independent director 
departures/additions surrounding CEO succession years. My measure of firm-level 
independent director departure rate is defined as the total number of independent 
directors left during years following CEO succession, normalized by the total number of 
independent directors in the year prior to CEO succession. More specifically, pre-
succession board composition is measured in the fiscal year prior to CEO succession and 
post-succession board composition is measured in the fiscal year after CEO succession. 
The CEO succession year is event year zero. 17 The mean and median independent 
director departure rates from the year prior to CEO succession to the year after CEO 
succession are 14% and 8%, respectively.18 It also appears that independent director 
departure concentrates within a two-year window19 surrounding a CEO succession, as the 
                                                 
17 The CEO succession year is determined by the effective date of a CEO succession.  
18 For non-CEO turnover years in the BoardEx database, the average (median) independent director 
departure rate for a two-year period is approximately 8% (0%). 
19 From one year prior to CEO succession to one year after CEO succession. 
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mean (median) independent director departure rate for a three-year window20 is 16% 
(11%), only slightly higher than the independent director departure rate for a two-year 
window. This is consistent with the evidence in previous studies (Gabarro (1985), 
Gabarro (1987), and Romanelli and Tushman (1994)) that substantial organizational 
changes are implemented within the first eighteen months of CEO successions. Firms 
also appear to hire independent directors, to replace exiting gray and inside directors,21 
since the mean and median independent director addition rates22 are much higher than the 
corresponding independent director departure rates for a two-year period surrounding 
CEO succession. In my empirical analysis, I follow Ward, Bishop and Sonnenfeld (1999), 
using a two-year window to capture much of the change in board composition without 
allowing excessive time to elapse and letting normal director retirement contaminate my 
results.23 
II.4.B. Analysis of independent director turnover 
B.1. Independent director characteristics 
I now turn to an analysis of how each independent director is affected by a change 
in CEO. I consider three groups of director characteristics that may influence an 
independent director’s departure/addition likelihood during CEO succession years. The 
first group of director characteristics, which is the focus of the analysis, considers a 
director’s past connection to the succeeding CEO. I expect directors with no past 
connection to the succeeding CEO to be more likely to leave the board after the new CEO 
                                                 
20 From one year prior to CEO succession to two years after CEO succession. 
21 “Gray directors” refer to directors who have business relations with the firm or personal relationships 
with the firm’s management team. “Inside directors” are directors who are also employees of the firm.  
22 Independent director addition rate is defined as the total number of independent directors elected to the 
board during a two-year window of CEO succession, normalized by the total number of independent 
directors in the year prior to CEO succession. 
23 I obtain similar results if I use a three-year window to estimate changes in independent directors.  
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takes office. The second group of director characteristics includes director age, tenure, 
and gender. I use director age24 and tenure to control for normal director retirement. The 
gender of the outside director may also matter since female directors are more likely to be 
retained for board diversity purposes (Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Ahern and Dittmar 
(2009)). The third group of variables includes director characteristics that may reflect 
their ability and incentive to serve on the board. I use the number of outside directorships 
at public companies as a proxy for a director’s perceived quality in the labor market. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the director labor market presents a useful way to 
measure a director’s managerial skills and external reputation. Outside directors with 
reputations to protect in the labor market are likely to be more effective advisors and 
monitors. Consistent with this hypothesis, Masulis and Mobbs (2009) find that firms 
whose inside directors hold other external directorships have higher valuation. However, 
Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggest that 
busy directors may be less effective monitors as they have less time for each of their 
board service. To capture the time outside directors have to serve on the board, I 
construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if a director holds three or more outside 
directorships and 0 otherwise. Vafeas (1999) finds that boards meet more frequently 
following performance deterioration and Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) suggest that 
outside directors have incentives to leave the board when their workload is expected to 
increase. Since new CEOs may need more board advising and monitoring, busy directors 
                                                 
24 As a robustness check, I use director age greater than 70, between 65 and 70, and below 65 dummy 
variables to control for the potential non-linear effect of director age on independent director turnover. This 
does not affect my results and conclusions. 
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who have high opportunity costs of time may be more likely to leave the board.25 I also 
construct a dummy variable to measure whether a director has CEO experience at other 
publicly traded companies (i.e., CEO directors). Ahern and Dittmar (2009) suggest that 
director quality such as CEO experience may matter for firm performance. Fich (2005) 
finds that the stock market reacts positively to a firm’s appointment of a director who is 
CEO of another firm. However, Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2008) find that CEO 
directors may have limited influence on firm performance. Although the evidence on 
whether CEO directors add value is mixed, directors with CEO experience may be able to 
provide valuable advising to a new CEO during the transition in leadership. I also 
consider whether a director has related industry experience outside the firm or holds an 
MBA degree. Directors who have related industry experience may be more aware of 
alternative strategies employed by other firms in the same industry (McDonald, Westphal, 
and Graebner (2008)). Directors who hold MBA degrees may have broader industry 
knowledge and management skills. I expect firms to be more likely to retain directors 
who have reputations in the labor market, are female, have CEO or related industry 
experience, or have MBA degrees. In addition, I control for the past connection between 
a director and the departing CEO. I expect directors, who are connected to the departing 
CEO and thus supporters of him, to be more likely to leave the board after a change in 
CEO. 
B.2. Independent director departure analyses 
                                                 
25 As a robustness check, I use outside directorship and the square term of outside directorship to control 
for the effect of director busyness on independent director turnover. This does not alter my results or 
conclusions. 
23 
 
Panel A of Table II.3 shows the percentage of independent directors who are 
connected to succeeding CEOs. Among retained independent directors, 7.02% of them 
are connected to succeeding CEOs via social activity, 4.42% via educational institution, 
and 16.43% via a same employer. In contrast, a much lower percentage of departed 
independent directors shares social connections with succeeding CEOs. Among departed 
directors, 4.96% of them are connected to succeeding CEOs via social activity, 2.95% of 
them via educational institution, and 13.95% via same employment. The univariate 
comparison suggests that independent directors with past connections to a succeeding 
CEO are more likely to remain on the board following CEO succession. 
Panel B of Table II.3 presents the summary statistics of other director 
characteristics. Compared to retained independent directors, exiting independent directors 
are older, have longer board tenure, hold fewer outside directorships, are less likely to be 
busy directors, and are less likely to hold MBA degrees. There is no significant difference 
between the two groups of directors in terms of their social connections to departing 
CEOs. 32.72% of the retained directors are connected to departing CEOs via activity, 
education or common employment outside the firm.  32.06% of the exiting directors 
share at least one past connection with departing CEOs.   
To conduct a multivariate analysis of whether social connections between 
independent directors and succeeding CEOs affect the likelihood of director departure, I 
use firm-CEO fixed effect regressions to control for the heterogeneity in CEO succession 
events and explore the within-firm variation in director departure likelihood. Table II.4 
presents the coefficient estimates for the firm-CEO fixed effect regressions. The 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if an independent director left the board during the two 
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years surrounding CEO succession and 0 otherwise. The main explanatory variable of 
interest is whether there is any past connection between an independent director and the 
succeeding CEO.  
Column (1) of Table II.4 shows that independent directors who share past 
connections to a succeeding CEO are less likely to depart from the board. Having past 
social connection to a succeeding CEO reduces the likelihood of director departure by 
2.6%. Given an average director departure likelihood of 14% during CEO succession 
years, the magnitude is both economically (an 18% increase in the likelihood of departure) 
and statistically significant.  
In Column (2), I use other director characteristics variables as additional controls. 
The negative relationship between a director’s connection to the incoming CEO and her 
likelihood of departure is still significant. Both director age and tenure are positively 
correlated with departure likelihood, suggesting that normal retirement also affects 
independent director departure at the time of CEO succession. Additionally, directors 
who hold fewer outside directorships or have related industry experience are more likely 
to depart from the board. Interestingly, whether an independent director shares a 
connection to the departing CEO does not seem to affect her likelihood of departure.  
I also examine how various types of connection affect the likelihood of director 
departure and distinguish between strong and weak ties (Granovetter (2005)). Table II.5 
shows the results. In Column (1), I replace the aggregate social connection measure with 
three separate measures of connection: social connection via activities, education and 
employment. Both the education and employment connections with the new CEO reduce 
a director’s departure likelihood, but the effect of activity tie is not significant. The 
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insignificant coefficient of the activity tie may be caused by the measurement error in this 
variable. In Column (2), I further distinguish between strong and weak ties. If two 
individuals graduated from the same institution within two years of each other or worked 
for the same employer at the same time, they are connected to each other via strong ties. 
Otherwise, I consider their connection weak. When degree dates are unknown, I treat two 
individuals as weakly connected through past education if they attended the same 
institution. I find that independent directors who have weak education ties to the 
succeeding CEO are more likely to depart from the board following CEO succession. 
This result can be caused by the fact that degree dates are unknown for many directors in 
the sample. I also find that independent directors who worked with the succeeding CEO 
for the same employer at the same time are more likely to remain on the board. However, 
the differences between the effects of strong ties and those of weak ties are not 
statistically significant.  
B.3. Independent director addition analyses 
Panel C of Table II.3 shows the percentage of independent directors who are 
connected to succeeding CEOs. Among exiting directors, 4.96% are connected to 
succeeding CEOs via social activity, 2.95% via educational institution, and 13.95% via 
common employment. In contrast, a higher percentage of new independent directors 
shares social connections with succeeding CEOs. Among new independent directors, 
6.26% are connected to succeeding CEOs via social activity, 4.61% via educational 
institution, and 14.56% via shared employment. The univariate comparison suggests that 
compared to exiting directors, new independent directors are more likely to have prior 
connections to succeeding CEOs. 
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Panel D of Table II.3 presents summary statistics of other director characteristics. 
Compared to exiting independent directors, new independent directors are younger, more 
likely to be female, less likely to be busy directors, more likely to have related industry 
experience, and more likely to hold MBA degrees. The evidence suggests that new 
independent directors are not lower in quality than exiting independent directors.   
I estimate firm-CEO fixed effect regressions using the sample of new and exiting 
independent directors. The regression results are in Table II.6. The dependent variable is 
equal to 1 if an independent director was elected to the board after the new CEO was 
hired and 0 if an independent director left the board after the new CEO took office. 
Column (1) of Table II.6 shows that compared to exiting independent directors, new 
independent directors are 4.7% more likely to share prior connections with the 
succeeding CEO. In Column (2), I add other director characteristic variables as controls. 
Compared to exiting independent directors, all else equal, new independent directors are 
5.1% more likely to have connections to succeeding CEOs. New independent directors 
are also younger and are more likely to have related industry experience. The overall 
quality of independent directors does not seem to decrease after CEO succession. 
I then examine the effect of the various types of connections and distinguish 
between strong and weak connections. Table II.7 presents the results. In Column (1), I 
replace the aggregate social connection measure with three separate measures of 
connectedness: social connections via activities, education, and employment. Compared 
to exiting independent directors, new independent directors are more likely to have 
connections to the succeeding CEO via education and employment. The effect of activity 
ties, however, is not significant. The insignificance of the activity ties variable may be 
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caused by the measurement error in this variable. In Column (2), I distinguish between 
strong and weak ties. I find that new independent directors are more likely to have weak 
education ties to a succeeding CEO, which can be caused by the unavailability of degree 
dates for many directors in the sample. I also find that new independent directors are 
more likely to have worked with a succeeding CEO under the same employer, at the same 
time. However, the effects of strong ties are not statistically significantly different from 
those of weak ties. 
I further test whether CEO power affects the relationship between CEO-director 
ties and director turnover. The regression results are presented in Panel A of Table II.8. In 
Column (1) of Panel A, I add an interaction term between CEO-director connection and a 
firm operating performance prior to CEO turnover greater than sample median dummy 
(ROA[-1]_High). In Column (2) of Panel A, I add an interaction term between CEO-
director connection and a board social independence prior to CEO turnover greater than 
sample median dummy (BSIND[-1]_High). The evidence suggests that compared to 
exiting independent directors, new independent directors are more likely to share prior 
connections with a succeeding CEO hired into an underperforming firm or a firm with 
low level of board independence. However, the coefficient estimate of the ROA above 
sample median group and that of the ROA below sample median group are not 
statistically significantly different. In Column (3) of Panel A, I allow for a non-linear 
effect of the board’s social independence on the relation between CEO-director tie and 
independent director turnover. I test the hypothesis that a CEO may not have sufficient 
power to influence board composition when the board’s social independence is high and 
he may not have an incentive to influence board composition when the board’s social 
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independence is low. More specially, I create two dummies variables to measure board 
social independence. BSIND[-1]_High is equal to 1 if a board’s social independence is in 
the highest tercile of its distribution and 0 otherwise. BSIND[-1]_Medium is equal to 1 if a 
board’s social independence is in the middle tercile of its distribution and 0 otherwise. 
The results show that a CEO is able to influence direction selection when the board’s 
social independence is in the lowest tercile, although the differences between the three 
groups are not statistically significant.  
I also test whether external governance affects the relationship between CEO-
director ties and independent director turnover. The regression results are presented in 
Panel B of Table II.8. In Column (1) of Panel B, I add an interaction term between CEO-
director ties and an industry concentration greater than sample median dummy (HHI [-
1]_High), where the industry concentration ratio is measured as the sum of the squares of 
percentage market share in sales of all firms in the 2-digit SIC industry. A higher industry 
concentration ratio indicates a less competitive industry. In Column (2) of Panel B, I add 
an interaction term between CEO-director ties and an after SOX dummy, where the after 
SOX dummy is equal to 1 if the CEO succession year is after 2003 and 0 otherwise. 
Although SOX does not prohibit firms from hire independent directors who are socially 
connected to their CEOs, Kim and Lu (2011) suggest that SOX may have weakened a 
CEO’s power in the boardroom. The regression results suggest that compared to exiting 
independent directors, new independent directors are more likely to share prior 
connections with a succeeding CEO only in non-competitive industries and in the years 
prior to the passage of SOX, although the difference between the pre-SOX period and the 
post-SOX period is not statistically significant.  
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II.4.C. Director turnover and firm value 
 The recent literature emphasizes both the monitoring and advising roles played by 
independent directors (Adams and Ferreira (2007), Adams (2009), and Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2010)). While an increase in the board’s social dependence is associated 
with weakened board monitoring, the overall value of a firm may not necessarily 
decrease as a friendly board also encourages boardroom collaboration, which is crucial 
for setting new corporate strategies (Foshee (1998)).  
  To examine how a change in the board’s social dependence affects firm value, I 
estimate OLS regressions of post CEO turnover firm value improvement against the 
change in the board’s social dependence while controlling for other financial and 
governance variables that may affect firm value. I follow previous studies (Kim and Lu 
(2010)) and examine changes in firm value, as measured by firm Tobin’s Q. The 
dependent variable in the regression is change in Tobin’s Q from one year prior to CEO 
turnover to two years after CEO turnover. The main explanatory variable is the change in 
the board’s social dependence during a two-year window surrounding CEO succession. 
Following Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004), I include change in operating 
performance, firm size, firm R&D intensity, board size, board independence, and the 
percentage of block holdings as control variables, all measured at the end of the fiscal 
year prior to CEO turnover. Table II.9 shows the regression results. In Column (1), I do 
not control for pre CEO turnover Tobin’s Q since it is likely to be correlated with the 
error term of the regression. In Column (2), I include pre CEO turnover Tobin’s Q in my 
regression to control for mean reversion of firm value. The results in both columns show 
that an increase in a board’s social dependence is detrimental to firm value, suggesting 
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that the benefits of better board advising are less than the costs of weakened board 
monitoring in the early years of a CEO’s tenure.26 The economic magnitude of the 
marginal effect is much smaller than that identified in Fracassi and Tate (2009), 
suggesting that boardroom collaboration brings additional benefits during a transition in 
leadership. 
I then test whether the effect of board social dependence on firm value varies with 
a firm’s need for board advising. Since an increase in board social dependence 
strengthens the advising effectiveness of the board but weakens the monitoring 
effectiveness of a board, it is more likely to impair firm value when the firm’s need for 
board advising is low. I first add an interaction term between change in board social 
dependence and a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s R&D intensity (R&D/Sale [-
1]_High) prior to CEO turnover is greater than the sample median. The results in Column 
(1) of Table II.10 show that the detrimental effect of board social dependence is primarily 
concentrated in low R&D intensity firms. This suggests that as firms with low R&D 
intensity are less likely to subject to information asymmetry and independent directors of 
these firms do not need to rely on insiders for firm-specific information, these firms 
benefit less from increased board social dependence. In Column (2) of Table II.10, I add 
                                                 
26 In unreported results, I also use a Heckman selection model to adjust for a potential selection problem. 
Specifically, for the first stage, I estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
firm remains independent and has financial information available for the two years following CEO turnover. 
The explanatory variables used in the Heckman selection model include firm operating performance and 
board characteristics, measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to CEO turnover. The regression also 
includes CEO age, CEO tenure with the firm, outside CEO dummy, block holdings, and fiscal year. I then 
include the inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) in the second stage regression. The inverse Mill’s ratio is not 
statistically significant in the second stage regression (with a regression coefficient of 0.239 and a p-value 
of 0.717). The coefficient for the change in board social dependence in the second stage regression is -
0.592 with a p-value of 0.019. The coefficients for other explanatory variables in the second stage 
regression remain qualitatively similar after I adjust for the potential selection bias. However, a lack of 
exclusion restriction makes the effect of adjusting for sample selection bias rather limited. 
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an interaction term between change in board social dependence and a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if a firm’s board social dependence (BSD [-1]_High) prior to CEO turnover 
is higher than the sample median. The results show that the detrimental effect of board 
social dependence on firm value is larger for firms with high pre-existing levels of board 
social dependence, which are less likely to benefit from increased board social 
dependence. However, the differences between the groups are not statistically significant.  
II.4.D. Additional tests 
D.1. Excluding certain independent directors 
In my sample, 201 independent directors may have left the board prior to CEO 
succession.  Excluding these directors does not affect my results. Since firms may have 
mandatory retirement age or term restrictions for independent directors, I exclude 
potential retiring independent directors who are 69 years old or older or have been on the 
board for more than six years. The regression results are similar. In addition, I re-estimate 
my firm-CEO fixed effect departure likelihood regressions using conditional logit models 
and obtain similar results. Furthermore, 242 independent directors may have joined the 
board prior to CEO succession and I obtain similar results if I exclude these independent 
directors from my director addition analyses. 
D.2. Including gray directors 
 Outside directors include both independent and gray directors. Gray directors are 
directors who have business relations with the firm or personal relationships with the 
firm’s management team. After CEO departure, gray directors may leave the board and 
they may be replaced by new independent or gray directors. To test whether my results 
hold for all outside directors, I rerun my firm-CEO fixed effect director level regressions 
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including both independent directors and gray directors and I obtain similar results. In 
addition, compared to independent directors, gray directors are more likely to depart from 
the board after a change in CEO. Consistent with an increase in board independence 
following CEO succession, newly hired outside directors are more likely to be legally 
independent. 
II.5. Conclusion 
Independent directors play a critical role on corporate boards. As representatives 
of shareholders, independent directors are expected to alleviate agency problems caused 
by the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations (Fama (1980)). High-
profile corporate scandals in the early 2000s led to recent stringent regulations aimed at 
ensuring board independence and strengthening board monitoring. Truly independent 
directors, however, are difficult to find. In this paper, I present evidence that a new CEO 
can have significant influence over who is retained on the board and who is elected to the 
board upon his promotion to the CEO position. In addition, the effect of CEO-director 
relationship on director turnover is more pronounced when the new CEO is likely to be 
powerful and when external governance is weak. Finally, an increase in the board’s social 
dependence is detrimental to shareholder value, when the benefits from enhanced 
boardroom collaboration are likely to be low. My results suggest that board restructuring 
following CEO succession is unlikely to be random and underscore the importance of 
examining CEO-direction relationships when analyzing changes in board composition. 
  
33 
 
References 
Adams, R.B., 2009. Asking directors about their dual roles. Working paper. 
Adams, R.B., and D. Ferreira, 2007. A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance 62, 
217-250. 
Adams, R.B., and D. Ferreira, 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 94, 291-309. 
Adams, R.B., S. Gray, and J. Nowland, 2010. Outside director appointments and director-
firm match. Working paper. 
Adams, R.B., B.E. Hermalin, and M.S. Weisbach, 2010. The role of boards of directors in 
corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature 48, 58-107. 
Agrawal, A., and M.A. Chen, 2009. Boardroom brawls: determinants and consequences 
of disputes involving directors. Working paper. 
Ahern, K.R., and A.K. Dittmar, 2009. The changing of the boards: The value effect of a 
massive exogenous shock. Working paper. 
Boone, A.L., L.C. Field, J.M. Karpoff, and C.G. Raheja, 2007. The determinants of 
corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial 
Economics 85, 66-101. 
Brickley, J.A., J.L. Coles, and G. Jarrell, 1997. Leadership structure: Separating the CEO 
and chairman of the board. Journal of Corporate Finance 3, 189-220. 
Chidambaran, N.K., S. Kedia, and N. R. Prabhala, 2010. CEO-director connections and 
corporate fraud, SSRN eLibrary. 
Coles, J.L., N. Daniel, and L. Naveen, 2007. Co-opted boards, costs, benefits, causes and 
consequences. Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming. 
Core, J.E., R.W. Holthausen, and D.F. Larcker, 1999. Corporate governance, chief 
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics 51, 371-406. 
Davidoff, S. M., 2010. How independent are Barnes & Noble directors? The New York   
Times, October 25, 2010. 
Denis, D.J., and D.K. Denis, 1995. Performance changes following top management 
dismissals. Journal of Finance 50, 966-967. 
Denis, D.J., and A. Sarin, 1999. Ownership and board structures in publicly traded 
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 187-223. 
Duchin, R., J.G. Matsusaka,  and O. Ozbas, 2009. When are outside directors effective? 
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Duchin, R., and D. Sosyura, 2010. Divisional managers and internal capital markets. 
Working paper. 
Fahlenbrach, R., A. Low, and R.M. Stulz, 2008. Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside 
directors? Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
Fahlenbrach, R., A. Low, and R.M. Stulz, 2010. The dark side of outside directors: Do 
they quit when they are most needed? Working paper. 
Fama, E.F., 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political 
Economy 88, 288-307. 
Fama, E.F., and M.C. Jensen, 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law 
and Economics 26, 301-325. 
Farrell, K.A., and D.A. Whidbee, 2000. The consequences of forced CEO succession for 
34 
 
outside directors. Journal of Business 73, 597-627. 
Fee, C.E., and C.J. Hadlock, 2004. Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 37, 3-38. 
Ferris, S.P., M. Jagannathan, and A.C. Pritchard, 2003. Too busy to mind the business? 
Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. Journal of Finance 58, 
1087-1111. 
Fich, E.M., 2005. Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director 
appointments by fortune 1000 firms. Journal of Business 78, 1943-1971. 
Fich, E.M., and A. Shivdasani, 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of 
Finance 61, 689-724. 
Foshee, D.L., 1998. How a new CEO reshapes governance. Directors & Boards, Fall 
1998. 
Fracassi, C., and G.A. Tate, 2009. External networking and internal firm governance. 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Gabarro, J.J., 1985. When a new manager takes charge. Harvard Business Review 63, 
110-123. 
Gabarro, J.J., 1987. The dynamics of taking charge. Harvard Business Press. 
Giroud, X., and H.M. Mueller, 2010. Does corporate governance matter in competitive 
industries? Journal of Financial Economics 95, 312-331. 
Giroud, X., and H.M. Mueller, 2011. Corporate governance, product market competition, 
and equity prices. The Journal of Finance 66, 563-600. 
Granovetter, M., 2005. The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 19, 33-50. 
Hayes, R.M., P. Oyer, and S. Schaefer, 2006. Coworker complementarity and the stability 
of top-management teams. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22, 184-
212. 
Helmich, D.L., and W.B. Brown, 1972. Successor type and organizational change in 
corporate enterprises. Administrative Science Quarterly 17, 371-381. 
Hermalin, B.E., and M.S. Weisbach, 1988. The determinants of board composition. The 
RAND Journal of Economics 19, 589-606. 
Hermalin, B.E., and M.S. Weisbach, 1998. Endogenously chosen boards of directors and 
their monitoring of the CEO. American Economic Review 88, 96-118. 
Huson, M.R., P.H. Malatesta, and R. Parrino, 2004. Managerial succession and firm 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics 74, 237-275. 
Huson, M.R., R. Parrino, and L.T. Starks, 2001. Internal monitoring mechanisms and 
CEO turnover: A long-term perspective. Journal of Finance 56, 2265-2297. 
Hwang, B.H., and S. Kim, 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics 
93, 138-158. 
Jenter, D.C., and F. Kanaan, 2008. CEO turnover and relative performance evaluation. 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Kaplan, S.N., and B.A. Minton, 2006. How has CEO turnover changed? Increasingly 
performance sensitive boards and increasingly uneasy CEOs. Working Paper. 
Khurana, R, 2002. Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for Charismatic 
CEOs. Princeton University Press. 
Kim, E.H., and Y. Lu, 2010. CEO ownership, external governance, and risk taking. 
Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.  
35 
 
Kim, E.H., and Y. Lu, 2011. The independent board requirement and executive suites. 
Working paper. 
Linck, J.S., J.M. Netter, and T. Yang, 2008. The determinants of board structure. Journal 
of Financial Economics 87, 308-328. 
Masulis, R.W., and H.S. Mobbs, 2009, Are all inside directors the same? Do they 
entrench CEOs or enhance board decision making? Journal of Finance 66, 823-
872. 
Masulis, R.W., C. Wang, and F. Xie, 2010, Globalizing the boardroom: The effects of 
foreign directors on corporate governance and firm performance. Working Paper. 
McDonald, M.L., J.D. Westphal, and M.E. Graebner, 2008. What do they know? The 
effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 29, 1155-1177. 
Mobbs, H.S., 2009. CEOs under fire: The effects of inside directors on CEO 
compensation and turnover. Working paper. 
Parrino, R., 1997. CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics 46, 165-197. 
Parrino, R., R.W. Sias, and L.T. Starks, 2003. Voting with their feet: institutional 
ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 
68, 3-46. 
Romanelli, E., and M.L. Tushman, 1994. Organizational transformation as punctuated 
equilibrium: an empirical test. The Academy of Management Journal 37, 1141-
1166. 
Schmidt, B., 2009. Costs and benefits of 'friendly' boards during mergers and acquisitions. 
Working paper. 
Shen, W., and A.A. Cannella, 2002. Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO 
succession: The impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive 
turnover, and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal 45, 717-
733. 
Shivdasani, A., and D. Yermack, 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board 
members: an empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 54, 1829-1853. 
Vafeas, N., 1999. Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics 53, 113-142. 
Wade, J., C.A. O'Reilly, and I. Chandratat, 1990. Golden parachutes: CEOs and the 
exercise of social influence. Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 587-603. 
Ward, A., K. Bishop, and J. A. Sonnenfeld, 1999. Pyrrhic victories: the cost to the board 
of ousting the CEO. Journal of Organizational Behavior 20, 767-781. 
Weisbach, M.S., 1995. CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions. Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 159-188. 
Westphal, J.D., and E.J. Zajac, 1995. Who shall govern: CEO/board power, demographic 
similarity, and new director selection. Administrative Science Quarterly 40, 60-83. 
Worthen, B., J. Scheck, and J.S. Lublin, 2011. H-P shakes up board of directors. The Wall 
Street Journal, January 11, 2011. 
Yermack, D., 2004. Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside 
directors. Journal of Finance 59, 2281-2308. 
Zajac, E.J., and J.D. Westphal, 1996. Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the 
dynamics of board interlocks. Administrative Science Quarterly 41, 507-529. 
36 
 
Table II.1. Sample distribution 
The sample consists of 1,489 CEO succession events identified from the BoardEx 
database. To be included in the sample, the departing CEO must be in office for at least 
two years and the succeeding CEO must survive for two years or more. Succession 
events due to mergers, acquisitions, and spinoffs are excluded. Firm year observations 
involving interim CEOs and co-CEOs are also deleted. 
Panel A: Year distribution   
Year Frequency Percentage 
2000 121 8.1% 
2001 113 7.6% 
2002 135 9.1% 
2003 201 13.5% 
2004 282 18.9% 
2005 262 17.6% 
2006 237 15.9% 
2007 138 9.3% 
Total 1,489 100.0% 
Panel B: Reported reasons for CEO succession     
Category Frequency Percentage 
No reason 643 43.2% 
Retire 478 32.1% 
Resign 151 10.1% 
Pursue Other Interest 56 3.8% 
Jump Ship 35 2.4% 
Ousted 33 2.2% 
Fraud 30 2.0% 
Health 20 1.3% 
Death 16 1.1% 
CEO/Chairman Separation 13 0.9% 
Shareholder Control 9 0.6% 
Restructure 5 0.3% 
Total 1,489 100.0% 
Panel C: Tabulation of CEO succession events by succession context   
Frequency Inside  CEO succession Outside CEO succession Total 
Voluntary CEO turnover 629 182 811 
Forced CEO turnover 443 235 678 
Total 1,072 417 1,489
Panel D: Top five industries that experienced CEO succession events 
Fama-French 48 industry Count Percentage 
Business Services 159 10.7% 
Banking 139 9.3% 
Electronic Equipment 95 6.4% 
Pharmaceutical Products 87 5.8% 
Retail 66 4.4% 
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Table II.2. Summary statistics 
This table provides the summary statistics for 1,489 firms included in the sample. 
Definitions of variables are in Appendix II.A. 
Panel A: Firm characteristics Mean Median Std.Dev 
One year prior to CEO turnover 
Total Assets, in billons 8.58 1.00 31.96 
Tobin's Q 2.09 1.46 1.70 
R&D/Sale 0.21 0.00 1.05 
Leverage 0.22 0.19 0.20 
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.01 0.01 0.23 
Market adjusted stock return 0.06 -0.04 0.52 
Stock return volatility 0.45 0.39 0.25 
Fraction of block holdings 0.17 0.14 0.15 
Two years after CEO turnover 
Total Assets, in billions 9.96 1.46 34.05 
Tobin's Q 1.74 1.36 1.08 
R&D/Sale 0.13 0.00 0.66 
Leverage 0.24 0.20 0.22 
Industry-adjusted ROA 0.01 0.01 0.19 
Panel B: CEO characteristics Mean Median Std.Dev.
Departing CEO characteristics 
Age 58.32 59.00 8.47 
Tenure as CEO 9.59 7.25 7.58 
Succeeding CEO characteristics 
Age 50.54 51.00 6.84 
Tenure with the firm 7.60 4.55 8.43 
Panel C: Board characteristics Mean Median Std.Dev 
In the year prior to CEO turnover 
Board Size 9.21 9.00 2.94 
Board Independence 67.84% 71.43% 16.89% 
CEO/Chairman duality 0.66 1.00 0.47 
One year after CEO turnover 
Board Size 9.18 9.00 2.63 
Board Independence 73.66% 75.00% 14.08% 
CEO/Chairman duality 0.29 0.00 0.45 
Panel D1:  
# Outside director departed / # Outside directors [-1] Mean Median Std.Dev 
[Prior to CEO turnover, New CEO elected to board] 0.07 0.00 0.14 
[Prior to CEO turnover, One year after CEO turnover] 0.14 0.08 0.19 
[Prior to CEO turnover, Two years after CEO turnover] 0.16 0.11 0.21 
Panel D2:  
# New outside directors / # Outside directors [-1] Mean Median Std.Dev 
[Prior to CEO turnover, One year after CEO turnover] 0.29 0.20 0.34 
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Table II.3. Independent director characteristics 
This table describes the characteristics of 7,939 retained, 1,391 exiting, and 2,171 new 
independent directors of the sample firms that experienced CEO succession during years 
2000 to 2007. Variable definitions are in Appendix II.A. Panel A and B compare the 
characteristics of retained and exiting independent directors. Panel C and D compare the 
characteristics of exiting and new independent directors. 
Panel A:  
Percentage connected to succeeding CEO (1) Retained (2) Exiting (1)-(2) 
N=7,939 N=1,391 p-value 
Any tie 24.07% 19.63% 0.000*** 
 Activity tie 7.02% 4.96% 0.004*** 
 Education tie 4.42% 2.95% 0.003*** 
 Employment tie 16.43% 13.95% 0.015** 
Panel B:  
Other director characteristics (1) Retained (2) Exiting (1)-(2) 
  N=7,939 N=1,391 p-value 
Tenure 6.79 8.44 0.000*** 
Age 59.37 62.09 0.000*** 
Female 12.08% 9.35% 0.003*** 
Outside directorships 1.28 1.12 0.002*** 
Busy directors 18.52% 16.10% 0.031** 
CEO experience 21.05% 20.78% 0.818 
Related industry experience 18.35% 20.20% 0.111 
MBA 29.85% 27.03% 0.033** 
Percentage connected to the departing CEO 32.72% 32.06% 0.626 
Panel C:  
Percentage connected to succeeding CEO (1) Exiting (2) New (1)-(2) 
  N=1,391 N=2,171 p-value 
Any tie 19.63% 22.52% 0.038** 
 Activity tie 4.96% 6.26% 0.095* 
 Education tie 2.95% 4.61% 0.009*** 
 Employment tie 13.95% 14.56% 0.612 
Panel D:  
Other director characteristics (1) Exiting (2) New (1)-(2) 
  N=1,391 N=2,171 p-value 
Age 62.09 56.25 0.000*** 
Female 9.35% 14.14% 0.000*** 
Outside directorships 1.12 1.10 0.788 
Busy directors 16.10% 13.96% 0.082* 
CEO experience 20.78% 22.34% 0.269 
Related industry experience 20.20% 23.86% 0.011** 
MBA 27.03% 35.47% 0.000*** 
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Table II.4. Director departure: baseline results 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if an independent director departed from the board 
during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover, and 0 if an independent director is 
retained on the board during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover. Definitions of 
explanatory variables are in Appendix II.A. Robust and clustered (at firm level) standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance 
based on two-sided tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Exit=1/Retained=0 (1) (2) 
Connections to the succeeding CEO 
Tie -0.028** -0.026** 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Other director characteristics 
Tenure 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Director Age 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Female 0.006 
(0.011) 
Outside directorships -0.006* 
(0.004) 
Busy director dummy 0.001 
(0.015) 
CEO experience 0.012 
(0.010) 
Related industry experience outside the firm 0.022* 
(0.012) 
MBA degree -0.006 
(0.008) 
Connected to departing CEO dummy 0.002 
(0.010) 
Constant 0.156*** -0.134*** 
(0.004) (0.033) 
Firm-CEO fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 9,330 9,313 
R2 0.262 0.284 
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Table II.5. Director departure: additional analyses 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if an independent director departed from the board 
during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover, and 0 if an existing independent director 
is retained on the board during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover. Definitions of 
explanatory variables are in Appendix II.A. Robust and clustered (at firm level) standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance 
based on two-sided tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Exit=1/Retained=0 (1) (2) 
Activity Tie -0.001 -0.001 
-0.016 (0.016) 
Education Tie -0.039** 
(0.019) 
Employment Tie -0.030** 
(0.014) 
Education Tie same time -0.029 
(0.039) 
Education Tie not same time -0.039* 
(0.020) 
Employment Tie same time -0.043**
(0.017) 
Employment Tie not same time -0.002 
(0.022) 
Director characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm-CEO fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 9,313 9,313 
R2 0.285 0.285 
F-test: Education Tie same time=Education Tie not same time      
p-value 0.836 
F-test: Employment Tie same time=Employment Tie not same time  
p-value   0.108 
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Table II.6. Director addition: baseline results 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if an independent director is added to the board 
during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover, and 0 if an existing independent director 
left the board during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover. Definitions of explanatory 
variables are in Appendix II.A. Robust and clustered (at firm level) standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance based on two-
sided tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: New=1/Exit=0 (1) (2) 
Connections to the succeeding CEO 
Tie 0.047* 0.051** 
(0.026) (0.025) 
Other director characteristics 
Director Age -0.017*** 
(0.001) 
Female -0.013 
(0.032) 
Outside directorships -0.004 
(0.012) 
Busy director dummy -0.049 
(0.051) 
CEO experience 0.020 
(0.028) 
Related industry experience 0.075** 
(0.030) 
MBA degree 0.036 
(0.024) 
Constant 0.598*** 1.535*** 
(0.011) (0.075) 
Firm-CEO fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3,562 3,533 
R2 0.303 0.377 
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Table II.7. Director addition: additional analyses 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if an independent director is added to the board 
during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover, and 0 if an existing independent director 
left the board during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover. Definitions of explanatory 
variables are in Appendix II.A. Robust and clustered (at firm level) standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance based on two-
sided tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: New=1/Exit=0 (1) (2) 
Activity Tie -0.025 -0.027 
(0.048) (0.048) 
Education Tie 0.112* 
(0.058) 
Employment Tie 0.065* 
(0.035) 
Education Tie same time 0.079 
(0.175) 
Education Tie not same time 0.122** 
(0.061) 
Employment Tie same time 0.078* 
(0.041) 
Employment Tie not same time 0.038 
(0.058) 
Director characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm-CEO fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 3,533 3,533 
R2 0.412 0.414 
F-test: Education Tie same time=Education Tie not same time  
p-value 0.819 
F-test: Employment Tie same time=Employment Tie not same time  
p-value   0.532 
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Table II.8. Director addition: interaction effects 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if an independent director is added to the board 
during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover, and 0 if an existing independent director 
left the board during (-1, +1) years surrounding CEO turnover. Definitions of explanatory 
variables are in Appendix II.A. Robust and clustered (at firm level) standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance based on two-
sided tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions control for director 
characteristics and Firm-CEO fixed effects. 
Panel A: Dependent variable: New=1/Exit=0 (1) (2) (3) 
Tie 0.082** 0.101*** 0.093** 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038) 
Tie × ROA [-1]_High -0.080 -0.025 
(0.050) (0.064) 
Tie × BSIND [-1]_High -0.094* -0.091 
(0.049) (0.056) 
Tie × BSIND [-1]_Medium 
    
F-test: Tie + Tie × ROA [-1]_High 0.002 
p-value 0.944 
F-test: Tie + Tie × BSIND [-1]_High 0.007 0.068 
p-value 0.843 0.190 
F-test: Tie + Tie × BSIND [-1]_Medium 0.002 
p-value 0.960 
Observations 3,533 3,533 3,533 
R2 0.379 0.378 0.378 
Panel B: Dependent variable: New=1/Exit=0 (1) (2) (3) 
Tie 0.051** 0.004 0.102** 
(0.025) (0.032) (0.046) 
Tie × HHI [-1]_High 0.107** 
(0.050) 
Tie × After_SOX -0.062 
      (0.054) 
F-test: Tie + Tie × HHI [-1]_High 0.111*** 
p-value 0.004 
F-test: Tie + Tie × After_SOX 0.041 
p-value     0.158 
Observations 3,533 3,533 3,533 
R2 0.377 0.379 0.378 
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Table II.9. Board social dependence and firm value: baseline results 
The dependent variable is change in firm Tobin’s Q from one year prior to CEO turnover 
to two year after CEO turnover. Definitions of explanatory variables are in Appendix II.A. 
Robust and clustered (at firm level) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ∆TobinQ [-1,+2] (1) (2) 
∆Board social dependence [-1,+1] -0.511* -0.592*** 
(0.290) (0.213) 
Turnover characteristics 
Voluntary turnover 0.084 -0.000 
(0.080) (0.057) 
Outside CEO 0.214** 0.113* 
(0.086) (0.061) 
Firm characteristics 
TobinQ [-1] -0.583*** 
(0.034) 
∆ROA [-1, +2] 0.649 0.922** 
(0.526) (0.401) 
Log (Total Assets) [-1] 0.061** -0.044** 
(0.028) (0.018) 
R&D/Sale [-1] -0.083 0.077 
(0.073) (0.058) 
Governance controls 
Board size [-1] 0.010 -0.009 
(0.019) (0.013) 
Board independence [-1] -0.027 0.007 
(0.019) (0.014) 
CEO/Chairman duality[-1] 0.050 0.077 
(0.088) (0.060) 
Block holdings [-1] 0.008*** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.443 1.097** 
(0.362) (0.442) 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,275 1,275 
R2 0.094 0.548 
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Table II.10. Board social dependence and firm value: additional analyses 
The dependent variable is change in firm Tobin’s Q from one year prior to CEO turnover 
to two year after CEO turnover. Definitions of explanatory variables are in Appendix II.A. 
Robust and clustered (at firm level) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate the statistical significance based on two-sided tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: ∆TobinQ [-1,+2] (1) (2) 
∆Board social dependence [-1,+1] -0.534*** -0.460* 
(0.183) (0.278) 
∆Board social dependence [-1,+1] × R&D/Sale [-1]_High -0.232 
(0.518) 
∆Board social dependence [-1,+1] × BSD [-1]_High -0.279 
(0.399) 
Turnover characteristics 
Voluntary turnover -0.003 0.003 
(0.057) (0.057) 
Outside CEO 0.110* 0.098 
(0.060) (0.062) 
Firm characteristics 
TobinQ [-1] -0.580*** -0.583***
(0.036) (0.035) 
∆ROA [-1, +2] 0.871** 0.921** 
(0.404) (0.401) 
Log (Total Assets) [-1] -0.050*** -0.043** 
(0.018) (0.018) 
R&D/Sale [-1] High 0.137* 0.079 
(0.078) (0.058) 
Governance controls 
Board size [-1] -0.008 -0.010 
(0.013) (0.013) 
BSD [-1] High 0.007 0.010 
(0.014) (0.014) 
CEO/Chairman duality[-1] 0.073 0.073 
(0.060) (0.060) 
Block holdings [-1] -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 1.051** 1.136** 
(0.463) (0.440) 
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Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Observations 1,275 1,275 
R2 0.547 0.549 
∆Board social dependence [-1,+1] × (1+ R&D/Sale [-1]_High) -0.766 
p-value 0.123 
∆Board social dependence [-1,+1] × (1+BSD [-1]_High) -0.739 
p-value   0.014** 
  
47 
 
Appendix II.A. Variable definitions 
Board characteristics 
Board 
independence  
The number of directors that are legally independent, divided by the 
total number of directors on a board. Source: BoardEx. 
Board size The total number of directors on a board. Source: BoardEx. 
CEO/Chairman 
duality 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a CEO is also the chairman of the 
board, and 0 otherwise. Source: BoardEx. 
Individual director characteristics 
Director Tenure Director tenure on the board. Source: BoardEx. 
Age Director age. Source: BoardEx. 
Director Female A dummy variable that equals 1 if the director is female, and 0 
otherwise. Source: BoardEx. 
Outside 
directorship 
The number of outside directorships at public companies held by a 
director. Source: BoardEx. 
Busy director A dummy variable that equals 1 if the director holds three or more 
outside directorships at public companies. Source: BoardEx. 
CEO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the director has experience as a 
CEO of a public company. Source: BoardEx. 
Industry 
experience 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the director has been employed 
by other public firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry as the 
firm in question and 0 otherwise. Source: BoardEx. 
MBA A dummy variable that equals 1 if the director has an MBA degree 
and 0 otherwise. Source: BoardEx. 
Activity Tie A dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals are members of 
the same social organization, and 0 otherwise. Source: BoardEx. 
Education Tie A dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals attended the 
same university. Source: BoardEx. 
Employment Tie A dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals worked for the 
same firm at the same time and 0 otherwise. Source: BoardEx. 
Tie A dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals share at least one 
past connection via activity, education, or employment. Source: 
BoardEx. 
ConnectedDirector A dummy variable that equals 1 if an independent director is legally 
independent but socially connected to the CEO. Source: BoardEx. 
Board social 
dependence 
The number of legally independent but socially connected directors, 
divided by the total number of directors. Source: BoardEx. 
Governance control variables 
Block holdings The sum of percentage stock holdings by institutions whose 
ownership is greater than 5%, measured at the fiscal year end prior 
to CEO turnover. Source: Thomson Reuters. 
HHI Industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated in each fiscal year 
as the sum of the squares of percentage market share (in sales) of all 
firms in each 2-digit SIC industry. Source: Compustat. 
Firm characteristics 
Firm size The natural log of firm’s assets (#6), in millions of dollars. Source: 
Compustat. 
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Leverage Book leverage ratio, measured as total debt [long term debt (#9) + 
short term debt (#34)], divided by total assets (#6). Source: 
Compustat. 
Tobin’s Q Market to book ratio, calculated as [total assets (#6) + market value 
of equity (#25×#199) – book value of equity (#60)], scaled by total 
assets (#6). Source: Compustat. 
R&D/Sale R&D intensity, measured as research and development expenditure 
(#46) scaled by total sales (#12); set to 0 if missing. Source: 
Compustat. 
ROA (Operating 
performance) 
Fiscal year return to assets, measured as operating income before 
depreciation (#13) divided by book value of total assets (#6), 
adjusted by 2-digit SIC industry median ROA. Source: Compustat. 
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Chapter III 
Universities as Firms: The Case of U.S. Overseas Programs 
 
III.1. Introduction 
U.S. universities are the leading providers of higher education in the world. 
According to Newsweek 2006 global university ranking, 15 of the top 20 universities 
worldwide are American universities.27 More than 580,000 foreign undergraduate and 
graduate students are currently studying in the U.S. They spend around 15 billion dollars 
yearly, propelling the education industry into the fifth largest export service sector in the 
U.S. (Bhandari and Chow, 2007). U.S. universities are also active in a wide range of 
international activities, from setting up cross-country research labs to offering degree 
programs in foreign countries. 
This paper employs the standard economic analysis to study overseas degree 
programs offered by U.S. universities. If U.S. universities ever behave like firms, they are 
more likely to do so overseas, where they are not bound by the same set of obligations to 
domestic stakeholders as they are in the U.S. We analyze how university characteristics 
(i.e., supply side) and host country environment (i.e., demand side) interact to affect the 
likelihood of a university offering overseas programs, how universities choose location, 
                                                 
27 Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14321230/, accessed August 2007. 
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and how they determine program pricing (tuition). We examine these issues using hand-
collected data on U.S. overseas programs from multiple sources.  
Our analyses help address whether university motives for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) are different from those of multinational corporations (MNCs). While 
there are numerous studies about MNCs’ FDI, to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
economics-based, scientific study of foreign investment by U.S. universities. We also 
gather a unique data set that provides a comprehensive picture of the nature and type of 
overseas degree programs offered by U.S. universities. 
Although there are important differences between nonprofit universities and 
profit-seeking corporations, we assume universities, like firms, are subject to financial 
constraints and give high priority to increasing the present value of the revenue-cost 
difference. In such a framework, universities endued with different intellectual capital 
will self-select into two broad types: reputable institutions with selective admission 
standards and active research programs, or moderately ranked universities with relaxed 
admission standards and greater tuition dependency. Given these two types of universities, 
which type is more likely to have an overseas program? The answer is not immediately 
obvious. While moderately-ranked universities may be more willing suppliers, local 
demand would be greater for programs offered by the elite type. However, elite schools 
may be less willing to venture abroad because of their concerns for quality control, 
diluting brand names, and diverting home campus resources. 
We start the paper comparing universities to firms. We discuss how economic 
motives and non-pecuniary factors affect universities’ decision to offer overseas 
programs, providing an overview of the costs and benefits affecting the supply for and 
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demand of U.S. university overseas programs. This overview is based on our survey of 
articles published in the Chronicle of Higher Education. When we examine the historical 
archive of the Chronicle, we observe two major waves of U.S. overseas programs. The 
first wave occurred during the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, mainly led by moderately 
ranked universities with less stringent admission standards. After almost a decade of 
relative inactivity, a new surge of overseas programs appears, with active participation by 
highly reputable research universities. 
During the first wave, most overseas programs were apt to be supply driven and 
failed due to the lack of demand in the host countries. For instance, more than 30 U.S. 
universities established branch campuses in Japan during its economic boom in the late 
1980s. These universities had low name recognition and almost all of these overseas 
programs were closed by the mid-90s due to low enrollment. In contrast, the current wave 
is more demand driven, and the main suppliers are large research universities with high 
visibility and strong reputation. It appears that the best schools are making efforts to 
globalize their institutions and to provide higher education opportunities overseas. 
Finance plays a decisive role in offering overseas programs. Schools with greater 
tuition-dependency are more likely to offer overseas programs. Their location choice 
illustrates the important role economics plays in these programs. Real GDP per capita and 
tertiary school age population are two key determinants of the location choice. U.S. 
universities target countries with large potential markets where the local population has 
the economic means to pay for their services. They also follow U.S. multinational 
corporations’ FDI flows and invest in business friendly countries with loose regulations. 
Asia and the Middle East are the most popular destinations for overseas programs, but for 
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different reasons. Asia provides a large market with strong local demand for U.S. style 
education. Alternately, Middle Eastern countries are attractive because they grant 
substantial financial aid to sponsoring universities with their oil money. 
Our analysis of tuition charges reveals that U.S. universities adjust their pricing to 
local conditions. They discount tuition less in countries with higher real GDP per capita. 
Undergraduate degree programs are discounted more than master degree programs 
because of greater local competition in the market for undergraduate degree programs. 
When universities reduce costs by forging local university partnerships and/or by 
obtaining financial support from local governments, they do not pass on the savings to 
local students in the form of lower tuition. 
In sum, universities behave much like multinational corporations when they make 
overseas investments and operate overseas programs. 
III.2. Universities as firms 
III.2.A. Organizational structure and objective function 
Universities differ from for-profit corporations in various ways. Universities 
provide both private and public goods. Their two main products are knowledge creation 
and knowledge dissemination through research and teaching. Research results are freely 
available to most members of society and help stimulate economic growth. Knowledge 
dissemination increases human capital, and the benefits can be direct to those who 
receive higher education, or indirect to those who benefit from the economic growth 
attributable to the development and accumulation of human capital through higher 
education. The need for higher education has become crucial in the age of globalization, 
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as knowledge-based workforces have become an essential ingredient to acquire and 
maintain a competitive edge in the market place.  
The payoffs from knowledge creation take a long time to be realized and are 
highly uncertain, yet they generate positive externalities to society. In turn, society 
supports these activities by nonprofit universities through gifts and endowments from the 
private sector and subsidies from local and federal governments. The Digest of Education 
Statistics (2007) reports that during the 2004-2005 academic year, total tuition revenue 
represented only 16.4% of total revenue for all public degree-granting institutions and 
29.5% for all private nonprofit degree-granting institutions in the U.S. Society does not 
provide much support for for-profit universities, as it expects them to support their own 
profit-generating activities.28  
Governance of universities is more complicated than governance of corporations. 
Unlike private enterprises with residual claim holders (stockholders), nonprofit 
universities have multiple stakeholders without a clearly defined pecking order, which 
leads to multiple objectives without well-defined priorities. Coleman (1973) compares 
universities to shells that encompass a variety of activities: teaching, research activities 
supported by government and private organizations, and external consulting. These 
activities often create conflicts of commitment and interest, leading to compromises in 
teaching and research effectiveness, although spillover effects (e.g., research and 
consulting experience benefiting the quality and effectiveness of teaching) may lessen the 
costs. Lacking well-defined priorities, faculty resource allocations are likely to be made 
                                                 
28 See Goldin and Katz (1999) for a review of the history of universities. Nonprofit organizations are 
preferred to for-profit organizations when consumers are uncertain about product quality due to asymmetric 
information (Easley and O'Hara, 1983). 
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for the benefits of individual faculty, and some universities may resemble a collection of 
little kingdoms built around individual faculty. Such an organizational form is not 
necessarily bad: It may encourage entrepreneurship on the part of individual faculty, 
making them more creative and productive. It also may make them more accountable for 
their individual actions. However, such an organizational form may make it difficult to 
create synergies between individual talents and for the university to act as a cohesive unit 
to meet various, and often conflicting, demands of the stakeholders. 
Regardless of the organizational form a university takes, it must provide services 
to various stakeholders, who ultimately decide on the amount of its financial resources.  
Universities generate revenues from tuition; private gifts and endowments; state subsidies; 
and federal and private grants. Like firms, they strive to maximize the present value of 
the revenue-cost difference, not because they are profit maximizing, but because they 
want to maximize financial resources available for their pursuit of various goals and 
objectives, however ambiguous they may be.29  
The strategies universities adopt to maximize the present value of the revenue-
cost difference depends on the university type. Consider an elite university with high 
intellectual capital based on past research accomplishments, academic traditions, and 
highly selective admission standards, yielding a strong reputation and a large number of 
prominent and loyal alumni. Its present value of the revenue-cost difference will be 
higher if the school maintains its high-quality research and teaching than if it suddenly 
turns into a tuition-maximizing entity by compromising its standards on research and 
teaching. 
                                                 
29 Winston (1999) also recognizes that nonprofit organizations’ behavior may appear profit driven because 
of budget constraints. 
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Unlike corporations, universities have strong incentives to be selective in 
choosing customers because of the quality of output−student academic performance, job 
placement, and life time achievement− depends on the quality of input−student quality 
and effort. That is, universities employ a customer-input technology (Rothschild and 
White, 1995). Furthermore, peer effects of fellow students generate externalities to the 
quality of output; e.g., having good students helps to improve the academic performance 
of fellow students (Sacerdote, 2001). This is one of the reasons universities subsidize 
their customers (students) with financial aid and maintain certain admission standards. 
Students’ learning is also enhanced by research activities (Clotfelter, 1999). Elite 
universities receive feedback effects from maintaining high quality research and teaching 
because they tend to attract more high-quality faculty and students who can further 
improve their quality and reputation. That is, high-quality research and teaching has a 
“multiplier effect” (Hoxby, 1997; Winston, 1999).  
These various attributes and effects give an elite university strong incentive to 
maintain its high-quality research and teaching and selective admission standards. The 
result is a continuation of high-quality products to serve their stakeholders, who will, in 
turn, provide the necessary financial resources for the university to carry on its 
knowledge creation and dissemination activities. At the same time, high quality students 
and faculty agglomerate in elite universities with ample financial resources. 
In contrast, a new university with low intellectual capital may have little chance to 
receive private gifts and endowments to support high-quality teaching and research. The 
present value of the revenue-cost difference will be higher if it forgoes costly research 
activities and maximizes tuition revenue by relaxing admission standards. Such 
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universities have little chance of survival if they imitate selective admission standards 
and pursuit of costly research activities of elite universities, unless they can obtain 
unusually large public subsidies or private gifts. In other words, to universities with low 
intellectual capital, survival is of greater concern than taking advantage of the customer-
input technology, peer effects, and the multiplier effects that are important to elite 
universities.  Therefore, universities with low intellectual capital will be more reliant on 
tuition revenue and compete for customers (students) by using less selective admission 
standards. 
Thus, we hypothesize that universities will self-select into either highly reputable 
institutions with high-quality teaching and research or largely tuition-dependent 
institutions that appear financially driven. We predict that these two types will follow 
different strategies in both knowledge creation and dissemination activities. Whereas the 
highly reputable will devote considerable resources to research and maintain highly 
selective admission standards, the tuition- dependent will maximize tuition revenues with 
relaxed admission standards. 
III.2.B. Economic motives for overseas ventures 
Are highly reputable universities or tuition-dependent ones more likely to provide 
overseas degree programs? The answer is not obvious. Tuition-dependent universities 
will view overseas programs as opportunities to increase revenues and to distinguish 
themselves from rival schools in terms of international presence; thus, they will be more 
willing suppliers. 30  However, a successful, financially viable program requires a demand 
                                                 
30 Winston (1999) points out U.S. universities with low financial resources tend to employ less costly 
teaching methods such as distance learning and also recruit more foreign and older students to generate 
more revenues.  
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for its services in the local economy. Because education is a large, one-time investment 
for students, demand is determined by a trade-off between school reputation and the costs 
of education. The local market will be less receptive to a program offered by a U.S. 
university with moderate reputation, unless it offers a deep discount in tuition. In contrast, 
more reputable schools will be able to charge higher tuition and/or enjoy greater 
demand.31 However, an elite university may be less willing to supply overseas programs 
because of its concern about controlling quality from a distance. They have more to lose 
by putting their reputation at stake.  
In this section, we provide an overview of the costs and benefits affecting the 
supply- and-demand for U.S. overseas programs. We then explore non-pecuniary factors 
that may affect the programs. In the following empirical section, we analyze the interplay 
of these supply-and-demand considerations by examining the characteristics of 
universities offering overseas programs and of countries hosting the programs. 
B.1. Supply 
B.1.i. Financial benefits 
The singular, most obvious financial benefit is tuition revenue. Successfully 
operating overseas programs also broaden a university’s name recognition globally and 
attract future foreign donors. Universities with moderate reputations may have less to 
lose reputationally if their overseas programs lack quality. And because they are more 
tuition-dependent, their programs will offer more expansive admission standards. 
                                                 
31 Hoxby (1997) argues that only elite universities are able to compete for the best students at the national 
level. Elite universities also enjoy advantages in the global education market due to yearly publication of 
various worldwide university rankings readily available on the internet. 
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Highly esteemed U.S. universities, by contrast, may be less willing to provide 
overseas programs because of their concerns for quality control, possible dilution of their 
brand names, and diversion of faculty resources from research. However, when foreign 
governments seek to expand higher education opportunities for their citizens through 
overseas programs, they are more likely to allow/invite highly ranked universities to 
establish programs, and may even entice them with financial subsidies. Consequently, 
successful programs are more likely to be in those disciplines in which the sponsoring 
universities already enjoy comparative strengths.  
B.1.ii. Financial costs 
Universities need physical assets (e.g., classrooms and equipment) and human 
capital (e.g., faculty and staff) to establish overseas programs. However, compared to 
manufacturing firms, universities require fewer physical assets. Although this may help 
keep fixed costs relatively low, variable costs tend to be higher than domestic programs 
because faculty often garner extra compensation for teaching in overseas programs. For 
example, Carnegie Mellon University gives their U.S.-based faculty teaching on its Qatar 
campus a 25% salary increase and provides them with amenities.32 The Global MBA 
Program at the University of Michigan pays its faculty an additional 18.75% of their base 
salary plus an overseas trip inconvenience fee of 2.5% to teach a ten-day, 2.25 credit-
hour course in Asia. 
To cover these higher costs, universities may pass through the additional costs as 
a tuition surcharge, which lowers demand and keeps class sizes small. An alternative 
strategy is to hire local faculty and/or offer joint programs with local universities, which 
                                                 
32 Bollag, Burton. “American's hot new export: higher education.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
February 17, 2006. 
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tends to lower the quality and prestige of the program. Some top ranked universities also 
may be able to convince local governments to provide financial support to cover costs. 
B.2. Demand 
In developing countries, the university attendance rate of the college age 
population is below 15%, much lower than the 40% to 50% in developed countries.33 To 
the extent that an insufficient supply of higher education opportunities contributes to the 
low college-attendance rate in developing countries, overseas programs provide a 
valuable service in satisfying the unmet demand.  
B.2.i. Alternative choices 
The extent that overseas programs resolve the unmet educational demand depends 
on alternative choices available to local students. The choices include attending a local 
university and going abroad for their degrees. Students will weigh the costs and benefits 
of these alternatives against attending an overseas program.  
a) Local colleges  
Students’ college choices are highly sensitive to university rankings, as there is a 
universal belief that a degree from a higher ranked university will enable a graduate to 
find a better job with a higher salary (Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg, 1999; Black and 
Smith, 2006). Whether students perceive undergraduate overseas programs as higher-
quality than programs offered by their local colleges depends upon the reputation of the 
provider. If the provider is a top ranked American university, students are more likely to 
consider the program as better than domestic programs and will be attracted to it. 
However, most undergraduate overseas programs are offered by moderately ranked U.S. 
                                                 
33 Mcmurtrie, Beth. “The global campus, American colleges connect with the broader world.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, March 2, 2007. 
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universities. These programs are not necessarily viewed as superior to domestic colleges 
and tend to be in low demand among top high school graduates.  Moreover, many 
overseas programs hire local faculty to staff some courses, which may affect students’ 
perceptions of program quality. The education market is considered a “trust market” 
where the quality of output is difficult to judge. Thus, it may take a while for overseas 
programs to build up their reputation, limiting the demand for the program and the price 
they can charge for their products. 
Overseas programs usually offer courses in a limited number of disciplines, 
typically focusing on areas such as computer science and business, whereas local colleges 
offer a greater variety of courses in a wider range of disciplines. Because of their 
narrower offerings, students may think that overseas programs do not provide a 
comprehensive college experience, deterring many qualified students from enrolling. 
Furthermore, students may be concerned with the continuity of overseas programs. The 
uncertainty over the continuity may pose a risk on the value of the degree, although the 
adverse effects can be mitigated if the degree granting institution has a proven track 
record at its home campus.  
b) Studying in the U.S. 
Local students may instead choose to attend universities in the U.S. This choice 
gives a better opportunity to improve their English language skills, a highly valued 
commodity in the global market. To some students, experiencing American culture 
throughout their campus lives is almost as important as their college degrees. Studying in 
the U.S. also provides some students an interim step to immigrate to the U.S. Those who 
highly value these non-degree experiences or opportunities will not be attracted to 
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overseas programs. Furthermore, degrees earned through overseas programs may be 
perceived as less prestigious. 
However, attending a university in the U.S. tends to be more costly. Students have 
to spend several years away from their family and friends, incurring high traveling and 
living expenses. They also may have to risk their career opportunities with their current 
employers. Overseas programs offer a less expensive alternative to studying abroad, 
targeting students who want foreign degrees without leaving their homeland. Individuals 
unwilling to incur the higher expenses, unable to obtain visas to study in the U.S., and/or 
unwilling to leave their current jobs because of high opportunity costs (e.g., managers 
interested in executive MBA programs) are the primary targets of the overseas programs. 
Most of these overseas programs also offer the opportunity for an American campus 
experience before graduation. 
B.2.ii. Host country environment 
Demand also depends on the host country’s institutional characteristics, which are 
shown to have significant impacts on how foreign ideas and systems are accepted. Djelic 
(1998) documents significant differences in the level of acceptance and adoption of 
American corporate capitalism between France, Germany, and Italy after World War II, 
which are attributed to the difference in local political and economic environments. 
Similar forces may apply to overseas programs: They are more likely to be offered and be 
successful in countries where government policies are friendly in terms of financial 
support and/or regulation.34  
                                                 
34 See Green (2007) for a description of government policies regulating foreign providers of higher 
education. 
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Many U.S. universities have recently established overseas programs in the 
Education City of Qatar and Knowledge Valley of United Arab Emirates (UAE) because 
of favorable government policies and generous financial support. Some Asian countries, 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, in their pursuit of becoming regional 
education hubs, actively encourage overseas programs by foreign universities. 
III.2.C. Non-pecuniary factors 
Firms venture abroad mainly to generate profits, and their location choices are 
largely determined by economic considerations.35 Their decisions also are influenced by 
non-pecuniary factors. Because universities’ stakeholders are more diverse without 
clearly defined pecking order, non-pecuniary factors may play a more important role in 
setting up overseas programs.  
C.1. Network dynamics 
Implementation decisions, such as location choice, are influenced by 
organizational and network dynamics. Setting up educational programs in foreign 
countries is not an easy task. It may take years to complete the whole process from 
selecting program location, signing a mutual agreement (if a local partner is involved), 
seeking government approval (if required), campus planning, to admitting the first class 
of students. To facilitate this process, some schools choose locations where they already 
have established connections either officially or unofficially through personal contacts. 
For instance, Cornell Medical School set up a branch campus in Qatar because one of 
                                                 
35 For instance, firms in natural resource industries invest in countries where the resources are located. 
Manufacturing firms invest in less developed countries to take advantage of cheap labor. Service industries 
invest in countries with large customer bases. See Caves (1996) for a review on foreign direct investment 
of U.S. multinational firms. 
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their trustees encouraged them to do so and helped arrange financial support.36 Overseas 
programs often have faculty directors who are born or have ethnic roots in the country of 
the program location.  
C.2. Campus internationalization 
An important benefit of offering overseas programs is broadening international 
perspectives of American faculty and students. Faculty benefit from face-to-face 
interactions with foreign students and researchers. They gain valuable international 
experience from staying abroad, which helps expand the scope of teaching and research. 
Some overseas programs facilitate American students study abroad, enriching their 
cultural experience. Courses are usually taught in English and credits can be easily 
transferred back to their home campuses. However, these benefits are not without costs. 
Faculty have to be away from home, spend less time on research, and teach in unfamiliar 
foreign surroundings, all of which make it difficult to secure a sufficient number of U.S. 
faculty for the long term.  
C.3. Status competition 
“Prestige maximization” (James, 1990) and “the pursuit of excellence” (Clotfelter, 
1996) are often considered most important objectives for university administrators. 
Universities compete for high quality faculty and students. They compete for faculty at 
the national level using tenure, lighter teaching loads, and plentiful research grants. This 
competition is especially severe among research oriented elite universities. To the extent 
that universities with higher status tend to receive greater endowments and gifts (e.g., 
Harvard), the status competition is not unrelated to economic motives. 
                                                 
36 This was pointed out to us by Ronald Ehrenberg during the NBER Conference on US Universities in a 
Global Market. 
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Universities compete for students using various means, ranging from merit- and 
need-based financial aid to large expenditures to improve campus facilities (e.g., 
Clotfelter, 1999). Like firms, universities advertise the beauty of their campuses and 
recreational facilities (Hutchins, 1936). They may also collude to ease the burden of 
competition. In 1991, The U.S. Justice Department charged eight Ivy League schools and 
MIT with violations of antitrust laws. Soon thereafter, the Ivy League universities agreed 
to stop comparing the aid packages of students admitted.37 Perhaps as a consequence, the 
competition became stiffer, as Stanford and Harvard introduced early admission policies 
and other schools such as Yale and Princeton adopted a variety of financial aid packages 
(Clotfelter and Rothschild, 1993; Winston, 1999). 
The international presence through overseas program may give a university an 
edge in this status competition. Setting up overseas programs signals a university’s 
commitment to internationalization, which is given an important weight in various 
influential college ranking systems. For example, the U.S. News and World Report 
ranking considers campus internationalization an important aspect of college 
competitiveness. Higher undergraduate college rankings help recruit not only higher-
quality students but also higher caliber research faculty through the halo effect (Kim, 
Morse, and Zingales, 2009).  
C.4. Altruism 
It is possible that there is an altruistic motive in offering overseas programs. It is 
not unreasonable for American educators to believe their higher education system is the 
best. In their desire to help fellow mankind, they may want to set up American-style 
                                                 
37 Jaschik, Scott. “Justice Department asks at least 15 colleges for detailed information on admissions.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, July 24, 1991. 
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higher education institutions in countries lacking good higher education systems. What 
we have in mind are universities set up by missionaries in developing countries. But these 
are not overseas programs. They are full pledged local universities founded by 
missionaries. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests many overseas programs set up by elite universities 
receive substantial financial support from foreign countries. Our empirical results 
indicate that universities establish programs in countries where there are sufficient 
student population that can afford an American-style higher education. If altruism were 
an important motive for the recent surge in U.S. overseas programs, we should have 
observed more media coverage of attempts to establish overseas programs in low income 
countries where people cannot afford higher education. However, this is not what we 
observe. The Chronicle reports very few U.S. overseas programs in Africa, a continent 
desperately in need of improvement in both quantity and quality of higher education.38   
III.3. Anecdotal evidence 
There is a dearth of empirical evidence on U.S. universities’ overseas programs. 
Thus, our initial step is to gather pertinent information about the overseas activities of 
U.S. universities. We choose the Chronicle of Higher Education because it is the leading 
source of information on university activities. Its International Section provides 
numerous anecdotes on overseas activities, which vary from student exchange programs, 
international research collaboration, to overseas degree programs. We focus on overseas 
degree programs. Some are financially supported by foreign governments and partners, 
                                                 
38 It may be that there is insufficient high school graduates capable of handling course work offered by 
American universities overseas, discouraging even the altruistic from attempting to establish overseas 
programs in Africa.    
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but many programs must be financially self-sufficient to avoid draining resources from 
home campuses. In this regard, these programs have to be run, at least partially, like 
business models. 
When we examine the historical archive of the Chronicle, an interesting pattern 
emerges. Most of the Chronicle articles on overseas programs are published in two time 
periods: between the late 1980s and early 1990s, and more recently, beginning in the 
early 2000s. The earlier articles are simple. They either announce initiation of new 
programs or report program failures and campus closures. The articles are short and the 
contents lack details. Then, after almost a decade of sporadic coverage and relative 
silence about overseas programs, there is a resurgence of articles beginning in 2000. They 
provide rather extensive coverage of overseas programs initiated mostly by top ranked 
U.S. universities. These recent articles provide more details about the overseas programs, 
including how the deals are structured with foreign governments.  
Why have elite U.S. universities suddenly started to offer overseas programs? Is 
this a second wave of overseas programs with different players? Or does the new spate of 
articles simply reflect a resurgence of the first wave? To analyze these questions, we use 
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) at the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) and download the overseas enrollment data from IPEDS 
enrollment surveys conducted in 1986, 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998. In these 
surveys, universities are asked to report their student enrollment numbers on branch 
campuses in foreign countries. In 1986, 110 schools report overseas enrollment; by 1998 
the number of schools reporting overseas enrollment shrinks to 61. The total overseas 
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enrollment39 reported on all branch campuses in 1986 is 21,090 students, peaks in 1995 at 
48,043 students, and gradually decreases to 23,534 students in 1998. The majority of 
these overseas programs are started by lesser-known American universities and colleges 
without doctoral programs. Less than 5% of the programs during this time period are 
sponsored by top research universities with doctoral programs. IPEDS dropped overseas 
enrollment questions from their enrollment surveys after 1998, presumably due to a 
significant decrease in the number of overseas programs and a concomitant decline in 
media interest. 
The decline in the first wave of U.S. overseas programs was preceded by a 
spectacular failure of American overseas programs in Japan. During the Japanese 
economic boom in the late 1980s, more than 30 U.S. universities established branch 
campuses there, hoping their western-style education programs would attract sufficient 
Japanese students. However, most programs struggled with low student enrollment and 
were closed by the mid 1990s. Temple University Japan is one of the rare survivors after 
16 years of operation. It currently has about 3,000 students enrolled (Bhandari and Chow, 
2007); however, at least until 2000, the branch campus reportedly lost $50 million a 
year.40 
Most U.S. universities involved in these Japanese overseas programs had low 
name recognition and, as a result, they were not able to attract students who could get 
into the upper tier Japanese universities. Location was another contributing factor. A 
number of U.S. universities, lured by financial support from local governments, set up 
                                                 
39 Total enrollment includes full-time and part-time students enrolled at the undergraduate, graduate, and 
professional degree levels. 
40 McMurtrie, Beth. “Culture and unrealistic expectations challenge American campuses in Japan.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, June 2, 2000. 
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their programs in small towns, which hoped to use the presence of U.S. overseas 
programs to stem the flight of their young people to larger metropolitan areas. However, 
these locations only made the programs less attractive to those who preferred to attend 
college in large cities. Language was also a problem. Even with English preparatory 
courses, students struggled to achieve sufficient English proficiency to enroll in degree 
programs. To make matters worse, many U.S. universities got into financial disputes with 
local partners, who often sacrificed academic integrity in exchange for tuition money. 
Some partners even committed outright financial fraud.41 These problems contributed to 
eventual closure of most of the programs. 
During the recent resurgence in overseas programs by U.S. universities, the 
leading players are different. They tend to be well established, highly ranked research 
universities with doctoral programs. They also appear to follow the recent globalization 
trend, somewhat analogous to U.S. multinationals’ FDI outflows. 
There is a perception that U.S. universities are not as involved in FDI as MNCs, 
which derive about 30% of their total sales revenue from foreign affiliates. The 
perception could be wrong because appropriate comparisons are knowledge-based 
service industries such as information and banking, which have less FDI. Table III.1 
shows that contributions made by foreign affiliates to U.S. firms’ total sales revenue 
during 1999 through 2004 increased for most industries. More important, it shows that 
for information and financial services industries, foreign affiliates’ contribution to total 
sales revenue averages only about 15%. Although we do not have sufficient data to make 
a general comparison, the case of University of Chicago Booth School of Business is 
                                                 
41 McMurtrie, Beth. “Culture and unrealistic expectations challenge American campuses in Japan.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, June 2, 2000. 
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illustrative. Chicago offers overseas Executive MBA programs in London and Singapore. 
According to its website, tuition revenue from the overseas programs represents about 14% 
of its total tuition revenue in 2006.42 This is quite comparable to that of the other 
knowledge-based industries, suggesting that some units of U.S. universities are as active 
in generating overseas revenues as U.S. multinational corporations. 
Of late, overseas programs getting the most press coverage are those set up by 
upper tier U.S. research universities in the Middle East (mainly Qatar and UAE). The 
Education City in Qatar, founded by the Qatar Foundation, spends $2 billion a year to 
host the branch campuses of Cornell University, Carnegie Mellon University, and 
others.43 The Qatar Foundation pays for all the costs of these overseas programs. For 
example, it offered Cornell medical school $750 million to provide medical programs in 
the Education City.44 
Money seems to be an important determinant in decisions to offer these overseas 
programs. According to one Chronicle article, the University of North Carolina declined 
to set up an overseas program in the Middle East region because the university was 
offered only $10 million, falling short of the $35 million the university requested.45 
Another article reports that New York University chose Dubai over Abu Dhabi because 
Abu Dhabi did not meet the university’s demand for a $50 million upfront fee, plus 
                                                 
42 Our calculation is based on tuition data information obtained from the University of Chicago Booth 
School of Business website at http://www.chicagobooth.edu/, accessed August 2007. Because their 
overseas tuition includes costs of books, materials, and other fees, the 14% may be a slight overestimation 
of the actual contribution made by the school’s overseas programs. 
43 Krieger, Zvika. “An academic building boom transforms the Persian gulf.” The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, March 28, 2008. 
44 Mangan, Katherine S. “Cornell’s medical school will open degree granting branch in Qatar.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, April 20, 2001. 
45 Mangan, Katherine S. “Qatar courts American colleges.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 
6, 2002. 
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payment for construction and expenses.46 Michigan State University will open a branch 
campus in the UAE and receive a line of credit with favorable terms in several million 
dollars from Tecom Investments.47 
Asia is another popular destination for overseas programs. In their efforts to 
become regional higher education hubs, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea offer 
financial support and tax exemptions to attract foreign universities’ overseas degree 
programs. Many U.S., U.K., and Australian universities have responded by setting up 
degree programs there, or are currently in negotiations to do so. However, local 
government support does not guarantee success. The University of New South Wales set 
up the first comprehensive foreign university in Singapore with partial financing from 
Singapore’s Economic Development Board. It hoped to enroll 300 students in the first 
semester and had a target enrollment number of 15,000 students by 2020. However, it 
attracted only 148 students and projected a deficit of $15 million. The branch campus 
was shut down in June 2007 after only three months of operation.48 Johns Hopkins 
University’s Biomedical Center in Singapore also closed in 2007 because of its failure to 
attract sufficient scientists and Ph.D. students despite the $50 million the Singapore 
government spent to support the program.49 
Other Asian countries, especially those with large college age populations, such 
as China and India, also attract numerous U.S. universities. Although we were unable to 
                                                 
46 Krieger, Zvika. “An academic building boom transforms the Persian gulf.” The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, March 28, 2008. 
47 Fischer, Karin. “How the deal was done: Michigan State in Dubai.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
March 28, 2008. 
48 Forss, Pearl. “University of New South Wales Singapore campus to shut in June.” Channel NewsAsia, 
May 23, 2007. 
49 Overland, Martha Ann. “Singapore to close Johns Hopkins Biomedical Center.” The Chronicle of Higher 
Education, August 11, 2006. 
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find profiles of many of these programs, one Chronicle article reports that at least 66 such 
programs exist in India.50 Again, the huge potential demand in these countries does not 
guarantee success for overseas programs. Some business schools failed in China because 
they could not attract enough executives with sufficient English proficiency to enroll in 
their programs.51 
Europe attracts relatively few U.S. overseas programs, although it shares the same 
Western culture and is a popular destination for FDI outflow from the U.S.  Several 
factors weaken the competitive edge of U.S. overseas programs there. First, Europe 
enjoys the presence of several prominent, highly-ranked universities. Second, it is easier 
for European students to come to the U.S. for higher education. Income disparities, 
culture, and language present lower barriers for Europeans. It is also much easier for 
Europeans to obtain U.S. visas in comparison to other nationalities, especially after 9/11.  
For similar reasons, Australia and New Zealand attract relatively few U.S. overseas 
programs. 
European and Oceania universities are also the main competitors of U.S. 
universities for foreign students. According to a report by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (2007), U.S. universities enrolled about 540,000 foreign 
students in 2005, making it the most popular destination for international students. U.K. 
and Australia are not far behind; their universities enrolled approximately 324,000 and 
162,000 foreign students, respectively. These two countries have also been very active in 
                                                 
50 Neelakantan, Shailaja. “In India, limits on foreign universities lead to creative partnerships.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, February 8, 2008. 
51 Damast, Alison. “China: why western b-schools are leaving.” Business Week, May 15, 2008. 
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setting up overseas programs.52 The University of Nottingham was the first foreign 
university to set up a branch campus in China and the University of New South Wales 
was the first to set up a branch campus in Singapore. However, recent overseas activities 
of Australian universities are slowing down,53 presumably due to low demand for their 
degrees.54 Failures of U.K. overseas programs have also been reported in the media.55  
For those few U.S. universities offering overseas programs in Europe, location is 
important. For example, Chicago initiated a part-time executive MBA program in 
Barcelona in 1994, but moved to London in 2005. London is the financial center for 
Europe. Chicago, best known for finance, wanted to move closer to its potential clients. 
There are also a number of U.S. overseas programs in South America. The 
majority of these programs are established by American universities located in the 
southern and western regions, which are more heavily populated with Hispanics.56 Their 
geographic and cultural proximity may explain why these universities are more likely to 
offer programs in South America. 
Few U.S. overseas programs in Africa are reported in the press.57 Income 
disparities, insufficient high school graduates able to handle course work offered by 
American universities, government instability, and volatility in the region all may play a 
                                                 
52 New Zealand Ministry of Education (2001), available at 
http://www.minedu.govt.nz/educationSectors/InternationalEducation/Initiatives/Offshore%20Education/NZ
sOffshorePublicTertiaryEducationProgrammes.aspx , accessed August 2008. 
53 Cohen, David. “Australian universities cull overseas programs.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
July 20, 2007. 
54 Slattery, Luke. “‘Beer and beaches’ image said to hurt Australia's higher-education ‘brand’.” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, November 30, 2007. 
55 Damast, Alison. “China: why western b-schools are leaving.” Business Week, May 15, 2008. 
56 See: http://www.censusscope.org/us/map_hispanicpop.html.  
57 Redden (2007) reports that through a World Bank grant Cornell University offers a master’s degree 
program in Agriculture and Rural Development in Ethiopia. See Redden, Elizabeth. “Cornell degree, 
offered in Africa.” Inside Higher Ed, September 21, 2007. 
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role in keeping U.S. overseas programs out of a continent that desperately needs 
improvement in the quantity and quality of higher education.  
III.4. Empirical analysis 
To conduct an empirical investigation of the interplay of supply and demand, we 
collect data on overseas programs, university characteristics, and host country 
characteristics. We use these data to identify which universities are more likely to offer 
overseas programs, what characteristics of host countries are important in attracting U.S. 
university programs, and how overseas programs are priced relative to their home 
campus tuitions. 
III.4.A. Sample construction 
A.1. Data on overseas programs 
Our dataset covers U.S. overseas programs from January 1988 through August 
2008 because our online access to The Chronicle of Higher Education via Proquest 
Research Library starts in January 1988. The data is hand-collected using a three-step 
search process. We first search the Chronicle of Higher Education using terms “overseas,” 
“offshore,” and “branch campus.” We read all newspaper articles and identify 
universities with overseas programs in foreign countries during this period. We 
supplement the data with Observatory on Higher Education (OBHE) breaking news and 
special reports headlines,58 American Council on Education (ACE) publications (Green, 
2007; Green, Luu, and Burris, 2008), and Institute of International Education (IIE) Open 
Doors Report 2007 (Bhandari and Chow, 2007). We include an overseas program in our 
sample whether it is failed, struggling, or forthcoming (i.e., agreement reached). An 
                                                 
58 We read the publicly available headlines of their news articles and special reports on the OBHE website 
at http://www.obhe.ac.uk/news/ and http://www.obhe.ac.uk/products/reports/ . 
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overseas program may or may not have a partner in the host country, and it may have a 
“brick and mortar” presence in the host country or offer degree programs only through 
online education. We exclude those in the discussion stage, or those awarding only 
certificates rather than degrees.59 All the degree programs included in our sample require 
significant commitment from U.S. universities (i.e., awarding degrees overseas) and put 
their reputation at stake. 
For each overseas program we identify, we run additional Chronicle of Higher 
Education searches using the sponsoring university name and the location of the overseas 
program to obtain necessary information. When available, we record information on 
discipline, establishment date, curriculum, size, and financing of the programs. 
For information concerning tuition and other program characteristics not covered 
in the articles, we search the websites of the overseas programs using the university’s 
name and location of the program, and record additional information on tuition. 
Sometimes this additional search leads to more overseas degree programs offered by the 
same universities. Based on these sample selection processes and criteria, we identify 159 
overseas programs offered by 86 U.S. universities in 46 countries. 60   
A.2. Data on university characteristics 
                                                 
59 Medical programs are an exception. Medical programs offered by U.S. institutions abroad usually do not 
award foreign students degrees or certificates qualifying them to practice medicine in the U.S. However, 
the students are mainly trained by U.S. institutions, and we include these medical programs in our sample. 
60 The CGS (2007) survey of graduate schools finds that 29% of American graduate schools have 
established collaborative overseas degree programs. Our sample is smaller because their survey includes 
programs that award certificates. Our sample is also smaller than Green, Luu, and Burris’s (2008) survey 
that identifies 101 U.S. degree granting institutions. The discrepancy here seems to be mainly due to media 
coverage bias; namely, overseas programs offered by lower level schools and small colleges are less likely 
to be reported. These omissions should not affect our results because our empirical analyses focus only on 
overseas activities of doctoral and master degree level institutions.  
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U.S. universities come in many different forms and shapes in both intellectual and 
physical contexts. To categorize university types, we rely on the Carnegie Basic 
Classification (2005),61 which categorizes universities into very high research universities, 
high research universities, research universities, master’s universities, baccalaureate 
colleges, associate’s colleges, and other specialized institutions. 
To obtain an objective measure of the ranking among research universities, we 
use the 2007-2008 university rankings from four sources62: American’s best national 
universities from U.S. News & World Report63, Top 100 Global Universities from 
Newsweek64, THE-QS World University Rankings from The Times Higher Education 
Supplement (THES) and Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) 65 and Academic Rankings of 
World Universities from Shanghai Jiaotong University.66 The last two are compiled by 
ranking agencies outside the United States (British and Chinese, respectively) and reflect 
the reputation and competitiveness of U.S. universities outside the U.S., which suits our 
purpose of analyzing U.S. degree programs abroad. The U.S. News & World Report and 
Newsweek rankings are the most widely cited and are readily available on the internet to 
all foreign students interested in U.S. universities. Moreover, these four rankings employ 
                                                 
61 The data is obtained from Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) 2005 Institutional 
Characteristics Survey. Each UnitID is treated as a university. UnitID is a unique identification number 
assigned to postsecondary institutions surveyed by IPEDS. Institutions participating in Federal financial 
assistance programs are required to complete IPEDS surveys. 
62 Worldwide ranking sources can be found at Wikipedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/College_and_university_rankings).When these ranking sources include 
foreign universities, we re-rank American universities excluding foreign universities. The Newsweek 
ranking is for year 2006.  
63 Available at http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/college/national-search/c_final_tier+1, 
accessed December 2008. 
64 Available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14321230/ , accessed August 2007. 
65 Available at 
http://www.topuniversities.com/worlduniversityrankings/results/2007/overall_rankings/top_400_universitie
s/, accessed December 2008. 
66 Available at http://www.arwu.org/rank/2007/ARWU2007_TopAmer.htm, accessed December 2008. 
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a broad range of ranking methodologies and measure different dimensions of university 
reputation. For example, U.S. News & World Report uses evaluations from peer 
institutions, faculty and financial resources, and student selectivity to construct the 
ranking. In contrast, Shanghai Jiaotong University bases its university ranking on the 
numbers of publications in Science and Nature, Nobel laureates, and Fields Medal 
winners. Relying on these four rankings takes into account both domestic and 
international reputation and alleviates some of the subjectivity inherent in using a single 
ranking methodology. 
Table III.2 shows the correlation between the four ranking sources. They are all 
highly correlated with each other. Yet, the correlations also indicate substantial variation 
across the rankings. This table also contains 2005 university endowment per full time 
equivalent (FTE) enrollment, Endow_FTE, which is obtained from 2005 IPEDS college 
finance survey. All four university rankings are highly correlated with the level of 
endowment, demonstrating the important role endowment plays in university visibility 
and reputation. 
Sixty-seven U.S. universities appear at least once as top 50 in at least one of the 
four rankings.67 We follow Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009) and use the Borda Count 
method to average the relative rankings within this group of 67 universities. A university 
ranked first in a ranking study is given a score of 50; the second is given 49; and so on. 
We then take the simple average of the scores each university gets from the four ranking 
sources. The average Borda Count Scores (BCS) are reported in Table III.3, which shows 
a natural break point at the sixteenth university. We classify these top 16 research 
                                                 
67 In Newsweek’s 2006 top 100 global university ranking, only 44 are U.S. universities.  
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universities as “Elite”, and the remaining 48 research universities (excluding specialized 
institutions) as “Good”.68 The other research universities not included in the list of 67 are 
defined as “Moderate.” We follow 2005 Carnegie Basic Classification and define all 
other universities that award at least 50 master's degrees and fewer than 20 doctoral 
degrees per year as “Master.” To check the sensitivity to the choice of different ranking 
sources, we add six more ranking sources to classify university categories. The results 
(unreported) are robust.69 
We retrieve university level enrollment and financial data for these universities 
from the IPEDS. We use a number of IPEDS surveys, including its Institutional 
Characteristics Surveys, Enrollment Surveys, and Finance Surveys. From these sources 
we construct the following variables: full time equivalent enrollment, Enrol_FTE, which 
is full time enrollment plus 0.3870 times part-time enrollment; Part_Time, percentage of 
part-time enrollment to total enrollment;71 Non_Resid, percentage of nonresident alien 
enrollment to total enrollment; tuition revenue dependence, Tui_Dep, the ratio of tuition 
                                                 
68 We exclude from our sample highly regarded but specialized institutions such as Rockefeller University, 
University of California at San Francisco, and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas. 
69 The six additional university ranking sources are: Faculty Scholarly Productivity Index from Academic 
Analytics, Top American Research Universities from the Center for Measuring University Performance at 
Arizona State University, United States National Research Council Rankings, Washington Monthly 
College Rankings, Avery et al. (2005), and Webometrics Ranking of World Universities by the 
Cybermetrics Lab. Ninety-five universities appear at least once as top 50 in at least one of the 10 rankings. 
We use the Borda Count method to average the relative rankings within this group of 95 universities. We 
classify the top 31 universities as “Elite”, and the remaining 64 schools as “Good.” The other research 
universities not included in the list of 95 are defined as “Moderate.” We follow 2005 Carnegie Basic 
Classification and define all other universities that award at least 50 master's degrees and fewer than 20 
doctoral degrees per year as “Master.” All our empirical results remain qualitatively the same. 
70 This number is the average full time equivalent of part-time enrollment reported in 2005 IPEDS 
Enrollment Survey. 
71 Total enrollment is the sum of full time enrollment and part-time enrollment. 
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revenue to total revenue;72 and university endowment, Endow_FTE, the market value of 
endowment assets divided by full time equivalent enrollment. 
A.3. Data on host country characteristics 
We obtain host countries’ real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, 
GDP_PPP,73 and growth rate of real GDP per capita, Growth, in years 1999 through 
2003 from Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006). The tertiary school 
age population, Stu_Pop, in years 1999 to 2003 is from United Nations Educational 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics Data Center. The 
U.S. FDI outflows to other countries from 1999 to 2003 are obtained from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) website. We also obtain measures of government stability 
Gov_Stab74 and strength of legal system Law_Order75 from the International Country 
Risk Guide in years 1999 to 2003 (Political Risk Services Group) and the ease of doing 
business index Ease_Bus in years 2004 to 2009 from the Doing Business website.76 
III.4.B. Summary statistics 
Table III.4 reports the number of universities with overseas programs, separately 
for nonprofit public, nonprofit private, and for-profit universities in each of the seven 
categories: Elite, Good, Moderate, Master, baccalaureate colleges, associate’s colleges, 
                                                 
72 Total revenue includes tuition revenue; revenue from federal, state, and local governments; endowment 
income; private gifts and grants; sales and services income; auxiliary income; hospital income; independent 
operations income; investment income; and others. 
73 It is measured in 2000 constant international dollars. An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power as U.S. dollar over U.S. GDP. 
74 It ranges from 1 to 12 with 12 indicating the highest governance stability. 
75 It ranges from 1 to 6 with 6 representing the strongest judicial system. 
76 Available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/CustomQuery/, accessed August 2008. The ease of doing 
business index ranks business regulations for 181 countries. It covers ten aspects including starting a 
business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, 
protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing business. A 
higher ranking means simpler regulation and stronger protection of property rights.   
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and other specialized institutions. In terms of percentage, elite universities are dominant 
players, with 66.7% of public universities and 53.8% of private universities having 
overseas programs. It also shows relatively higher participation rates by public research 
universities than by their private counterparts. One possible explanation is that relative to 
private universities, public universities face greater operational constraints imposed by 
local governments and state legislators. For example, they are often required to charge in-
state students lower tuition and give them preferential treatment in admission. These 
constraints no longer apply when these public universities go abroad. 
Table III.4 also shows that less than 1% of schools belonging to the categories of 
baccalaureate colleges, associate’s colleges, and other specialized institutions offer 
overseas programs. This extremely low percentage may be due partially to the lack of 
press coverage on those institutions. However, the Chronicle usually covers newsworthy 
activities even by very small and little known colleges. Among for-profit universities, 
none belong to the Elite or Good universities, and most belong to Associates or Others. 
Of 2,764 for-profit universities, we are able to identify only seven that offer overseas 
programs, with five belonging to Masters. There are probably many more overseas 
programs offered by for-profit universities, which are not covered by the press and, hence, 
are not identified through our search process. Based on these data considerations, we 
focus our investigation only on nonprofit universities in the Elite, Good, Moderate, and 
Master categories. 
Table III.5 shows the number of overseas degree programs offered by the four 
categories of universities and by nine broadly defined disciplines. Arts & Sciences 
includes foreign languages, economics, physics, and others. Engineering includes 
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mechanical engineering, chemical engineering, material engineering, and other traditional 
engineering programs. EECS refers to electrical engineering, computer science, and IT 
programs. Business includes finance, accounting, marketing, and management. Public 
affairs includes international relations and public policy. Medicine includes medical 
education, nursing, and health care. Other includes film, theater, and hotel management. 
Panel A shows that among the 91 undergraduate overseas programs, only one is 
offered by Elite universities. The main suppliers of the undergraduate programs are 
Master universities, with 70% of market share. In contrast, Panel B shows a higher 
participation rate by Elite universities in graduate level programs, offering 9% of the 
master’s degree programs. Master universities are still the biggest suppliers, offering 48% 
of the master’s degree programs. This dominance by Master universities simply reflects 
the fact that Master universities outnumber Elite universities by 688 to 16. Although not 
included in the table, when Master universities offer overseas programs, they are much 
more likely to offer both undergraduate and graduate programs in a variety of disciplines 
at the same location. 
In terms of discipline, Business and EECS are by far the most popular majors 
offered in overseas programs. Finally, Panel C shows U.S. universities offer significantly 
fewer doctoral-level overseas programs, perhaps because they require substantial research 
expenditures without generating sufficient tuition revenue. 
Table III.6 shows the average university financial and enrollment data in years 
1995 to 2005 by university category and by whether or not they have overseas programs. 
Higher-ranked schools are generally larger and better endowed than lower-ranked schools. 
Private schools are better endowed, depend more on tuition revenue, are smaller, have 
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more nonresident alien students, and have more part-time students than public schools. 
This table also shows that universities with overseas programs are larger and more 
dependent on tuition revenue. 
III.4.C. Regression results 
C.1. Likelihood of having overseas programs 
Our first inquiry is what university characteristics help explain the likelihood of 
having overseas programs. For this purpose, we use the following probit specification:  
Pr (overseasi) = G (β0 + β1 × Enrol_FTEi + β2 × Part_Timei + β3 × Non_Residi + β4 × 
Tui_Depi + β5 × Log(Endow_FTE)i + β6 × Reputationi + β7 × Publici + β8 × interaction 
termsi + εi) 
The dependent variable Pr (overseas) is equal to 1 if a university has overseas 
programs and 0 otherwise. Enrol_FTE is full time equivalent enrollment and measures 
the size of a university. Part_Time is the percentage of part-time student enrollment. 
Non_Resid is the percentage of nonresident alien enrollment and measures a university’s 
openness to foreigners. Tui_Dep is tuition revenue as a percentage of total revenue. Log 
(Endow_FTE) is the log value of university endowment per full time equivalent student. 
Reputation is proxied by indicator variables, Elite, Good, and Moderate. Public is an 
indicator variable for public university. We also include interaction terms between 
university ranking categories and the Public indicator. Subscript i refers to university i. G 
is the probit cumulative distribution function.  
Because overseas programs affect tuition revenue, expenditure, and the 
percentage of nonresident alien enrollment, we lag all financial and enrollment variables 
by using 1995 university enrollment and financial data. Of the 144 current overseas 
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programs offered by advanced-degree awarding institutions, only four existed in 1995. At 
that time, both public and private schools followed the same accounting standard (the Old 
Form), making their financial data more directly comparable.77 As a robustness check, we 
also use 2005 data as independent variables in unreported regressions. The results are 
quantitatively the same. 
When universities have missing data in 1995, we use the average values of 
universities in the same category (in terms of reputation and the public/private 
classification) in 1995. Table III.7 presents the summary statistics of the 1995 university 
enrollment and financial data.78 The 1995 data are highly correlated with their 2005 data, 
indicating persistency in university characteristics. 
Table III.8 reports the estimates using probit regression.79 University size, 
measured by full-time-equivalent enrollment, has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of having overseas programs, indicating larger universities are more likely to 
offer overseas programs. A 1,000 increase in full-time-equivalent enrollment increases 
the probability of having an overseas program by 0.8%, holding all other variables 
constant at the mean. This impact of size is non-trivial, considering that the likelihood of 
sponsoring overseas programs for an average university80 is only 5.33%. Nonresident 
                                                 
77 Public institutions used the Old Form until 2002, and were required to follow New GASB no later than 
2004. Private institutions used the Old Form until 1997, when they switched to FASB. These accounting 
standards differ in their treatment of revenue and expenditure composition.  
78 The average tuition dependency in Table VII is much higher than those reported by the Digest of 
Education Statistics (2007) for the academic year 2004 - 2005. The difference is mainly due to the 
difference in computing the average. The averages reported by DES are value-weighted—calculated as 
total tuition revenue of all public (or private nonprofit) institutions divided by total revenue of all public (or 
private nonprofit) institutions, whereas the average in Table VII is equal-weighted. Thus, the DES averages 
give greater weights to top tier, larger schools with greater endowment, which Table VI shows are less 
tuition dependent.  
79 We also estimate OLS and Logistic regressions. The results (unreported) are quantitatively the same. 
80 An average university implies all independent variables are held at their mean values. Mean values of 
independent variables are reported in Table VII. 
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enrollment also has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of having overseas 
programs. A 1% increase in nonresident enrollment increases the probability of having 
overseas programs by 0.4%, holding all other variables constant at the mean. Tuition 
revenue dependence has a significant positive effect as well.81 A 1% increase in tuition 
revenue dependence increases the likelihood of having overseas programs by 0.1%, 
holding all other variables constant at their mean. Elite universities are more likely to 
have overseas programs. Moving from Master to the Elite category increases the 
likelihood of having overseas programs by 44.9% for private schools, holding all other 
variables constant at their mean.82  
These results suggest that the most active participants in overseas programs are 
large Elite research universities. Schools more open to foreign students are also more 
likely to have overseas programs. It appears that the best schools are making efforts to 
globalize their institutions and to provide higher education opportunities overseas.  
The regression estimates also indicate that universities with higher tuition 
dependency are more likely to have overseas programs, suggesting that finance plays a 
role in the decision making process. How much economics matter in offering of overseas 
programs is the subject of investigation in the next two sections. 
C.2. Location choice 
                                                 
81 We also use two alternative measures of tuition dependency that account for student financial aid. The 
first is the ratio of tuition revenue net of financial aid to total revenue; the second ratio is based on the same 
numerator divided by total revenue net of financial aid. The results (unreported) are quantitatively the same. 
82 We are not interpreting the marginal effects of the interaction terms, because we have three interaction 
terms in the probit regression. Interpreting interaction effect in nonlinear models is complicated and the 
widely-used Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) interaction effect correction can only be applied to probit 
specification with one interaction term. Not correcting for interaction effect does not affect the marginal 
effects of other independent variables.  
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If finance plays an important role, universities’ location choice may not be much 
different from those of multinational corporations making FDI. Thus, to examine how 
host country characteristics are related to the location of overseas programs, we follow 
the international trade literature. Specifically, we relate the number of overseas programs 
in a host country to measures of economic development, the recent economic growth rate, 
the size of the market for higher education, the U.S. outflow of FDI, and other local 
environmental factors by estimating the following regression:83 
Densityj = β0 + β1 × GDP_PPPj + β2 × Growthj + β3 × Stu_Popj + β4 × FDIj + β5 × 
Gov_Stabj + β6 × Law_Orderj + β7 × Ease_Busj + β8 × Continentj + εj 
Density measures the number of overseas programs located in host country j. It 
includes all overseas degree programs offered by advanced-degree awarding U.S. 
universities in that country. As a robustness check, we include overseas programs offered 
by all categories of universities and colleges. The results (unreported) do not change. 
All independent variables are averaged values from 1999 to 2003 except for 
Ease_Bus, which is available only from 2004 to 2009. GDP_PPP is the host country real 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Growth is the growth rate of GDP_PPP. These 
two variables measure the level and the slope of economic development of host country j. 
Stu_Pop is the tertiary school age population, which measures the potential size of the 
host country’s higher education market. FDI is U.S. foreign direct investment outflow to 
host country j. Gov_Stab is government stability of the host country, which is a proxy for 
political risk. Law_Order measures the strength of judicial system and Ease_Bus 
                                                 
83 As a robustness check, we also estimate a conditional (fixed-effect) logit and a standard logit model with 
clustered standard errors (at university level) by relating a university’s probability of having overseas 
programs in a host country (1 if having overseas programs in the host country and 0 otherwise) to host 
country characteristics. The results (unreported) are very similar. 
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measures the ease of conducting business in the host country. Continent is a set of 
dummy variables that indicates whether the host country j is located in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, Middle East,84 North America (Canada), and Oceania. We would have liked to 
include the likelihood of obtaining local financial support, and the quality and openness 
of local higher education markets; unfortunately, we can obtain such data only for a 
handful of countries, making it impossible to conduct meaningful tests. 
Table III.9 reports the regression estimates. We use the Negative Binomial model 
because the variance of the dependent variable (2.68) is much larger than the mean (0.77). 
A likelihood ratio test confirms the existence of over-dispersion. 
The regression estimates in Table III.9 indicate that economics play an important 
role in location decisions of U.S. universities. The two significant variables, the level of 
GDP per capita and student population, are both critical ingredients for financial viability. 
U.S. universities target countries with large potential markets where the local population 
has the economic means to pay for their programs. 
The regression estimates imply that a one thousand dollar increase (in 2000 
constant international dollars) in real GDP per capita increases the expected number of 
overseas programs in a country by 7.1%, holding all other variables constant. The size of 
the local market also has an important impact. An increase in the tertiary school age 
population by one million increases the expected number of overseas program in a 
country by 4.4%, holding all other variables constant. U.S. universities also seem to 
follow U.S. FDI outflow, perhaps because they regard the countries with close U.S. trade 
                                                 
84 Following Bhandari and Chow (2007), the Middle East region includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen. 
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relationships as having friendlier environments for U.S. entities to conduct business and 
having a higher demand for U.S. style higher education. An increase of one billion 
dollars (in 2000 constant international dollars) in U.S. FDI outflow increases the expected 
number of overseas programs in a country by 4.9%.  
U.S. universities also are more likely to have overseas programs in countries with 
business friendly environments and weaker regulations. A one point improvement in the 
ease of doing business index85 increases the expected number of overseas programs by 
1.6%, and a one point increase in the strength of judicial system86 decreases the expected 
number of overseas program by 31.6%. We doubt that U.S. universities purposefully 
target countries with weaker judicial systems; rather, the correlation seems to be due to 
the fact that de-facto barriers against setting up overseas programs are less effective in 
countries with weaker judicial systems. 
Table III.9 also shows that Asian and Middle Eastern countries are more popular 
destinations for overseas programs. U.S. universities offer more overseas programs in 
Asia because of its large market for higher education and greater local demand for U.S.-
style higher education. The main attraction to the Middle East appears to be its financial 
support with oil money. 
To examine whether geographical and cultural proximity also matter when 
universities make decisions about location, we divide U.S. universities into four regions 
according to U.S. Census Bureau geographic locations: Northeast, Midwest, South and 
                                                 
85 This variable ranges from 1 to 181, where 1 is the country where it is easiest to do business. 
86 This variable ranges from 1 to 6, where 6 indicates the strongest judicial system. 
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West.87 Table III.10 tabulates the number of overseas programs located in the seven 
continents by the region. It shows that Asia and Europe have more or less equal 
representation from all four regions (relative to the total number of overseas programs 
offered by universities in each region). The Middle East has a high representation of 
universities from the Northeast region. Middle Eastern countries tend to target top U.S. 
universities with substantial financial aid and the Northeast region has more top ranked 
universities. The only indication of cultural and geographic proximity affecting location 
decisions is the relatively higher representation of universities from the South and West 
regions in Latin America (relative to the total number of overseas programs offered by 
universities in each region). In short, although geographic and cultural distance may 
matter, the overriding factor in location decisions seems to be economics. 
C.3. Tuition discounts 
If universities behave like firms, they will adjust product pricing to suit the local 
environment. In this section we investigate this pricing issue by focusing on tuition 
discounts. We hypothesize that universities adjust their tuition based on affordability; that 
is, they offer higher tuition discounts in countries with lower income to attract a sufficient 
number of students. Other factors relevant to the local demand include the reputation of 
the sponsoring university, the degree level, and the discipline. 
Tuition discounts may also be influenced by the cost structures of overseas 
programs. Costs can be lowered by inviting a local university as a partner and by 
employing local faculty at lower salaries than U.S. faculty. Costs can also be lowered by 
                                                 
87 Northeast includes ME, NH, VT, MA, CT, NY, NJ, PA, and RI. Midwest includes MI, OH, IN, IL, WI, 
MN, IA, MO, KS, NE, SD, and ND. South includes TX, OK, AR, LA, MS, AL, TN, KY, GA, FL, SC, NC, 
VA, WV, DC, MD, and DE. West includes WA, OR, CA, NV, ID, UT, AZ, NM, CO, WY, MT, AK, and 
HI. 
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obtaining financial aid from the local government and/or a third party such as the World 
Bank. Thus, we use the following specification to analyze overseas program tuition:  
Discountijk = β0 + β1 × GDP_PPPj + β2 × Stu_Popj + β3 × Gov_Stabj + β4 × Reputationi 
+ β5 × Publici + β6 × Profk + β7 × BAk + β8 × Jointk + εijk 
Discountijk is 1 minus the ratio of overseas sub-program k’s tuition in host country 
j to the tuition of a comparable program at the same degree level and in the same 
discipline on university i’s U.S. home campus. Because some universities offer several 
degree programs in multiple disciplines at the same location and tuition varies across 
degree levels and disciplines, we break down an overseas program at each location into 
sub-programs by their degree levels and disciplines. We make tuition comparable across 
programs and locations by assuming that a student takes, on average, four 3-credit 
courses per semester, or equivalently, eight 3-credit courses per academic year.88 
The average tuition discounts are 21%, 26%, 28%, and 8% for Master, Moderate, 
Good, and Elite universities, respectively. The discounts are significantly greater than 
zero at the 1% level for all types except Elite universities. 
Profk is an indicator variable for professional schools, equal to 1 if the overseas 
sub-program is in engineering, EECS, business, law, medicine, or other professional 
disciplines, and 0 otherwise. BAk is equal to 1 if the overseas sub-program is a bachelor’s 
program and 0 otherwise. Jointk is equal to 1 if the overseas sub-program has a partner 
university in the host country or has received full or partial local financial support. This 
variable is our proxy for lower cost. Other independent variables are defined earlier. 
                                                 
88 If overseas program tuition is in foreign currency, we convert it to U.S. dollars using foreign exchange 
rates as of August 29, 2008.  
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Table III.11 reports the OLS regression estimates with robust and clustered (at the 
university level) standard errors. We exclude overseas Ph.D. programs, because doctoral 
students often work as research and/or teaching assistants, receiving financial stipends 
and tuition waivers. 
Three variables show statistical significance: real GDP per capita, Good 
university category, and bachelor’s degree programs. Overseas programs offer lower 
tuition discounts in higher income countries. An increase in real GDP per capita by a 
thousand dollars (2000 constant international dollar) leads to a 2.2% decrease in tuition 
discount, holding all other variables constant. 
Tuition discounts for baccalaureate programs are 25.5% more than master’s 
programs, holding all other variables constant. We attribute this greater discount to the 
stiffer competition undergraduate degree programs face from local universities, relative 
to advanced degree programs. 
Indicator variable Good has a significant effect on tuition discounts, while Elite 
and Moderate do not. Moving from the Master university group to the Good group 
increases tuition discounts by 23.6%, holding all other variables constant. However, 
Elites do not offer higher tuition discounts even though tuition is much higher at Elite 
universities’ home campuses than at Masters. Because of their high visibility and 
reputation, they may not have to offer tuition discounts to attract students. Good 
universities, by contrast, lack the same visibility and reputation and, thus, have to offer 
substantial tuition discounts to fill their classrooms.89  
                                                 
89 Differences in home campus tuition charged by Moderate and Master level universities are much smaller than those 
between Good and Master; hence, Moderate schools may not need to offer significantly more tuition discounts than 
Master schools. The average private university home campus tuitions for the 2007 – 2008 academic year are $35,082, 
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Finally, but equally interesting, our proxy for lower costs, Joint, has no effect on 
tuition discounts, implying that U.S. universities do not pass on any cost savings to local 
students in the form of lower tuition. This pricing behavior is similar to that of profit-
seeking corporations.  
III.5. Conclusion  
This paper examines U.S. university overseas programs because if universities 
ever behave like firms, they are more likely to do so when they make investments 
overseas. When operating abroad, universities are not bound by the same set of implicit 
and explicit contracts entered over time with domestic stakeholders.  
We unearth an abundance of evidence in support of our hypothesis that U.S. 
universities behave like firms when they make overseas investments. Universities with 
higher tuition dependency are more likely to offer overseas programs. They target 
markets with a large pool of potential clients, in business friendly environments, with 
loose regulation. Upon entering these markets, they price their products to suit local 
affordability and local competition. Furthermore, when they save costs by forming local 
partnerships or by obtaining local financial support, we find no evidence that they pass on 
the savings to local clients. These behaviors are exactly what one would expect from 
profit-seeking multinational firms in their foreign direct investments. 
These findings do not necessarily imply that U.S. universities behave like firms in 
their domestic operations. Because nonprofit universities face various constraints from 
explicit and implicit contracts entered over time with multiple stakeholders, their 
domestic behavior may differ substantially from their overseas behavior. Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                 
$34,941, $25,220, and $21,084 for Elite, Good, Moderate, and Master groups, respectively. The corresponding 
averages for public schools are $8,259, $8,030, $6,318, and $5,374. 
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one can easily think of similarities in governance structures between large universities 
and large, diffusely held public corporations with clear separation of ownership and 
control: centralized administration, bureaucratic behavior, the me-first attitude often 
observed among those who participate in the governance process, and finally, but most 
important, the need to ensure sustainability by ensuring sufficient financial resources. 
Whether these similarities lead large modern U.S. universities to emulate profit-seeking 
public corporations in operating home campuses within the U.S. borders is an interesting 
subject for future research. 
Finally, our results have an implication on how U.S. universities’ overseas 
programs affect their domestic programs. In a recent hearing by the House Committee on 
Science and Technology, lawmakers questioned whether university ventures abroad are 
undermining American economic competitiveness. Rep. David Wu of Oregon says that 
he “wanted to be sure that colleges that established branches overseas did not price 
themselves too cheaply and ‘start giving away the store’.”90 Our results suggest that the 
public can rest assured that U.S. universities are not diverting resources to the benefit of 
overseas students. Quite the contrary, U.S. universities seem to price their products 
strategically, like U.S. multinational corporations, using their competitive edge in 
attempts to generate more resources for the benefit of their home institution. 
  
                                                 
90 Blumenstyk, Goldie. “House panel quizzes universities on value of overseas ventures.” The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, August 10, 2007. 
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Table III.1. U.S. foreign direct investment (selected industries) 
This table shows the percentage of sales from majority-owned foreign affiliates, 
calculated as sales revenue of majority-owned foreign affiliates divided by the total sales 
of U.S. parent firms and majority-owned foreign affiliates. The numbers are based on 
worldwide sales of U.S. parent firms and majority-owned foreign affiliates from 1999 to 
2004 obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis website. 
Majority Owned Foreign 
Affiliates (%) 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
All industries 27.1 27.3 27.1 28.4 30.5 31.8 28.7 
Mining 48.6 25.0 25.0 35.3 38.9 37.3 35.0 
Utilities 12.8 14.9 15.0 15.7 11.6 10.2 13.4 
Manufacturing 34.7 35.4 36.1 37.8 40.2 41.7 37.7 
Wholesale trade 28.7 26.6 25.8 19.2 21.6 23.1 24.2 
Information 13.1 12.4 12.3 13.8 14.8 17.2 13.9 
Finance (except 
depository institutions) 
and insurance 15.3 17.8 17.3 17.4 18.5 18.8 17.5 
Professional, scientific, 
and technical services 36.8 34.7 36.2 36.4 40.2 38.7 37.2 
Other industries 13.0 14.2 15.3 15.8 16.7 15.8 15.1 
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Table III.2. Correlation matrix 
USNews refers to America’s best national universities from U.S. News & World Report, 
NewsWeek refers to Top 100 Global Universities by Newsweek, Times refers THE-QS 
World University Rankings from The Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) and 
Quacquarelli Symonds (QS), and SJTU refers to Academic Rankings of World 
Universities from Shanghai Jiaotong University. Endow_FTE is the 2005 market value of 
endowment assets divided by full time equivalent enrollment obtained from 2005 IPEDS 
College Finance Survey.  
  USNews NewsWeek Times SJTU 
NewsWeek 0.61 
Times 0.76 0.72 
SJTU 0.54 0.90 0.70 
Endow_FTE 0.68 0.48 0.57 0.45 
 
96 
 
Table III.3. Relative ranking of universities using average Borda Count Scores 
We use the Borda Count method to average the relative rankings from four ranking 
sources. A university ranked first in a ranking study is given a score of 50, the second is 
given 49, and so on. We then take the simple average of the scores each university gets 
from the four ranking sources to calculate the average Borda Count Score (BCS). When 
the ranking sources include foreign universities, we re-rank American universities 
excluding foreign universities. Diff is the difference in BCS scores between a university 
and the university ranked one place above it. A natural breakpoint in BCS is at the 
sixteenth university. We classify the first 16 universities as “Elite” and the remaining 48 
research universities (excluding specialized institutions Rockefeller University, 
University of California at San Francisco, and University of Texas Southwestern Medical 
Center at Dallas) as “Good”.  
Institution Name BCS Diff 
Harvard University 50 - 
Yale University 46.75 -3.25 
California Institute of Technology 46.25 -0.5 
Stanford University 46.25 0 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 46 -0.25 
Princeton University 44.75 -1.25 
Columbia University in the City of New York 43.75 -1 
University of Chicago 42.25 -1.5 
University of Pennsylvania 41.25 -1 
University of California-Berkeley 40.25 -1 
Cornell University 38.5 -1.75 
Duke University 38 -0.5 
Johns Hopkins University 36 -2 
University of California-Los Angeles 35 -1 
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 33.5 -1.5 
Northwestern University 33.25 -0.25 
University of California-San Diego 29 -4.25 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 28 -1 
University of Washington-Seattle Campus 27.75 -0.25 
New York University 26 -1.75 
Washington University in St Louis 24.75 -1.25 
Brown University 24.25 -0.5 
Carnegie Mellon University 23 -1.25 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 22.5 -0.5 
Vanderbilt University 22 -0.5 
The University of Texas at Austin 22 0 
University of California-San Francisco 19.75 -2.25 
University of Maryland-College Park 16.75 -3 
University of Southern California 16.75 0 
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Dartmouth College 16.5 -0.25 
Emory University 16.5 0 
University of Pittsburgh-Main Campus 16.25 -0.25 
University of California-Santa Barbara 14.75 -1.5 
University of Colorado at Boulder 14.5 -0.25 
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 14.5 0 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 14.5 0 
Rice University 13.25 -1.25 
University of Rochester 13 -0.25 
Boston University 12.75 -0.25 
University of Virginia-Main Campus 12.5 -0.25 
Purdue University-Main Campus 10.5 -2 
Case Western Reserve University 10.5 0 
Georgetown University 10.25 -0.25 
University of California-Davis 10.25 0 
North Carolina State University at Raleigh 9.25 -1 
University of Notre Dame 8.25 -1 
Georgia Institute of Technology-Main Campus 7.5 -0.75 
Rockefeller University 7.25 -0.25 
Pennsylvania State University-Main Campus 7.25 0 
University of California-Irvine 6.75 -0.5 
Tufts University 5.75 -1 
Wake Forest University 5.75 0 
Michigan State University 5.25 -0.5 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas 5.25 0 
Brandeis University 5 -0.25 
University of Florida 5 0 
College of William and Mary 4.75 -0.25 
Texas A & M University 4.75 0 
Ohio State University-Main Campus 4.5 -0.25 
Boston College 4.25 -0.25 
Rutgers University-New Brunswick/Piscataway 4 -0.25 
Lehigh University 4 0 
University of Arizona 3.25 -0.75 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 2.5 -0.75 
University of Massachusetts-Amherst 1.75 -0.75 
Indiana University-Bloomington 1.25 -0.5 
Yeshiva University 0.25 -1 
  
98 
 
Table III.4. Universities with overseas programs 
Column (1) shows the total number of universities in each category based on our average 
Borda Count Score and Carnegie 2005 basic classification. Column (2) shows the number 
of universities with overseas programs in each category. Column (3) shows the 
percentage of universities with overseas programs in each category, which is calculated 
as number of universities with overseas programs divided by the total number of 
universities in that category. Each UNITID in IPEDS is treated as a university. 
Type Public Private Nonprofit Private For-Profit 
 (1)  (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Elite 3 2 66.7% 13 7 53.8% 0 0  - 
Good 27 9 33.3% 21 5 23.8% 0 0  - 
Moderate 136 18 13.2% 74 10 13.5% 8 0 0.0% 
Masters 270 8 3.0% 375 18 4.8% 43 5 11.6% 
Baccalaureates 149 0 0.0% 511 1 0.2% 77 1 1.3% 
Associates 1,073 1 0.1% 132 0 0.0% 589 0 0.0% 
Others 547 0 0.0% 908 0 0.0% 2,047 1 0.0% 
Total 2,205 38 1.7% 2,034 41 2.0% 2,764 7 0.3% 
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Table III.5. Summary statistics of overseas programs 
A&S (Arts & Sciences) includes foreign languages, economics, physics, and others. Edu 
(Education) refers to education programs. Engine (Engineering) includes mechanical 
engineering, material engineering, and other traditional engineering programs. EECS 
refers to electrical engineering, computer science, and IT programs. Bus (Business) 
includes finance, accounting, marketing, and management. PA (Public Affairs) includes 
international relations and public policy. Med (Medicine) includes medical education, 
nursing, and health care. Other includes film, theater, and hotel management. 
Panel A:Bachelor A&S Edu Engine EECS Bus PA Law Med Other Total
Elite 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Good 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 8 
Moderate 6 1 0 3 3 2 0 1 2 18 
Master 15 1 1 13 27 5 0 1 1 64 
Total 23 3 3 18 31 8 0 2 3 91 
Panel B:Master A&S Edu Engine EECS Bus PA Law Med Other Total
Elite 2 0 0 1 4 2 0 1 1 11 
Good 1 0 1 8 5 2 0 1 0 18 
Moderate 0 4 1 6 16 1 1 3 1 33 
Master 5 5 1 3 32 6 0 3 2 57 
Total 8 9 3 18 57 11 1 8 4 119 
Panel C:Ph.D. A&S Edu Engine EECS Bus PA Law Med Other Total
Elite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Good 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Moderate 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
Master 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Total 1 0 2 2 1 0 2 3 0 11 
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Table III.6. Summary statistics of financial and enrollment variables 
All variables are averaged values from 1995 to 2005. Enrol_FTE is full time equivalent 
enrollment, which is full time enrollment plus 0.38 times part-time enrollment. Part_Time 
is the percentage of part-time enrollment to total enrollment. Non_Resid is the percentage 
of nonresident alien enrollment to total enrollment. Tuition revenue dependence, 
Tui_Dep, is the ratio of tuition revenue to total revenue. Endow_FTE is market value of 
endowment assets divided by full time equivalent enrollment. Endow_FTE is adjusted by 
inflation and is in 2005 constant dollars. Financial variables are available in 1995, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 IPEDS Finance Surveys. Enrollment variables are 
available in all IPEDS Enrollment Surveys from 1995 to 2005. IPEDS surveys were not 
conducted in 1999. Both public and private schools follow the Old Form accounting 
standards until 1997, after which most of the public schools follow Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) accounting rules while the others follow Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) accounting standards. GASB and FASB treat 
revenue items differently, which render the financial data for public and private schools 
not directly comparable after 1997. 
Category Control 
Over-
seas 
Enrol_
FTE 
Part_Time 
(%) 
Non_Resid 
(%) 
Tui_Dep 
(%) 
Endow_ 
FTE 
Elite Public Yes 33,047 8.6 9.0 15.3 65,557 
No 35,214 4.5 6.2 8.3 13,573 
Private Yes 14,308 16.6 15.0 17.3 347,639 
    No 13,729 13.9 17.9 8.4 633,932 
Good Public Yes 29,997 16.8 8.1 19.7 8,349 
No 29,377 14.6 5.9 17.2 29,200 
Private Yes 17,472 18.4 13.6 35.3 112,854 
    No 8,800 10.8 9.7 29.6 210,896 
Moderate Public Yes 21,338 27.6 5.8 20.9 7,846 
No 14,158 27.6 4.6 22.8 6,888 
Private Yes 10,037 34.4 8.1 60.0 29,953 
    No 5,936 32.4 6.8 60.0 29,059 
Masters Public Yes 11,633 30.4 4.2 34.0 910 
No 6,619 31.7 2.2 26.1 2,291 
Private Yes 3,829 42.0 4.8 69.3 10,271 
    No 2,449 33.6 3.2 62.7 17,533 
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Table III.7. Summary statistics for independent variables in the likelihood regression 
Enrol_FTE is full time equivalent enrollment, which is full time enrollment plus 0.38 
times part-time enrollment. Part_Time is the percentage of part-time enrollment to total 
enrollment. Non_Resid is the percentage of nonresident alien enrollment to total 
enrollment. Tuition revenue dependence, Tui_Dep, is the ratio of tuition revenue to total 
revenue. Endow_FTE is market value of endowment assets divided by full time 
equivalent enrollment. All variables are based on data obtained from 1995 IPEDS 
College Enrollment and Finance Surveys. 
Variable 
Name Obs Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Correlation 
with 2005 
data 
Enrol_FTE 913 6,614.5 4,026.8 6,986.6 61.9 43,860.7 0.98 
Part _Time 913 33.0 30.0 17.9 0.2 99.1 0.79 
Non_Resid 913 3.7 2.3 4.4 0.0 35.7 0.79 
Tui_Dep 913 44.7 40.6 22.7 4.9 100.0 0.89 
Endow_ 
FTE 913 17,761.4 3,352.8 73,845.3 0.0 1,703,445.0 0.88 
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Table III.8. Probit regression on the likelihood of having overseas programs 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a university has overseas programs and 0 
otherwise. Enrol_FTE is full time enrollment plus 0.38 times part-time enrollment in 
thousands. Part_Time is the percentage of part-time student enrollment. Non_Resid is the 
percentage of nonresident alien enrollment. Tui_Dep is tuition revenue as a percentage of 
total revenue. Log(Endow_FTE) is the log value of university endowment per full time 
equivalent student in thousands. All financial and enrollment variables are 1995 value. 
Elite is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a university’s Borda Count Score is ranked in 
the top 16 and 0 otherwise. Good is equal to 1 if a university’s Borda Count Score is 
ranked between 17 and 67 (specialized institutions excluded). Moderate is equal to 1 if a 
university is considered a research university by the Carnegie 2005 report but is ranked 
below 67. Public is an indicator variable for public university. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
Variable Name Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Enrol_FTE 0.074*** 0.008*** 
(0.015) 
Part_Time 0.006 0.001 
(0.004) 
Non_Resid 0.035*** 0.004*** 
(0.012) 
Tui_Dep 0.011* 0.001* 
(0.006) 
Log (Endow_FTE) -0.043 -0.005 
(0.077) 
Elite 1.640*** 0.449*** 
(0.505) 
Good 0.617 0.102 
(0.401) 
Moderate 0.180 0.021 
(0.234) 
Public -0.166 -0.018 
(0.337) 
Elite*Public -0.855 
(0.930) 
Good*Public -0.576 
(0.554) 
Moderate*Public 0.020 
(0.317) 
Constant -2.839*** 
(0.495) 
Observations 913   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.22   
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Table III.9. Negative Binomial location regression 
Dependent variable is Density, which measures the number of overseas programs offered 
in a host country by U.S. institutions that award advanced degrees. All our independent 
variables (except for Ease_Bus, which is averaged from 2004 to 2009) are averaged 
values from 1999 to 2003. GDP_PPP is host country real gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita in 2000 constant international dollars (in thousands). Growth is the growth rate 
of GDP_PPP. Stu_Pop is the tertiary school age population in millions. FDI is the U.S. 
foreign direct investment outflows to the host country in 2000 constant U.S. dollars (in 
billions). Gov_Stab measures government stability. Law_Order measures the strength of 
legal system. Ease_Bus measures the easiness of doing business. Africa, Asia, Europe, 
Middle East, and Oceania are dummy variables indicating the location of host country. 
The Middle East region includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and 
Yemen. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Variable Name Negative Binomial Coefficient Percentage Change (%) 
GDP_PPP 0.069** 7.1** 
(0.029) 
Growth -0.006 -0.6 
(0.046) 
Stu_Pop 0.043*** 4.4*** 
(0.006) 
FDI 0.048** 4.9** 
(0.021) 
Gov_Stab 0.015 1.5 
(0.138) 
Law_Order -0.379* -31.6* 
(0.226) 
Ease_Bus -0.016** -1.6** 
(0.008) 
Africa -0.183 -16.7 
(0.751) 
Asia 1.054** 186.9** 
(0.452) 
Europe -0.350 -29.5 
(0.683) 
Middle East 1.078** 193.9** 
(0.518) 
Oceania 0.196 21.7 
(0.726) 
Constant 0.446 
(1.655) 
Observations 117   
Log Pseudo Likelihood -111.47   
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Table III.10. Overseas programs by geographic location 
Northeast includes ME, NH, VT, MA, CT, NY, NJ, PA, and RI. Midwest includes MI, 
OH, IN, IL, WI, MN, IA, MO, KS, NE, SD, and ND. South includes TX, OK, AR, LA, 
MS, AL, TN, KY, GA, FL, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, and DE. West includes WA, OR, 
CA, NV, ID, UT, AZ, NM, CO, WY, MT, AK, and HI. Middle East region includes 
Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. This table includes all 159 
overseas programs identified from the press. 
U.S. 
region Africa Asia Europe 
Latin 
America 
Middle 
East 
North 
America Oceania Total
Midwest 0 29 6 1 3 0 0 39 
Northeast 2 27 7 4 11 1 2 54 
South 1 25 8 5 6 0 1 46 
West 0 10 3 4 0 3 0 20 
Total 3 91 24 14 20 4 3 159 
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Table III.11. Tuition discount regression 
Discount is the ratio of overseas sub-program tuition to the tuition of a comparable 
program on the sponsoring U.S. university’s home campus. We make tuition comparable 
across programs and locations by assuming that a student takes an average of four 3-
credit courses per semester or eight 3-credit courses per academic year whenever 
necessary. GDP_PPP is host country’s real per-capita GDP in 2000 constant international 
dollars (in thousands). Stu_Pop is the tertiary school age population in millions. 
Gov_Stab measures government stability, which is a proxy for political risk. Elite is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a university’s Borda Count Score is ranked in the top 16 
and 0 otherwise. Good is equal to 1 if a university’s Borda Count Score is ranked 
between 17 and 67 (three specialized institutions excluded). Moderate is equal to 1 if a 
university is considered a research university by the Carnegie Classification but is ranked 
below 67. Variable Public is an indicator variable for public university. Prof is equal to 1 
if the overseas sub-program is in engineering, EECS, business, law, medicine, and other 
professional disciplines and 0 otherwise. BA is equal to 1 if the overseas sub-program is a 
baccalaureate program and 0 otherwise. Joint is equal to 1 if the overseas sub-program 
has a partner university in the host country or has received local financing support. 
Robust and clustered (at university level) standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Variable Name OLS Coefficient 
GDP_PPP -0.022*** 
(0.004) 
Stu_Pop -0.000 
(0.001) 
Gov_Stab -0.050 
(0.054) 
Elite 0.021 
(0.187) 
Good 0.236** 
(0.114) 
Moderate 0.046 
(0.113) 
Public 0.006 
(0.074) 
Prof 0.050 
(0.053) 
BA 0.255* 
(0.131) 
Joint 0.032 
(0.068) 
Constant 0.913 
(0.572) 
Observations 86 
R-squared 0.510 
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Chapter IV 
Earnings Restatements and Costs of Raising Equity 
 
IV.1. Introduction 
The integrity of financial reporting by public corporations and its ramifications 
for firm value have long been subjects of significant interest to capital market participants, 
regulators, and academic researchers. Transparent and truthful representations of firm 
performance and financial conditions facilitate accurate pricing of securities and ensure 
efficient allocation of capital. High-profile corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and 
other major corporations in the early 2000s led to more stringent listing requirements by 
NYSE and NASDAQ and to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Reports 
published by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) indicate that financial 
misreporting is a more widespread problem than the few major cases. For example, the 
period of 1997 to 2006 witnessed over 2,700 announcements of earnings restatements.  
It is well documented that revelations of financial misreporting cause immediate, 
large declines in share value (see, e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Anderson 
and Yohn (2002), and Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004)). As such disclosures 
call into question the integrity of a firm’s financial reporting system, firms are likely to 
also experience long-lasting repercussions in their contracting in the factor and product 
markets given the reliance on accurate financial information by various contracting 
parties (Ball (2001) and Holthausen and Watts (2001)). Research on this issue has been 
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limited. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) examine the effects of earnings restatements on the 
contracting between firms and creditors in a sample of bank loans. But the literature has 
been largely silent on the contracting implications of financial misrepresentation in the 
equity market. Since equity market transactions are particularly susceptible to 
information asymmetry and adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf (1984)), 
financial reporting integrity may have potentially more profound effects on contracting 
outcomes. In addition, while prior research focuses on the response by either shareholders 
or creditors, firms as a nexus of contracts interact with many other parties (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). It remains unknown whether corporate disclosures of financial 
misreporting change the contracting terms between firms and non-investor groups or 
entities. Finally, to the extent that firms committing financial misrepresentation 
subsequently take corrective measures to improve internal control and governance and 
restore credibility to their financial reporting (Farber (2005), Cheng and Farber (2008), 
and Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008)), it is an interesting yet unexplored issue whether 
these remedial actions are able to mitigate any elevated contracting costs faced by 
misreporting firms.  
We aim to answer these questions by examining the underwriting contracts 
between firms and investment banks in seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We investigate 
how prior incidences of financial misrepresentation by issuing firms affect the price and 
nonprice aspects of these contracts. Investment banks provide services and expertise to 
firms on a variety of corporate finance activities, such as securities issuance, mergers and 
acquisitions, and restructuring. As sophisticated players in the financial markets, they are 
likely to take into account an issuing firm’s past misreporting when negotiating terms of 
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the underwriting contracts for a number of reasons. First, an issuing firm’s past 
misreporting reduces the credibility of its financial statements. As a result, the due 
diligence process becomes more challenging for underwriters since they cannot rely 
solely on the information furnished by the issuing firm. Instead, they may need to expend 
more resources on fact finding and verification.  
Second, by entering into an underwriting contract, investment banks implicitly 
certify the value of issuers’ securities to the capital market. If the issuers are found out 
later to have misled investors through an inaccurate portrayal of their financial 
conditions, both the underwriters and the issuing firms will be subject to investor lawsuits 
and potentially liable for investor losses (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004)). If 
past reporting violations make a firm’s financial disclosure less trustworthy, investment 
banks may perceive a higher litigation risk from underwriting the company’s stock 
offering.  
Third, since investor demand is likely to be weak for stock offerings by 
misreporting firms, these issues would entail more marketing and placement efforts from 
underwriters and expose underwriters to greater inventory risk. Based on these 
considerations, we hypothesize that investment banks will design the underwriting 
contracts (price and nonprice terms) in ways that  account for the extra work and risk 
involved with SEOs of misreporting firms, especially if the issuers have not addressed 
adequately the internal control and corporate governance weaknesses that may have led 
to the misreporting.91 
                                                 
91 There is a strand of literature that examines whether financial reporting quality is linked to costs of equity 
capital measured by either realized stock returns or implied discount rates estimated based on an assumed 
stock valuation model and analyst forecasts of earnings and dividends. While some researchers find that 
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We find supportive evidence for our conjecture in a sample of 2,337 firm-
commitment SEOs issued by U.S. firms during the period from 1997 to 2008. 
Specifically, we show that firms with past earnings restatements pay significantly higher 
underwriting spreads when compared both to themselves prior to restatements and to 
non-restatement firms. The results are primarily driven by restatements due to accounting 
irregularities, i.e., deliberate manipulation, rather than unintentional errors. This suggests 
that underwriters discriminate between restatements of varying nature and severity and 
firms committing more serious financial misreporting face greater contracting costs. In 
addition, our findings are robust to controlling for the issuing firm’s information 
asymmetry (Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) and Lee and Masulis (2009)), stock market 
liquidity (Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005)), and corporate governance (Amiyatosh 
and Kim (2010)), and to correcting for potential self-selection bias arising from firms’ 
decisions to issue equity. 
Moreover, we show that restatement firms can restore credibility to their financial 
reporting and regain investor trust by implementing corporate governance improvements. 
Specifically, the effect of restatements on underwriting fees decreases as restatement 
firms increase the percentage of independent directors on their boards and replace a 
larger percentage of audit committee members present at restatement announcements. 
                                                                                                                                                 
lower-quality financial reporting are associated with higher costs of equity capital (e.g., Botosan (1997), 
Francis et al. (2004), and Hribar and Jenkins (2004), Beneish, Billings, and Hodder (2008)), others argue 
that financial reporting quality is a diversifiable risk and find no relation between financial reporting quality 
and costs of equity capital (e.g., Ball and Brown (1969), Kasznik (2004), and Ogneva, Subramanyam, and 
Raghunandan (2007), Core, Guay, Verdi (2008), Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2009)). The literature is also faced 
with the empirical challenge of measuring costs of equity, since realized stock returns are poor proxies for 
expected stock returns (Fama and French (1997)) and implied cost of equity estimates are flawed due to 
biases in analyst forecasts (Kasznik (2004) and Guay, Kothari, and Shu (2006)). By focusing on the 
underwriting contracts in SEOs and the actual costs of raising equity, our analysis is free both of any 
assumption of equilibrium asset pricing model that specifies whether financial reporting quality is priced 
and of the aforementioned measurement issues. 
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 The higher underwriting fees due to restatements display other cross-sectional 
variations as well. In particular, we find that the effect of restatements on underwriting 
fees is stronger in SEOs that attempt to issue a larger number of shares relative to shares 
outstanding. This is consistent with the idea that larger offerings by restatement firms 
involve especially greater underwriting risk and efforts (Butler, Grullon, and Weston 
(2005)). We also find that that the effect of restatements is more pronounced in the first 
few years after restatements, suggesting that investor concerns over the integrity of a 
firm’s financial reporting are heightened immediately after earning restatements and 
appear to lessen over time in the absence of further reporting violations. 
Variations in other dimensions of the underwriting contracts are also consistent 
with restatement firms losing credibility in their financial reporting and facing more 
obstacles and weaker demand in equity issuance. For example, we find that restatement 
issuers employ significantly larger underwriting syndicates with more lead managers. 
They are also more likely to utilize an extensive book building process than the faster and 
cheaper accelerated underwriting method that either bypasses or substantially curtails the 
conventional book building. Consistent with evidence from the gross spread analysis, 
both of these results are driven by restatements due to accounting irregularities, and 
suggest that offerings by restatement firms entail greater due diligence, marketing, and 
placement efforts from underwriters. 
In addition to the characteristics of underwriting contracts between issuing firms 
and investment banks, we examine the stock price reaction to SEO announcements as 
another gauge of the costs firms incur in accessing the equity market. The adverse 
selection model in Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts stock price declines upon SEO 
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announcements and has received empirical support from a large number of studies (see 
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007) for a comprehensive literature review). Consistent with 
past restatements rendering a firm’s financial disclosure less trustworthy and 
exacerbating investor concerns about adverse selection problems, we find significantly 
more negative stock price reactions to the SEO announcements by restatement firms. 
Again, this result is primarily concentrated in firms that have intentionally manipulated 
their earnings.  
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, we provide clear 
evidence on how financial misrepresentation affects firms’ contracting outcomes in the 
equity financing setting. Our findings of higher underwriting fees, larger underwriting 
syndicates, and lengthier and costlier underwriting process associated with SEOs of 
restatement firms suggest that misreporting firms experience higher costs in contracting 
with outside parties. To the extent that firms anticipating especially severe penalties will 
avoid accessing the equity market, the effects we uncover are a lower bound of the 
incremental contracting costs levied on restatement firms in equity issuance. In addition, 
our analysis yields several novel cross-sectional variations in the effect of financial 
misreporting on contracting costs. For example, we find that higher underwriting fees due 
to previous restatements can be mitigated through corporate governance improvements 
that rebuild investor confidence in firms’ financial reporting and are more pronounced in 
the first few years after restatements. 
Second, we identify the issuer’s financial reporting integrity indicated by previous 
financial misrepresentation as a new determinant of SEO underwriting costs. Prior 
research shows that firms with greater information asymmetry (Altinkilic and Hansen 
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(2000)) and Lee and Masulis (2009)) and poorer stock market liquidity (Butler, Grullon, 
and Weston (2005)) incur higher flotation costs when issuing seasoned equity. Our 
evidence indicates that the issuer’s financial reporting integrity is another factor that 
investment banks take into account in pricing underwriting contracts, and its effect on 
flotation costs is incremental to those of other determinants.  
Third, our findings highlight the importance of differentiating among earnings 
restatements based on their causes. Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) develop a 
sophisticated classification scheme to separate restatements into those due to accounting 
irregularities and those due to unintentional errors. They show that such a distinction 
significantly enhances the power of tests to detect the effect of restatements on executive 
turnovers. In a different setting, we find highly consistent results throughout our analysis 
that it is the irregularity-related restatements that are significantly related to SEO 
underwriting fees, underwriting syndicate structure, underwriting method, and 
announcement returns. This lends further support to the validity of Hennes et al.’s 
methodology.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the construction 
of the SEO sample and the identification of restatement firms. Section III presents the 
results from our empirical analysis. Section IV concludes.  
IV.2. Sample construction 
We begin our sample construction by extracting from the SDC Global New Issues 
database all firm-commitment seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. firms from 
January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2008. For each SEO in the initial sample, we require 
that the offering size is at least $10 million, the offer price is at least $5, the percentage of 
113 
 
secondary shares in the offering is less than 100%, and the issuer has financial statement 
information available from Compustat and stock return data available from CRSP. We 
also follow literature conventions to exclude units, rights, closed-end fund and 
simultaneous international offerings. The final sample consists of 2,337 SEOs. Table 
IV.1 presents the sample distribution by offer year. The number of SEOs is at the highest 
level in 1997, the beginning of our sample period, but declines significantly after that and 
drops to its lowest level in 2000 and 2001, coinciding with the burst of the internet 
bubble. The offering activity starts to recover from 2002 and reaches another high point 
of 252 issues in 2004. Then it declines gradually to 146 offerings in 2008, the last year of 
our sample period and also the year when the stock market plummeted due to the 
financial crisis. 
Our sample of restatement firms comes from two reports issued by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2003 and 2007, which include a list of companies 
that restated their financial statements during the period from 1997 to 2006. According to 
the GAO, “a restatement occurs when a company, either voluntarily or prompted by 
auditors or regulators, revises public financial information that was previously reported.” 
The GAO sample includes both financial reporting frauds or irregularities (intentional 
misreporting) and accounting errors (unintentional misstatements). Hennes, Leone, and 
Miller (2008) develop a methodology that classifies a restatement as an irregularity if it 
satisfies at least one of the three criteria: (i) variants of the words “irregularity” or “fraud” 
were explicitly used in restatement announcements or relevant filings in the four years 
around the restatement; (ii) the misstatements came under SEC or DOJ investigations; 
and (iii) independent investigations were launched by boards of directors of restatement 
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firms. In a sample of restatements between 2002 and 2005, they demonstrate the 
importance and effectiveness of their classification scheme by showing that compared to 
error restatements, irregularity restatements are met with significantly more negative 
announcement returns (on average: -14% vs. -2%), are followed by shareholder class 
action lawsuits at a significantly higher rate, and lead to significantly more CEO/CFO 
turnovers. We obtain from Andrew Leone’s website the irregularity-error classification 
for the GAO sample of restatements.92 
We match the samples of restatements and seasoned equity offerings, and find 
that 202 of the 2,337 SEOs are by restatement firms after their restatements, while the 
rest are either by firms that have never restated earnings or by restatement firms prior to 
their restatements.93 The small number of offerings by restatement firms after 
restatements is consistent with Chen, Cheng, and Lo’s (2009) finding that firms face 
greater financial constraints after restatements. As shown in Table IV.1, 162 of these 202 
SEOs are issued by companies whose restatements are due to unintentional accounting 
errors, and 40 are issued by firms whose restatements are due to intentional misreporting.  
IV.3. Empirical results 
IV.3.A. The effect of restatements on underwriting fees 
A.1. Baseline analysis 
Our main test is to examine whether investment banks charge higher underwriting 
fees for SEOs by companies that have restated their financial statements, especially when 
                                                 
92 We thank Karen Hennes, Andrew Leone, and Brian Miller for generously sharing their data. 
93 Since the GAO reports identify firms that restated earnings during the period from 1997 to 2006, it is 
possible that some SEOs in our sample are by firms that restated earnings prior to 1997 or after 2006. 
These SEOs will be classified as offerings by non-restatement firms, and their presence would bias against 
us finding support for our hypothesis that SEOs of restatement firms are associated with higher issuance 
costs. 
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restatements are due to intentional misreporting. Our measure of underwriting fees is the 
gross spread per share scaled by the offer price. In firm commitment offerings, 
underwriters purchase shares from issuing firms at a discount and sell the shares to 
investors at the offer price. The gross spread is the difference between the offer price and 
the purchase price paid by underwriters to issuing firms. Table IV.2 presents the 
summary statistics for the whole sample, as well as for different sub-samples. For the full 
sample, the mean and median percentage gross spread are 4.9% and 5%, similar to what 
Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) and Lee and Masulis (2009) find for their samples. 
The average (median) offering size measured by the principal amount is $170 ($80) 
million, representing about 22.5% (17.7%) of the pre-issue market value of equity for the 
average (median) issuer in our sample.  
When we partition the sample into SEOs by firms that have restated earnings and 
those by firms that have not, we find that the former are associated with slightly lower 
gross spreads. For example, the gross spreads of SEOs by restatement firms have a mean 
(median) of 4.5% (4.8%), while the mean (median) gross spread of offerings by non-
restatement firms is 5.0% (5.0%). This is most likely driven by the fact that the principal 
amount of SEOs by restatement firms tends to be much larger and that there is a well-
documented negative relation between percentage gross spread and principal amount (see, 
e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) and Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005)). The average 
(median) offering size by restatement companies is $442 ($116) million, while the 
average (median) principal amount by non-restatement issuers is only $145 ($77) million. 
Therefore, in order for us to draw reliable inference on the effect of past restatements on 
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underwriting fees, it is important to control for offering size and other known 
determinants of gross spread in a multivariate regression framework.  
We classify these control variables into two groups: firm characteristics and issue 
characteristics. The former group includes firm size, leverage, Tobin’s q, return on assets 
(ROA), stock return volatility, share turnover, and NYSE listing. The second group 
includes whether an issue is shelf registered, the proportion of secondary shares offered, 
lead underwriter reputation, as well as offering size measured by the logarithmic 
transformation of the principal amount. Appendix IV.A contains the definitions of these 
variables.  
Larger firms are likely to have more analyst coverage and attract more 
institutional shareholders. Greater analyst coverage reduces the information asymmetry 
between firms and outside investors. A more transparent information environment is 
conducive to eliciting greater demand from investors for a firm’s equity offering. 
Therefore, underwriters may find it easier to market and place offerings by larger firms 
and thus charge a lower gross spread. We measure firm size by the logarithmic 
transformation of the issuer’s book value of total assets at the pre-issue fiscal year end 
(Compustat data 6). 
Since underwriters guarantee the success of an offering in a firm-commitment 
issue by agreeing to purchase the entire offering from the issuer at a fixed price, they will 
take on more price risk in SEOs of firms with greater stock price fluctuations. To 
compensate for the additional risk, we expect investment banks to charge higher fees for 
such issues. We measure stock price fluctuations by the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns during the 250 trading days prior to the offer date. To the extent that firms with 
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higher stock return volatilities may also be associated with greater information 
asymmetry, underwriters may find that certifying the value of these companies entails 
more efforts and brings more litigation risk. As a result, they demand higher 
compensation for their services. 
Firm leverage is defined as the sum of long-term debt (data 9) and short-term debt 
(data 34) over the book value of total assets at the pre-issue fiscal year end. Since highly 
levered issuers are associated with higher probabilities of financial distress and are likely 
to use offer proceeds to repay debt rather than take advantage of profitable growth 
opportunities, investors may be less enthusiastic about the SEOs of these firms. As a 
result, placing these offerings requires greater efforts from and carries more risk to 
underwriters, who in response charge higher fees.  
The adverse selection problem for companies with higher Tobin’s q tends to be 
less of a concern, since these firms are more likely to have profitable growth options. We 
expect that shareholders are more receptive to the equity offerings from firms with more 
profitable growth options. As a result, underwriters charge lower fees for these issuers. 
We define Tobin’s q as the ratio of an issuer’s market value of assets over its book value 
of assets at the pre-issue fiscal year end, where the market value of assets is computed as 
the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity (data 60) plus the 
market value of common equity (data 25 x data 199). 
Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) argue that underwriters face lower inventory 
risk when placing shares that are liquid and they show that stock liquidity has a negative 
impact on gross spread. To control for the market liquidity of a stock, we include share 
turnover as an explanatory variable for gross spread. Share turnover is defined as the ratio 
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of the average daily trading volume during the 250 trading days prior to the offer date 
over the number of shares outstanding.94 
Investment banks may find it easier to place shares listed on the NYSE, since 
firms trading on the NYSE tend to have a larger shareholder base. To control for this 
possibility, we include an indicator for NYSE listing in the regression model of gross 
spread.  
With respect to issue-specific characteristics, we include an indicator for shelf 
registrations, a measure of lead underwriter reputation, and the percentage of secondary 
shares in an offering. Autore, Kumar, and Shome (2008) find that SEOs using shelf 
registrations have lower underwriting fees. More reputable underwriters may provide 
better-quality service and can charge a higher spread if their service is in high demand. 
Alternatively, if higher-ranked underwriters are able to conduct the underwriting in a 
more efficient manner, they may be able to pass some of the cost savings onto the issuers, 
resulting in a lower spread. We measure the reputation of each SEO’s lead manager by its 
Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking updated by Jay Ritter and made available on his 
website.95 For SEOs with multiple lead managers, we use the average ranking of these 
managers. Secondary shares are shares owned by existing shareholders, normally insiders 
of issuing firms. The effect of secondary shares on underwriting fees depends on the 
motive behind insider selling. If insider selling is mostly for liquidity needs, we do not 
expect it to have any bearing on underwriting fees, but if insiders sell to take advantage 
                                                 
94 For stocks listed on Nasdaq, we follow Gao and Ritter’s (2010, Appendix B) algorithm to adjust their 
trading volumes for the different ways in which Nasdaq and NYSE-Amex volumes are computed. We 
thank Jay Ritter for suggesting this approach. Our results are robust if we simply divide Nasdaq volumes by 
two. 
95 Loughran and Ritter (2004) use this ranking in their study of time-series variations in IPO underpricing.  
119 
 
of favorable price levels, the adverse selection effect of their action may make a 
successful offering more difficult and call for higher underwriting compensation. Finally, 
we also control for calendar year fixed effects and Fama-French 12-industry fixed effects 
to account for any time-specific or industry-specific factors that could influence 
underwriting fees.  
We present the coefficient estimates of our regression model of underwriting 
gross spread in Table IV.3. In parentheses are two-sided p-values based on standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and firm clustering (Petersen 
(2009)). The dependent variable is the log transformation of percentage gross spread.96 In 
column (1), our key explanatory variable is an indicator variable, restatement, that is 
equal to one for SEOs by firms that have previously restated earnings, regardless of 
whether the restatements are due to errors or irregularities. The coefficient estimate of the 
“restatement” dummy variable is -0.025, insignificantly different from zero with a p-
value of 0.479.  
In column (2) of Table IV.3, we replace the “restatement” dummy with two 
indicator variables, one for restatements caused by errors, and the other for restatements 
due to irregularities. We find that the indicator for errors has a negative and insignificant 
coefficient, but the indicator variable for irregularities has a positive coefficient of 0.099, 
which is highly significant with a p-value of 0.002. This suggests that firms that 
committed deliberate earnings manipulations suffer more damage to the credibility of 
                                                 
96  Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) and Lee and Masulis (2009) use this measure as well. The 
logarithmic transformation offers the convenience that the coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the 
percentage change in gross spread per one-unit increase in independent variables, and this is especially 
convenient for dichotomous explanatory variables. Our results are robust to using the percentage spread as 
the dependent variable.  
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their financial reporting and investment banks charge higher fees for these firms’ SEOs to 
compensate for the greater underwriting efforts and risk involved. In terms of the 
economic significance of the coefficient, it appears that ceteris paribus, the percentage 
gross spread is about 10% higher for SEOs by irregularity-restatement firms, and this 
translates into 50 basis points (bps) for the typical SEO in our sample with a 5% (500 bps) 
gross spread. In dollar terms, a 50 bps increase in gross spread raises the underwriting fee 
by about $3.8 million for the average SEO by an irregularity-restatement firm. 
The effect of irregularity-induced restatements on underwriting fees is even more 
striking when we introduce issuer fixed-effects in column (3) to control for any time-
invariant firm characteristics that might be responsible for the effect of restatements 
uncovered by the regression in column (2). We find that the indicator for error-induced 
restatements is still not significant, and the indicator for irregularities has a positive 
coefficient that is significant with a p-value of 0.03. Comparing to the results in column 
(2), the coefficient of the irregularity dummy nearly doubles in magnitude to 0.192. This 
suggests that compared to themselves prior to restatements, firms that intentionally 
misstated financial reports have to pay almost 20% higher percentage gross spreads, 
which translates into 100 bps in spread.97  
With respect to the control variables, their coefficients are largely consistent with 
the evidence in Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) and Lee and Masulis (2009). 
Specifically, as shown in column (2), underwriting spreads are significantly lower for 
                                                 
97 This evidence should be viewed with caution since only nine firms issued SEOs both before and after 
irregularity-induced restatement. This low frequency of repeat equity issues by irregularity-restatement 
firms, which biases against finding significant results from the firm fixed effects specification, is consistent 
with firms facing substantially higher contracting costs after irregularity restatements and thus having less 
incentive to access the equity market. 
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larger offerings and offerings by larger firms traded on the NYSE that have higher 
Tobin’s q, better stock market liquidity, and lower stock return volatility. Consistent with 
Autore, Kumar, and Shome (2008), we also find that shelf-registered offerings are 
associated with significantly lower underwriting spreads. 
A.2. Matched-sample analyses 
 One potential concern with the regressions in Table IV.3 is that they may not be 
able to control adequately for the differences in issue- and issuer-specific characteristics 
between the restatement and non-restatement subsamples. In particular, as shown in 
Table IV.2, both the size of the issuing firm and the size of the offering are much larger 
for the restatement subsample than for the non-restatement subsample. These differences 
could affect underwriting spread in non-linear fashions that linear regressions such as 
those in Table IV.3 cannot fully capture. 
We take three approaches to address this potential problem. First, we note that the 
size differences actually bias against us finding higher underwriting spreads for SEOs by 
restatement firms, since it is well documented that the percentage underwriting spread is 
lower for larger offerings and for offerings by larger firms (see, .e.g., Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2000) and Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005)). Second, we include higher-
order, such as quadratic and cubic, terms of firm size and offering size as additional 
controls in the spread regressions in Table IV.3 and find that our results on the effect of 
restatements continue to hold. 
Third, we conduct a matched-sample analysis in which for each restatement 
firm’s SEO, we select a matching SEO by a non-restatement firm based on the following 
three criteria: (1) the matching SEO’s offer date is within one year of the offer date of the 
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restatement firm’s SEO, (2) the non-restatement firm’s size measured by total assets falls 
between 75% and 125% of the restatement firm’s size, and (3) conditional on the first 
two conditions being met, the matching SEO’s offer size measured by principal amount is 
closest to that of the restatement firm’s SEO. We are able to find matches for all 202 
SEOs by restatement firms, resulting in a sample of 404 SEOs. 
Panels A-C of Table IV.4 show that the SEOs by restatement firms and non-
restatement firms in the matched sample are very similar in terms of issuer size and offer 
size, validating the effectiveness of our matching. We then estimate gross spread 
regressions using the matched samples and present the results in Panel D of Table IV.4. 
We find that the restatement dummy in column (1) has an insignificant coefficient, 
suggesting that SEOs by restatement firms as a whole are not associated with higher 
underwriting fees. However, there is strong evidence of higher underwriting fees charged 
on SEOs by firms with irregularity-induced restatements, as indicated by the significantly 
positive coefficient on the irregularity-restatement dummy in column (2). These 
inferences are consistent with those we draw from the full sample regressions in Table 
IV.3. Also worth noting is that the magnitude of the effect of irregularity restatements on 
gross spread is similar between the full sample and the matched sample. Overall, our 
analysis in this section shows that our findings are not driven by any potential inadequate 
control for size differences among SEOs and issuing firms.  
A.3. Controlling for issuing firm governance characteristics 
 An alternative interpretation of our findings on the effect of restatements on 
underwriting fees is that SEO firms with prior restatements may be associated with poor 
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corporate governance98, and firms with poor corporate governance pay higher 
underwriting fees when floating seasoned equity. In other words, the effect of 
restatements we identify could be an artifact of that of issuing firm corporate governance.  
To address this concern, we control for each issuing firm’s internal and external 
governance characteristics at the time of the offering in the gross spread regression. 
Toward that end, we merge our sample of SEOs with the IRRC database to obtain 
information on firms’ anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) and board characteristics. In 
column (1) of Table IV.5, we control for the issuer’s Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 
2003) index based on 24 ATPs, and in column (2), we control for board size, the 
percentage of independent directors, and CEO/Chairman duality, which is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
Since IRRC covers mostly large companies while our sample spans a wider spectrum of 
firm size, the number of observations used in these two regressions is substantially 
smaller than that in previous tables. Nevertheless, we find that the coefficient on the 
irregularity-restatement dummy continues to be positive and significant. The governance 
variables we control for, on the other hand, do not enter significantly in the gross spread 
regressions. These findings suggest that the effect of restatements is not driven by issuer 
corporate governance. 
A.4. Controlling for additional measures of information asymmetry 
                                                 
98 Note that the evidence has been rather mixed on whether poor corporate governance leads to earnings 
restatements (see, e.g., Beasley (1996), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Agrawal and Chadha (2005), 
Farber (2005), Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007), and Baber, Kang, Liang, and Zhu (2009)). To the 
extent that poor corporate governance indeed contributes to earnings restatements, firms appear to take 
steps to improve their corporate governance practice that led to financial misreporting (Farber (2005) and 
Cheng and Farber (2008)). But if a restatement firm has not been able to implement all necessary corporate 
governance improvements by the time of a seasoned equity offering, it may still be associated with poor 
corporate governance at the offering.  
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In this section, we control for more measures of information asymmetry in 
addition to firm size and stock return volatility included in our baseline regressions in 
Table IV.2. Specifically, we follow Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) by controlling for the 
dispersion (standard deviation) of analyst forecasts of current-fiscal-year earnings per 
share scaled by stock price, since Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) find that 
analyst forecast dispersion increases for firms announcing restatements. We further 
control for the number of analysts covering each issuing firm to capture the possibility 
that restatement firms receive less analyst coverage. We also include the consensus 
(mean) analyst forecast for current-fiscal-year earnings per share scaled by book assets 
per share as an additional control to account for the possibility that restatement firms 
have poorer future performance, which could lead to higher underwriting spreads. We 
construct these new variables based on information from the I/B/E/S database in the 
month prior to each SEO. Requiring data availability from I/B/E/S reduces our sample 
size to 1,767 SEOs. We re-estimate models (1) and (2) in Table IV.3 with these 
additional controls and present the results in Table IV.6. We find that the number of 
analysts covering an issuing firm has a significantly negative effect on underwriting 
spread while the analyst forecast dispersion has a significantly positive effect, consistent 
with underwriters charging higher fees on issuers with higher information asymmetry. 
The coefficient on the average analyst forecast of future earnings is negative but 
insignificant. More importantly, we continue to find that SEOs by issuers with 
irregularity restatements are associated with significantly higher underwriting fees, as 
indicated by the significant and positive coefficient on the irregularity-restatement 
dummy in column (2).  
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In addition to analyst based variables, we also control for information asymmetry 
measures based on earnings accruals.99 Lee and Masulis (2009) find that seasoned equity 
issuers with lower accruals quality pay higher underwriting fees. We construct two 
measures of accruals quality. The first measure is the absolute value of the issuer’s 
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals (Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005)).100 Our 
sample size is reduced to 1,254 because we cannot estimate discretionary accruals for 
about half of the sample due to lack of data. The regression results are shown in column 
(1) of Table IV.7. Consistent with Lee and Masulis (2009), the coefficient of the accrual 
quality measure is significant and positive. More importantly, we continue to find 
significantly positive coefficients for the irregularity dummy variable, even in this 
smaller sample.  
Our second measure of accruals quality is the one developed by Dechow and 
Dichev (2002), namely, the standard deviation over the previous five years of a firm’s 
annual accruals unexplained by cash flows in the current year, prior year, and next year. 
We control for this alternative measure in column (2) of Table IV.7. We find that it has a 
significant and positive effect on gross spread, but the coefficient on the irregularity 
restatement dummy remains significantly positive. Overall, our results indicate that a 
firm’s financial reporting integrity has an incremental effect on its SEO contracting costs 
that is beyond that of accruals-based measures for information asymmetry. 
A.5. Correcting for self-selection bias 
                                                 
99 A caveat of accruals-based measures is that they potentially suffer from measurement errors and capture 
differences in firms’ operating environment and production functions, making interpretations difficult 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Ball and Shivakumar (2008), and Costello and Wittenberg-
Moerman (2011)). Restatements, on the other hand, provide a strong and unambiguous signal about the 
reliability of a firm’s financial reporting. 
100 Please see Appendix IV.B for more details on the construction of this measure.  
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We recognize that a self-selection bias potentially complicates our analysis since 
firms issuing SEOs are not a random sample. This issue could be especially relevant in 
our setting, since our tests are intended to identify the effect of a firm’s past financial 
misreporting on its SEO issuance costs, and past financial misreporting is likely to impact 
the firm’s likelihood of issuing seasoned equity in the future.  
To correct for any potential self-selection bias, we adopt the Heckman (1978) 
two-step procedure. In the first step, we estimate a probit model using all COMPUSTAT 
firms with necessary data during our sample period to predict the likelihood of a firm 
issuing seasoned equity in a given year. The dependent variable is equal to one if a firm 
issues seasoned equity during a year according to the SDC and zero otherwise. The 
explanatory variables include the dummy variables for error and irregularity restatements, 
firm size, leverage, Tobin’s q, ROA, stock return volatility, the ratio of capital 
expenditure to the book value of total assets, the ratio of corporate cash holding to the 
book value of total assets, a dividend-paying status dummy, and the buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted return over the previous year. Other than the two restatement dummy 
variables, the model specification is very similar to that used by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Stulz (2010). The estimation results presented in Panel A of Table IV.8 show that 
firms with irregularity-induced restatements are less likely to issue seasoned equity, as 
are dividend-paying firms and firms with higher stock return volatilities. On the other 
hand, larger and more levered firms and firms with higher Tobin’s Q, ROA, capital 
expenditure, cash holdings, and buy-and-hold excess returns over the previous year are 
more likely to issue seasoned equity. All these relations are statistically significant at the 
5% level or better. Overall, it appears that equity issuing firms have better performance, 
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lower risk, and more growth opportunities, and they have been using more debt capital 
and making more capital investments.101 
In the second step of the Heckman procedure, we construct an inverse Mills’ ratio 
(IMR) based on the coefficient estimates from the first-step probit model, and include the 
IMR as an additional explanatory variable in the gross spread regression. Panel B of 
Table IV.8 presents the estimation results. We find that the IMR has a significantly 
negative coefficient, consistent with the interpretation that firms with a higher ex ante 
probability of issuing equity are associated with lower underwriting fees. More 
importantly for our purpose, the irregularity-restatement dummy still has a significant and 
positive coefficient with similar magnitude to that in Table IV.3. Therefore, we conclude 
that our results are robust to correcting for potential self-selection bias arising from a 
firm’s decision to issue equity.  
A.6. Cross-sectional variation in the effect of restatements on underwriting fees 
Having established the robustness of our finding that firms with previous 
restatements due to accounting irregularities pay higher underwriting fees in SEOs, we 
next explore potential cross-sectional variations in the effect of restatements to add more 
texture to our evidence.  
We first examine whether the restatement effect varies with offering size. In their 
study of firm stock market liquidity and SEO issuance costs, Butler, Grullon, and Weston 
(2005) argue and show that the effect of liquidity is more pronounced for larger offerings, 
                                                 
101 We also estimate the probit model only using firm-years associated with restatement firms. We find that 
restatement firms with higher leverage, better ROA, more capital expenditure, lower stock return 
volatilities, and higher stock returns in the previous year are significantly more likely to issue equity. These 
patterns are similar to those observed among all firms. Therefore, it does not appear to be the case that 
restatement firms resorting to equity financing are in dire financial conditions and in desperate needs for 
capital, and as a result, pay higher underwriting fees.  
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which require more marketing and placement efforts from underwriters. Similarly, we 
expect the effect of financial reporting integrity on underwriting costs to be greater for 
larger SEOs. To test this hypothesis, we create two indicator variables, one for SEOs 
whose relative size, defined as the number of shares offered divided by the pre-issue 
number of shares outstanding, is above sample median and the other for SEOs whose 
relative offer size is below sample median. In light of the evidence in Tables IV.3 and 
IV.4, we focus exclusively on irregularity restatements and interact the irregularity 
restatement dummy with each of the two indicator variables. We then re-estimate the 
gross spread regression with the two interaction terms as key explanatory variables. 
Results presented in column (1) of Table IV.9 support our conjecture. The significantly 
positive effect of irregularity restatements on underwriting fees is mostly concentrated in 
larger deals, while the effect, albeit still positive, is insignificant in smaller deals.  
In addition to offering size, we also examine whether the restatement effect 
depends on how recent a restatement is relative to an offering. We expect the effect to be 
stronger immediately after restatements and weaken as more time lapses since the most 
recent restatement, because firms are found to take steps to improve their corporate 
governance practice that led to financial misreporting and to regain investor confidence 
(Farber (2005) and Cheng and Farber (2008)). It is also possible that the longer a firm can 
avoid further reporting violations since its last transgression, the more trust it can regain 
from capital market participants in its financial statements. To the extent that the 
restatement effect may not vary over time in a linear fashion, we create two indicator 
variables, one for SEOs taking place within three years of the most recent restatements 
and the other for SEOs happening more than three years after the most recent 
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restatements.102 We then interact the irregularity restatement dummy with each of the two 
newly created indicator variables and include the interaction terms as our key explanatory 
variables in the gross spread regression. Results in column (2) of Table IV.9 show that 
investment banks charge significantly higher underwriting fees (by about 16%) only on 
SEOs happening within three years of a restatement. This is consistent with our 
prediction and suggests that the higher contracting costs faced by restatement firms 
indeed are more pronounced during the period immediately following restatements and 
lessen over time.  
Finally, we directly examine whether restatement firms can restore credibility to 
their financial reporting and mitigate the increased contracting costs by making corporate 
governance improvements. Given the importance of board and audit committee 
independence in a firm’s financial reporting process (Klein (2002)), for each irregularity-
restatement issuer in our sample, we examine its proxy statements and measure (i) the 
change in the percentage of independent directors on its board from immediately prior to 
the restatement announcement to immediately prior to the SEO announcement and (ii) the 
percentage of audit committee members replaced from immediately prior to the 
restatement announcement to immediately prior to the SEO announcement.103 We 
interact each of the two corporate governance improvement measures with the 
irregularity-restatement dummy and include the interaction term as an additional 
explanatory variable in the gross spread regression.  
                                                 
102 Farber (2005) finds that fraud firms exhibit governance characteristics similar to or better than non-fraud 
firms three years after the fraud revelation. 
103 During our sample period, audit committees of most firms are fully independent. 
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Table IV.10 presents the regression results. In column (1), we find that the 
irregularity-restatement dummy itself continues to have a significant and positive 
coefficient, but its interaction with the change in board independence has a significantly 
negative coefficient, suggesting that increasing board independence can reduce the 
additional underwriting fees that restatement firms have to pay for their SEOs. It appears 
that reconstituting the audit committee has a similar effect on underwriting fees, 
evidenced by the significantly negative coefficient on the interaction between the 
irregularity-restatement dummy and the percentage of audit committee members replaced 
(see column (2)). However, the governance improvements are unlikely to completely 
eliminate the higher contracting costs imposed on restatement issuers. The change in the 
percentage of independent directors has a median of around 0.07 with an inter-quartile 
range of about 0.21, while the percentage of audit committee members replaced has a 
median of 0.45 with an inter-quartile range of 0.55. These numbers, combined with the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates in Table IV.10, imply that a large majority of the 
restatement issuers still pay higher underwriting fees despite the post-restatement 
governance changes implemented. 
IV.3.B. The effect of restatements on underwriting syndicate size 
In this section, we design an auxiliary test to the gross spread analysis and 
examine how past restatements by issuing firms impact the size of underwriting 
syndicates. Our hypothesis is that if a firm’s prior financial misreporting tarnishes its 
financial reporting integrity and makes its equity offering unappealing to investors, the 
firm is likely to enlist the service of more underwriters in order to tap into a broader 
investor base through underwriters’ connections and ensure the successful placement of 
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its offering. Lead underwriters may also have the incentive to bring more investment 
banks into the underwriting syndicate to share the potentially heavier work load and 
greater risk associated with underwriting SEOs by firms with financial reporting 
transgressions.  
To test this prediction, we examine both the number of lead underwriters and the 
number of all syndicate members in relation to issuer past restatements, and present the 
results in Table IV.11. The regression models are largely the same as those in Table IV.3, 
except that the dependent variable is the number of syndicate members in columns (1) 
and (2) and the number of lead underwriters in columns (3) and (4). We find that SEOs 
by firms with past restatements due to irregularities are underwritten by significantly 
larger syndicates with more lead managers than other SEOs. All else being equal, 
irregularity-restatement firms’ SEOs on average have 0.893 more managers and 0.415 
more lead underwriters. Both numbers are economically significant given that the 
average syndicate has about 4 underwriters and 1.4 lead managers. These results suggest 
that offerings by firms with irregularity-induced restatements require greater efforts and 
risk sharing by underwriters. 
IV.3.C. The effect of restatements on offering methods 
 In keeping with most of the SEO literature, our analysis thus far focuses on firm-
commitment underwritten offerings that involve the conventional book-building process 
through which the issuers and underwriters gauge the interest of institutional investors 
and drum up demand for the new issues. Since the turn of the century, however, a new 
breed of SEOs that either bypass or significantly shorten the traditional book building 
process have been gaining popularity (Bartolotti, Megginson, and Smart (2008) and Gao 
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and Ritter (2010)). These issues include bought deals, block trades, and accelerated book-
built offers. Collectively, they are called accelerated offers.104 Compared to conventional 
offers, accelerated offers are conducted by smaller underwriting syndicates, completed 
much more quickly, and associated with lower underwriting costs, since they do not 
require from underwriters as much due diligence, marketing, and placement efforts as 
conventional offerings do (Bartolotti et al. (2008)). Despite the speed and cost advantages, 
an accelerated offering is not suitable for all issues or issuers. Gao and Ritter (2010) 
examine the factors driving SEO firms’ choice between the accelerated and conventional 
underwriting, and find that the accelerated underwriting is more common for smaller 
offerings and for issuers with less information asymmetry and more elastic demand 
curves for their stock.  
 To the extent that firms with past restatements face more questions about their 
financial reporting and weaker demand from investors, their SEOs would benefit from an 
extended book building process, which can generate higher investor interest by bridging 
the information gap between issuing firms and investors. Underwriters of restatement 
firms’ offerings may also prefer the conventional book-building approach, as it gives 
them an opportunity to obtain more accurate price and demand information from 
potential investors to ensure a successful placement. Therefore, we predict that firms with 
past restatements are less likely to choose the accelerated underwriting for their offerings.  
                                                 
104 Block trades and bought deals are similar; in both cases, issuing companies sell shares directly to an 
investment bank at an auction-determined or negotiated price with little or no book-building process, and 
the investment bank will then resell the shares to institutional investors. Accelerated book-built offerings 
are similar to conventional book-built offerings in that underwriters gather price and demand information 
and form syndicates, but they are executed much more rapidly. Please see Bartolotti et al. (2008) for more 
detailed descriptions of these offering methods. 
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 To test this hypothesis, we extract from SDC all seasoned equity offerings by U.S. 
companies from 1997 to 2008 that are designated as block trade, bought deal, or 
accelerated book built by SDC. After imposing the same selection criteria as those in the 
beginning of Section II, we end up with 471 accelerated offers. Merging these deals with 
the sample of 2,337 firm-commitment offers creates a sample of 2,808 SEOs. Using this 
combined sample, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 
one for accelerated offers and zero otherwise. Table IV.12 presents the marginal effects 
of explanatory variables from probit regressions. In column (1), the key explanatory 
variable is the restatement dummy, and it has a negative but insignificant marginal effect. 
In column (2), we replace the restatement dummy with the error dummy and the 
irregularity dummy. We find that the error dummy has an insignificant effect on an 
issuer’s choice of offering method, while the marginal effect of the irregularity dummy 
on the probability of an accelerated offering is negative and statistically significant with a 
p-value of 0.016. The irregularity dummy retains its significantly negative marginal 
effect when we drop the error dummy from the regression model in column (3). These 
results suggest that firms that restated due to irregularities are less likely to issue new 
shares in an accelerated offering. In economic terms, such restatements reduce the 
probability of an accelerated offering by about 5.7%, which is a meaningful effect since 
the unconditional probability of an accelerated offering is about 16%. In summary, the 
evidence from the probit model of offering method choices is consistent with the 
hypothesis that past restatements, in particular those caused by deliberate earnings 
manipulations, raise significant concerns about firms’ financial reporting integrity that 
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preclude them from taking advantage of faster and cheaper accelerated underwriting 
options for their SEOs.  
 With respect to control variables, their coefficient estimates are largely consistent 
with those found by Gao and Ritter (2010). Specifically, we find that issuers that are 
larger, have higher Tobin’s Q, have more liquid stock, and are traded on the NYSE are 
more likely to choose the accelerated approach, while issuers with higher stock return 
volatility and better operating performance and issuers trying to raise more proceeds and 
sell a higher percentage of secondary shares in the offerings are more likely to use 
traditional book building to float their shares.  
 As a robustness check, we repeat our earlier analyses using the combined sample 
that includes both conventional and accelerated SEOs. All our results continue to hold.  
IV.3.D. The effect of restatements on SEO announcement returns 
In this section we examine the effect of restatements on SEO announcement 
returns. Prior studies document negative stock market reactions to SEO announcements 
whose magnitude increases with the adverse selection problems between issuers and 
outside investors (Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2007)). Prior earnings restatements, 
especially those due to deliberate manipulations, are likely to exacerbate investor 
concerns about adverse selection by making a firm’s financial reporting less trustworthy 
and increasing the uncertainty over its true value. Therefore, we expect restatement firms 
to experience more negative abnormal returns upon SEO announcements.  
For our analysis of announcement returns, we exclude offerings through shelf 
registrations. Shelf registrations allow an issuer to defer the equity offer until a much 
later date after shelf filings. Managers at the issuing firm can pick a date to offer shares 
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within two years after the shelf filing date when they believe their company’s stock is 
overvalued. As a result, there is little adverse selection problem around shelf filings. 
Consistent with this argument, Autore, Kumar, and Shome (2008) find that the average 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) during the three-day window centered on the filing 
date for shelf offers is only -0.30% and not statistically different from zero. We have 
1,228 non-shelf offers left after excluding SEOs through shelf registrations. 
We calculate abnormal stock returns by subtracting the CRSP value-weighted 
market returns from a firm’s daily returns.105 We compute 3-day CARs during the 
window encompassed by event days (-1, +1), where event day 0 is the SEO 
announcement date. Studies on SEO announcement returns often use the SEO filing date 
as the announcement date. Kim and Purnanandam (2009) find that sometimes the initial 
announcement date in Factiva is different from the filing date recorded by SDC, but 
typically is off by no more than two trading days. To identify the correct announcement 
date, we use a correction procedure based on trading volume. Our assumption is that the 
trading volume immediately after the SEO announcement would be abnormally higher 
than the company’s typical daily trading volume. Among the 5 trading days from 2 days 
before the filing date to 2 days after the filing date, we compare the date with the largest 
trading volume and the filing date. If they are different and the volume on the former date 
is more than twice the average daily volume over the previous 90 trading days, we select 
the date with the largest trading volume as the announcement date. Otherwise, we treat 
the filing date provided by SDC as the correct announcement date.   
                                                 
105 We prefer this approach over the market model approach because the post-restatement announcement 
abnormal return patterns could bias the coefficient estimates of the market model. Our results, however, are 
robust to using the abnormal returns estimated from the market model.  
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The mean (median) three-day CAR is -1.73% (-1.86%), both significantly 
different from zero with p-values less than 0.001. These statistics are also similar to those 
reported by Gao and Ritter (2010) and Kim and Purnanandam (2009). Table IV.13 
presents the results from OLS regressions of announcement returns. The dependent 
variable is the three-day CAR over the event window (-1, +1) in percentage points. Our 
key independent variable in column (1) is the indicator for restatements. We find that it 
has a negative coefficient estimate that is insignificant. In column (2), we replace the 
restatement dummy variable with the error dummy and irregularity dummy. We find that 
the coefficient of the error dummy is insignificant, but the indicator for irregularity 
restatements has a coefficient of -3.108 that is significant with a p-value of 0.040. In 
column (3), we only include the irregularity dummy, and its coefficient barely changes in 
both magnitude and statistical significance from column (2). It appears that ceteris 
paribus, the announcement returns of SEOs by irregularity restatement firms on average 
are significantly lower by over 3%. This is substantial considering the typical SEO 
announcement returns. Overall, the evidence on announcement returns suggests that the 
market reacts more negatively to SEO announcements made by firms that intentionally 
misreported financial statements, adding to the higher issuance costs of these firms.  
IV.4. Conclusion 
We examine whether prior financial reporting violations affect the terms of 
underwriting contracts between firms and investment banks in SEOs. Financial 
misrepresentation undermines the credibility of a firm’s future financial disclosure and 
reduces its appeal to potential capital providers. As a result, its stock offering requires 
greater due diligence, certification, marketing and placement efforts from underwriters. 
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In response, investment banks demand higher gross spreads as compensation for the 
additional work and risk involved. Such an offering also entails choosing a syndicate 
structure and an underwriting process that are conducive to creating more investor 
demand. 
We find strong support for these conjectures. Specifically, firms that restated 
earnings due to deliberate manipulations subsequently pay higher underwriting fees 
(about 10-20% in relative terms or 50-100 basis points in absolute terms), and the relation 
is robust to controlling for issuing firm fixed-effects. The effect of restatements on 
underwriting fees is more pronounced for larger offerings, but declines as more time 
elapses without further reporting violations and as firms implement more corporate 
governance improvements. In addition, SEOs of restatement firms tend to be 
underwritten by larger syndicates with more lead managers through the traditional book 
building process rather than the faster and cheaper accelerated process. Compounding 
these costly features of underwriting contracts, we also find that the stock market reacts 
more negatively to SEO announcements of restatement firms. 
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Table IV.1. Frequency of SEOs by offer year 
The sample consists of 2,337 firm-commitment underwritten seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008. To be included in the sample, an SEO has to 
satisfy the following criteria: it is a firm-commitment offer; the size of the offering is at 
least $10 million; the offer price is no less than $5; the proportion of secondary shares 
offered is less than 100%; the issuer has financial statement information available from 
Compustat and stock return data from CRSP. Rights issues, unit offerings, closed-end 
fund offerings, and simultaneous international offerings are also excluded. 
Offer 
Year 
Number 
of SEOs 
Number of 
SEOs by 
restatemen
t firms 
Number of SEOs by 
firms that restated due to 
accounting  errors 
Number of SEOs by firms 
that restated due to 
intentional manipulation 
1997 413 1 1 0 
1998 214 2 2 0 
1999 142 3 3 0 
2000 137 3 2 1 
2001 137 6 4 2 
2002 157 11 9 2 
2003 201 18 12 6 
2004 252 34 28 6 
2005 185 34 30 4 
2006 188 32 27 5 
2007 165 29 24 5 
2008 146 29 20 9 
Total 2337 202 162 40 
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Table IV.2. Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 2,337 firm-commitment underwritten seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008. To be included in the sample, an SEO has to 
satisfy the following criteria: it is a firm-commitment offer; the size of the offering is at 
least $10 million; the offer price is no less than $5; the proportion of secondary shares 
offered is less than 100%; the issuer has financial statement information available from 
Compustat and stock return data from CRSP. Rights issues, unit offerings, closed-end 
fund offerings, and simultaneous international offerings are also excluded. 
Panel A Full sample Non-restatement firms Restatement firms 
(N=2337) (N=2135) (N=202) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Spread 0.049 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.045 0.048 
Offering size ($ mil) 170 80 145 77 442 116 
Relative offer size 0.225 0.177 0.226 0.181 0.217 0.145 
No. of managers 3.998 4 3.892 3 4.98 4 
No. of lead managers 1.428 1 1.398 1 1.748 1 
Lead manager rank 7.745 8 7.727 8 7.99 8.367 
Total assets ($ mil) 8126 381 5633 356 34481 870 
Market cap ($ mil) 1811 497 1508 475 5013 750 
Leverage 0.315 0.302 0.312 0.296 0.347 0.344 
Tobin’s q 2.55 1.507 2.606 1.513 1.962 1.456 
ROA -0.03 0.023 -0.032 0.024 -0.002 0.021 
Stock return volatility (%) 3.204 2.851 3.232 2.889 2.914 2.604 
Share turnover (%) 0.591 0.392 0.566 0.377 0.862 0.664 
 Panel B Error firms Irregularity firms 
(N=162) (N=40) 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Spread 0.045 0.049 0.044 0.044 
Offering size ($ mil) 363 106 761 176 
Relative offer size 0.231 0.145 0.159 0.143 
No. of managers 4.66 4 5.275 5 
No. of lead managers 1.611 1 2.3 2 
Lead manager rank 7.951 8 8.152 8.619 
Total assets ($ mil) 21316 711 87803 2036 
Market cap ($ mil) 3402 708 11536 1464 
Leverage 0.349 0.348 0.335 0.335 
Tobin’s q 2.066 1.499 1.537 1.264 
ROA -0.013 0.02 0.042 0.026 
Stock return volatility (%) 2.939 2.624 2.81 2.57 
Share turnover (%) 0.867 0.674 0.843 0.655 
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Table IV.3. Regression analyses of gross spreads 
The sample consists of 2,337 firm-commitment underwritten seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008. The dependent variable is the log 
transformation of gross spread per share as a percent of the offer price. The key 
explanatory variable in column (1) is an indicator that is equal to one for SEOs by firms 
that have restated earnings at the time of the offering, regardless of whether the 
restatements are due to errors or irregularities. In column (2) and (3), the restatement 
dummy is replaced by an indicator for restatements due to errors (i.e. unintentional 
misstatements) and an indicator for restatements due to irregularities (i.e. deliberate 
misreporting).  Definitions of other explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. In 
parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on 
two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year and industry fixed 
effects are included in the first two regressions, while year and issuer fixed-effects are 
included in the third regression. 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS 
Restatement -0.025   
 (0.479)   
Restatement due to error  -0.054 -0.086 
  (0.188) (0.345) 
Restatement due to irregularity  0.099*** 0.192** 
  (0.002) (0.030) 
Log(Principal amount) -0.026* -0.026* 0.023 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.539) 
Log(Total assets) -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.107*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
Leverage -0.001 0.002 0.067 
 (0.983) (0.970) (0.588) 
Tobin’s q -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.017** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) 
ROA -0.029 -0.030 0.050 
 (0.190) (0.173) (0.609) 
Stock return volatility 0.012** 0.013** -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.515) 
Share turnover  -0.023* -0.022* -0.005 
 (0.065) (0.070) (0.910) 
NYSE listing -0.066** -0.064** 0.117 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.266) 
Shelf registration -0.059*** -0.059*** 0.040 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.457) 
Lead manager rank -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 
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 (0.110) (0.127) (0.909) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.026 -0.023 -0.017 
 (0.273) (0.325) (0.815) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Issuer fixed effects No No Yes 
Number of observations 2,337 2,337 2,337 
Adjusted-R2 0.274 0.276 0.282 
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Table IV.4. Matched-sample analyses of the effect of restatements on gross spreads 
This table is based on a matched sample of 404 seasoned equity offerings that consist of 
202 offerings by restatement firms and 202 offerings by non-restatement firms. For each 
restatement firm’s SEO, a matching SEO by a non-restatement firm is selected according 
to the following criteria: (1) the matching SEO’s offer date is between 1 year before and 
1 year after the offer date of the restatement firm’s SEO, (2) the non-restatement firm’s 
size measured by total assets falls between 75% and 125% of the restatement firm’s size, 
and (3) conditional on the first two conditions being met, the matching SEO’s offer size 
measured by principal amount is closest to that of the restatement firm’s SEO. Panels A-
C present comparisons of issue size and issuer size between restatement SEOs and their 
matching offers. Panel D presents regressions of gross spreads based on the matched 
sample. The dependent variable is the log transformation of gross spread per share as a 
percent of the offer price. The key explanatory variable in column (1) is an indicator that 
is equal to one for SEOs by firms that have restated earnings at the time of the offering, 
regardless of whether the restatements are due to errors or irregularities. In column (2), 
the restatement dummy is replaced by an indicator for restatements due to errors (i.e. 
unintentional misstatements) and an indicator for restatements due to irregularities (i.e. 
deliberate misreporting). Definitions of other explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. 
In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance 
based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year and industry 
fixed effects are included. 
Panel A: Comparison between SEOs by restatement firms and their matching SEOs 
 
 
(1) 
Restatemen
t SEOs 
(N=202) 
(2) 
Matching 
SEOs 
(N=202) 
(1)-(2) 
Difference 
p-value for 
tests in 
difference 
Total Assets  
(in millions $) 
Mean 34481 34559 -78 0.997 
Median 870 791 79 0.882 
Principal 
Amount 
(in millions $) 
Mean 442 338 104 0.435 
Median 116 117 -1 0.962 
Panel B: Comparison between SEOs by “error” restatement firms and their matching 
SEOs 
 
 
(1) 
Restatement 
SEOs 
(N=162) 
(2) 
Matching 
SEOs 
(N=162) 
(1)-(2) 
Difference 
p-value for 
tests in 
difference 
Total Assets  
(in millions $) 
Mean 21316 21576 -260 0.895 
Median 711 726 -15 0.876 
Principal 
Amount 
(in millions $) 
Mean 363 275 88 0.511 
Median 106 108 -2 0.976 
Panel C: Comparison between SEOs by “irregularity” restatement firms and their 
matching SEOs 
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(1) 
Restatement 
SEOs 
(N=40) 
(2) 
Matching 
SEOs 
(N=40) 
(1)-(2) 
Difference 
p-value for 
tests in 
difference 
Total Assets  
(in millions $) 
Mean 87803 87138 665 0.991 
Median 2036 1643 393 0.881 
Principal 
Amount 
(in millions $) 
Mean 761 594 167 0.670 
Median 176 165 11 0.999 
Panel D: OLS regressions of gross spreads using the matched samples 
 (1) (2) 
Restatement -0.001  
 (0.975)  
Restatement due to error  -0.028 
  (0.548) 
Restatement due to irregularity  0.117** 
  (0.039) 
Log(Principal amount) 0.008 0.011 
 (0.877) (0.827) 
Log(Total assets) -0.088*** -0.096*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.142 0.153 
 (0.259) (0.226) 
Tobin’s q -0.018* -0.019* 
 (0.078) (0.077) 
ROA -0.070 -0.084 
 (0.313) (0.251) 
Stock return volatility 0.022 0.024 
 (0.392) (0.344) 
Share turnover  -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.903) (0.959) 
NYSE listing -0.145* -0.137* 
 (0.064) (0.074) 
Shelf registration -0.123*** -0.121*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Lead manager rank -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.352) (0.352) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.031 -0.018 
 (0.648) (0.792) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 404 404 
Adjusted-R2 0.272 0.277 
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Table IV.5. Controlling for issuer corporate governance 
The sample used for column (1) consists of 425 firm-commitment underwritten seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008 that have information on 
antitakeover provisions from IRRC. The sample used for column (2) consists of 365 firm-
commitment underwritten seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 
2008 that have information on board characteristics from IRRC. The dependent variable 
is the log transformation of gross spread per share as a percent of the offer price. 
Definitions of explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. In parentheses are p-values 
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and issuer 
clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all 
regressions.  
 (1) OLS (2) OLS 
   
Restatement due to error -0.117 -0.074 
 (0.215) (0.475) 
Restatement due to irregularities 0.188** 0.278*** 
 (0.018) (0.004) 
GIM index 0.007  
 (0.440)  
Board Size  0.012 
  (0.295) 
Percentage of independent directors  0.196 
  (0.241) 
 CEO/Chairman duality  0.037 
  (0.471) 
Log(Principal amount) 0.018 0.070 
 (0.714) (0.199) 
Log(Total assets) -0.120*** -0.144*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.195 0.015 
 (0.162) (0.928) 
Tobin’s q -0.066*** -0.077*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
ROA -0.116 -0.005 
 (0.580) (0.987) 
Stock return volatility 0.038 0.029 
 (0.271) (0.541) 
Share turnover  -0.003 -0.061 
 (0.944) (0.345) 
NYSE listing  -0.051 -0.045 
 (0.496) (0.656) 
Shelf registration -0.082 -0.053 
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 (0.165) (0.440) 
Lead manager rank -0.026 -0.039 
 (0.253) (0.140) 
Percentage of secondary shares 0.197 0.017 
 (0.184) (0.881) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 425 365 
Adjusted-R2 0.211 0.192 
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Table IV.6. Controlling for analyst forecast variables 
The sample consists of 1,767 firm-commitment underwritten seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008 that have information on analyst forecast 
dispersion from I/B/E/S. The dependent variable is the log transformation of gross spread 
per share as a percent of the offer price. Analyst forecast dispersion is the standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts of current-fiscal-year earnings in the month before the SEO 
offer date, scaled by the stock price. Analyst coverage is the number of analysts issuing 
earnings forecasts in the month prior to the SEO offer date. Mean earnings forecast is the 
average analyst forecast of current-fiscal-year earnings in the month before the SEO, 
scaled by the book value of assets per share. Definitions of other explanatory variables 
are in Appendix IV.A. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical 
significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year 
and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
 (1) OLS (2) OLS 
   
Restatement due to error -0.016 -0.040 
 (0.688) (0.406) 
Restatement due to irregularities  0.072** 
  (0.042) 
Forecast dispersion 1.299*** 1.287*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Analyst coverage -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.027) (0.031) 
Mean earnings forecast -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.556) (0.578) 
Log(Principal amount) -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.263) (0.258) 
Log(Total assets) -0.060*** -0.062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.031 -0.030 
 (0.512) (0.535) 
Tobin’s q -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.820) (0.814) 
Stock return volatility 0.006 0.006 
 (0.362) (0.351) 
Share turnover  -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.397) (0.425) 
NYSE listing  -0.074** -0.071** 
 (0.034) (0.039) 
Shelf registration -0.045* -0.045* 
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 (0.075) (0.075) 
Lead manager rank -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.440) (0.440) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.019 -0.018 
 (0.485) (0.510) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,767 1,767 
Adjusted-R2 0.277 0.278 
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Table IV.7. Controlling for accruals quality measures 
The sample in column (1) consists of 1,254 firm-commitment seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008 that have necessary data for estimating the pre-
SEO abnormal accruals based on the modified Jones (1991) model. The sample in 
column (2) consists of 1,162 firm-commitment seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. 
firms from 1997 to 2008 that have necessary data for estimating the Dechow-Dichev 
(2002) accruals quality measure. The dependent variable is the log transformation of 
gross spread per share as a percent of the offer price. Definitions of explanatory variables 
are in Appendix IV.A. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical 
significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year 
and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS 
   
Restatement due to error -0.033 -0.073 
 (0.468) (0.111) 
Restatement due to irregularities 0.155*** 0.085** 
 (0.000) (0.031) 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals 0.033*  
 (0.060)  
Dechow-Dichev accruals quality measure  0.669*** 
  (0.000) 
Log(Principal amount) -0.019 -0.047** 
 (0.304) (0.025) 
Log(Total assets) -0.109*** -0.062*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.088* 0.055 
 (0.099) (0.321) 
Tobin’s q -0.017*** -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.012 0.005 
 (0.574) (0.901) 
Stock return volatility -0.004 0.028*** 
 (0.606) (0.002) 
Share turnover  -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.165) (0.190) 
NYSE listing  -0.061** -0.098*** 
 (0.031) (0.000) 
Shelf registration -0.004 -0.086*** 
 (0.868) (0.000) 
Lead manager rank 0.005 0.002 
 (0.429) (0.848) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.004 0.007 
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 (0.861) (0.860) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,254 1,162 
Adjusted-R2 0.398 0.294 
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Table IV.8. Correcting for self-selection bias 
Panel A presents the first-stage probit analysis of SEO issuance decision based on 74,910 
firm-year observations from the Compustat universe during the period of 1997 to 2008. 
The dependent variable is equal to one if a firm issues SEO in a given year and zero 
otherwise. Panel B presents the second-stage OLS regression of gross spreads based on a 
sample of 2,337 SEOs from 1997 to 2008. The dependent variable is the log 
transformation of gross spread per share as a percent of the offer price. IMR is the inverse 
Mills’ ratio constructed based on the coefficient estimates of the probit model in Panel A. 
Definitions of other explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. In parentheses are p-
values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and issuer 
clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. 
Panel A: First-stage probit regression of SEO issuance decisions 
  
Restatement due to error 0.018 
 (0.605) 
Restatement due to irregularities -0.138 ** 
 (0.037) 
Log(Total assets) 0.026*** 
 (0.000) 
Leverage 0.350*** 
 (0.000) 
Tobin’s q 0.008*** 
 (0.000) 
ROA 0.073*** 
 (0.000) 
Stock return volatility -0.062*** 
 (0.000) 
Buy-and-hold market-adjusted return during the past year 0.101*** 
(0.000) 
Dividend paying status (dummy)  
-0.101*** 
(0.000) 
Cash/Total assets 0.264*** 
 (0.000) 
Capital expenditure/Total assets 0.484*** 
 (0.000) 
  
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Number of observations 74,910 
Pseudo-R2 0.060 
Panel B: Second-stage OLS regression of gross spreads 
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Restatement due to 
irregularities 
0.102*** 
 (0.001) 
IMR -0.223** 
 (0.026) 
Log(Principal amount) -0.023 
 (0.112) 
Log(Total assets) -0.080*** 
 (0.000) 
Leverage 0.018 
 (0.655) 
Tobin’s q -0.014*** 
 (0.000) 
ROA -0.033 
 (0.145) 
Stock return volatility 0.012** 
 (0.028) 
Share turnover  -0.022* 
 (0.067) 
NYSE listing  -0.066** 
 (0.020) 
Shelf registration -0.059*** 
 (0.002) 
Lead manager rank -0.009 
 (0.118) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.024 
 (0.315) 
  
Year fixed effects Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Number of observations 2,337 
Adjusted-R2 0.275 
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Table IV.9. Variation along offering size and time lapse since restatement 
The sample consists of 2,337 firm-commitment underwritten seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008. The dependent variable is the log 
transformation of gross spread per share as a percent of the offer price. Definitions of 
explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. In parentheses are p-values based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, 
**, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
 (1) OLS (2) OLS 
   
Irregularity restatement * Indicator for SEOs 
with relative offer size above sample median 
0.149***  
(0.002)  
Irregularity restatement * Indicator for SEOs 
with relative offer size below sample median 
0.053  
(0.160)  
Irregularity restatement * Indicator for 
restatements within the past 3 years 
 
 0.157*** 
 (0.001) 
Irregularity restatement * Indicator for 
restatements over 3 years ago 
 0.034 
 (0.351) 
Log(Principal amount) -0.034** -0.034** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Log(Total assets) -0.075*** -0.075*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.001 0.001 
 (0.972) (0.977) 
Tobin’s q -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.055** -0.054** 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Stock return volatility 0.008 0.008 
 (0.172) (0.175) 
Share turnover  -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.102) (0.102) 
NYSE listing  -0.064** -0.064** 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Shelf registration -0.061*** -0.062*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Lead manager rank -0.012** -0.012** 
(0.042) (0.042) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.026 -0.026 
 (0.259) (0.246) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,337 2,337 
Adjusted-R2 0.275 0.276 
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Table IV.10. Variation along corporate governance improvements 
The sample consists of 2,337 firm-commitment underwritten seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008. The dependent variable is the log 
transformation of gross spread per share as a percent of the offer price. Definitions of 
explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. In parentheses are p-values based on 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, 
**, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions.  
 (1) OLS (2) OLS 
   
Restatement due to irregularity 0.147*** 0.168*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Irregularity restatement * Change in the 
percentage of independent directors 
-0.281**  
(0.029)  
Irregularity restatement * Proportion of audit 
committee members who departed after 
restatement 
 -0.160* 
 (0.052) 
Log(Principal amount) -0.026* -0.026* 
 (0.070) (0.072) 
Log(Total assets) -0.079*** -0.079*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.002 0.002 
 (0.966) (0.955) 
Tobin’s q -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.032 -0.033 
 (0.149) (0.148) 
Stock return volatility 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.024) (0.021) 
Share turnover  -0.023* -0.023* 
 (0.058) (0.060) 
NYSE listing  -0.065** -0.065** 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Shelf registration -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Lead manager rank -0.010 -0.010 
(0.114) (0.112) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.386) (0.392) 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,337 2,337 
Adjusted-R2 0.275 0.275 
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Table IV.11. Regression analyses of underwriting syndicate size 
The sample consists of 2,337 firm-commitment seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by U.S. 
firms from 1997 to 2008. The dependent variable in column (1) and (2) is the number of 
all managers in an underwriting syndicate.  The dependent variable in column (3) and (4) 
is the number of lead managers in an underwriting syndicate. The key explanatory 
variable in column (1) and (3) is an indicator that is equal to one for SEOs by firms that 
have restated earnings at the time of the offering. In column (2) and (4), the restatement 
dummy is replaced by an indicator for restatements due to errors (i.e. unintentional 
misstatements) and an indicator for restatements due to irregularities (i.e. deliberate 
misreporting). Definitions for other explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. In 
parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on 
two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year and industry fixed 
effects are included in all regressions. 
 Number of all managers Number of lead managers 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS 
Restatement 0.059  -0.019  
 (0.814)  (0.776)  
Restatement due to error  -0.140  -0.122* 
  (0.610)  (0.069) 
Restatement due to 
irregularity  
0.893*  0.414** 
  (0.081)  (0.034) 
Log(Principal amount) 1.372*** 1.372*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total assets) -0.069 -0.080 0.038* 0.032* 
 (0.416) (0.340) (0.053) (0.090) 
Leverage -0.105 -0.089 0.124* 0.132** 
 (0.679) (0.727) (0.056) (0.039) 
Tobin’s q 0.002 0.002 -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.908) (0.905) (0.019) (0.020) 
ROA -0.066 -0.075 -0.030 -0.035 
 (0.711) (0.670) (0.614) (0.555) 
Stock return volatility -0.092* -0.091* 0.021* 0.022* 
 (0.069) (0.073) (0.095) (0.082) 
Share turnover  -0.109 -0.106 -0.047 -0.046 
 (0.421) (0.432) (0.144) (0.150) 
NYSE listing  0.298** 0.308** 0.137*** 0.143*** 
 (0.039) (0.031) (0.002) (0.001) 
Shelf registration -0.107 -0.108 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.339) (0.343) (0.955) (0.954) 
Percentage of secondary 
shares 
0.103 0.121 0.107* 0.116** 
 (0.554) (0.489) (0.054) (0.036) 
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Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,337 2,337 2,337 2,337 
Adjusted-R2 0.348 0.350 0.316 0.322 
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Table IV.12. Marginal effects from probit analyses of offering method choices 
The sample consists of 2,337 firm-commitment seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and 
471 accelerated SEOs made by U.S. firms between 1997 and 2008. The dependent 
variable is equal to one for accelerated offerings and zero otherwise. The key explanatory 
variable in column (1) is an indicator that is equal to one for SEOs by firms that have 
restated earnings at the time of the offering. In column (2) and (3), the restatement 
dummy is replaced by an indicator for restatements due to errors (i.e. unintentional 
misstatements) and an indicator for restatements due to irregularities (i.e. deliberate 
misreporting).  Definitions for other explanatory variables are in Appendix IV.A. In 
parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White 
(1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on 
two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year and industry fixed 
effects are included in all regressions. 
 (1) Probit (2) Probit (3) Probit 
    
Restatement -0.025   
 (0.077)   
Restatement due to error  -0.016  
  (0.342)  
Restatement due to irregularity  -0.057** -0.056** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Principal amount) -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total assets) 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.866) (0.881) (0.870) 
Tobin’s q 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
ROA -0.067** -0.066** -0.067** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) 
Stock return volatility -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Share turnover  0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
NYSE listing  0.058*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Percentage of secondary shares -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.164*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,808 2,808 2,808 
Pesudo-R2 0.222 0.222 0.221 
162 
 
Table IV.13. Regression analyses of SEO announcement returns 
The sample consists of 1,228 non-shelf firm-commitment seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008. The dependent variable is the issuer’s 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return in percentage points around the SEO announcement date. 
The key explanatory variable in column (1) is an indicator that is equal to one for SEOs 
by firms that have restated earnings at the time of the offering. In column (2) and (3), the 
restatement dummy is replaced by an indicator for restatements due to errors (i.e. 
unintentional misstatements) and an indicator for restatements due to irregularities (i.e. 
deliberate misreporting). Definitions for other explanatory variables are in Appendix 
IV.A. In parentheses are p-values based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
(White (1980)) and issuer clustering. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance 
based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Year and industry 
fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS 
Restatement -0.938   
 (0.335)   
Restatement due to error  -0.496  
  (0.654)  
Restatement due to irregularity  -3.108** -3.068** 
  (0.040) (0.042) 
Log(Principal amount) 0.379 0.386 0.385 
 (0.364) (0.356) (0.357) 
Log(Total assets) -0.048 -0.043 -0.042 
 (0.856) (0.872) (0.876) 
Leverage 0.360 0.358 0.345 
 (0.755) (0.757) (0.766) 
Tobin’s q 0.027 0.025 0.026 
 (0.828) (0.839) (0.834) 
ROA 1.755 1.773 1.768 
 (0.332) (0.328) (0.329) 
Stock return volatility 0.263 0.266 0.264 
 (0.237) (0.232) (0.236) 
NYSE listing 0.118 0.111 0.107 
 (0.835) (0.845) (0.850) 
Lead manager rank 0.100 0.098 0.096 
 (0.607) (0.616) (0.621) 
Percentage of secondary shares -1.950** -1.978** -1.968** 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 
Adjusted-R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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Appendix IV.A. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
 
Restatement Dummy variable: 1 for firms that restated earnings prior to the SEO, 0 otherwise. 
Restatement due to 
errors 
Dummy variable: 1 for restatements due to unintentional 
errors, 0 otherwise. 
Restatement due to 
irregularities 
Dummy variable: 1 for restatements due to intentional 
manipulations, 0 otherwise.   
Gross spread Underwriting fee per share divided by the SEO offer price. 
CAR(-1,+1) 
Three-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage) 
surrounding the SEO announcement calculated by subtracting 
the CRSP value-weighted returns from a firm’s daily returns. 
Offer size Log of principal amount (in $ mil) offered. 
Relative offer size Number of shares offered divided by number of shares outstanding 
Shelf registrations Dummy variable: 1 for shelf offers, 0 otherwise. 
Lead manager 
reputation The Carter and Manaster (1990) ranking updated by Jay Ritter. 
Firm size Log of book value of total assets (data6) 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets over book value of assets: (data6-data60+data25*data199)/data6 
Leverage  Book value of debts (data34+data9) over book value of assets (data6) 
ROA Net income (data 172) over book value of assets (data 6) 
Share turnover 
The ratio of the average daily trading volume during the 250 
trading days prior to the offer date over existing shares 
outstanding.  
Stock return volatility The standard deviation of daily stock returns during the 250 trading days prior to the offer date. 
NYSE listing Dummy variable: 1 for firms listed on the NYSE, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix IV.B. Construction of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
 We follow the prior literature and estimate discretionary accruals using a 
modified Jones (1991) model specified as follows: 
TAit /Ait-1 = β1 × (1/Ait-1) + β2 × [(ΔSALESit – ΔRECit)/Ait-1] + β3 × (PPEit/Ait-1) + eit,  
where TAit is firm i’s total accruals in year t, computed using the statement of cash flows 
information as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (Compustat data 123) and operating cash flows from continuing 
operations (data 308 – data 124). Hribar and Collins (2002) show that accruals estimated 
this way are more accurate than those estimated based on successive balance sheets. We 
obtain quantitatively similar results using accruals estimated from balance sheet data. Ait-1 
is the book value of total assets (data 6) at the beginning of year t, ΔSALESit is the change 
in sales (data 12) during year t, ΔRECit is the change in accounts receivable (data 2) 
during year t, and PPEit is the book value of property, plant, and equipment (data 7) in 
year t.   
 We estimate the modified Jones model cross-sectionally using all Compustat 
firms for each year and Fama-French 48-industry cohort that has at least 10 observations. 
The modified-Jones model discretionary accruals are simply the residuals from the 
regressions. Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) show that performance can be correlated 
with the discretionary accruals estimated from the variants of the Jones model and the 
reliability of inferences can be enhanced by using performance-matched discretionary 
accruals. For each company in our sample, we select a control firm in the same Fama-
French industry with the closest return on assets (ROA) computed as the ratio of net 
income (data 172) over the book value of total assets (data 6) at the end of the pre-SEO 
fiscal year. The performance-matched discretionary accruals is defined as the difference 
between the sample firm’s modified-Jones model discretionary accruals and the matched 
firm’s modified-Jones model discretionary accruals. 
 
 
